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INTRODLCTION 
Following decades of attempts to overhaul the federal system of poor relief, 
President Clinton signed a bill in 1996 that dramatically reformed "welfare as 
we know it" by repealing the New Deal program of Aid for Families vvith 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and replacing it with Temporary Ass istance for 
Needy Families (TANF). Although the revi sed statute left some wel Care~ 
programs untouched,
1 
it transformed poor relief for most families by 
incorporating strict time limits and manclatury work requirements. The 
iife tirne limit on cash assistance for families is now fixed at sixty months. 
Recipients must engage in part-time work and move toward full-time 
em ployment to remain qualified for benefits.' In the wake of these reforms. 
many beneficiaries have left the welfare rolls altogether, while many others 
receive some public assistance to supplement their (often meager) earmngs at 
low-wage jobs. 
The enactment of TANF represents the triumph of the familiar distinction 
between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor. That distinction rests on the 
·vvidespread and popular view that the able-bodied should work and that public 
assistance should be available only to those who cannot work or who cannot 
support themselves by working. Although the historical absence of poor relief 
for able-bodied men shows that this paradigm has always held sway in the 
United States, TANF extends its hold by imposing work requirements on 
care takers of children-most importantly single mothers. The categories of 
''deserving" and "undeserving" are now applied regardless of sex. 
1 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 10-1-193. 
liO Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § !305 (20001) (leaving in place some means-tested. in-kind 
programs (ivledicaid and food stamps) and maintaining the basic clements of the federal program for the poor, 
disabled, and elderly (SSI)). 
2 See HELEN I-IERSHKOcF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR 32-5-1 ( 1997) (providing a 
broaJ analysis of rights and restrictions unJer TANF); DAN BLOOM. AFIER AFDC. WELF.·\Rlo-TO- WORK 
CHOICES AND CHALLENGES FOR STATES 74-77, amilul1le or http://www.mdrc.org/Repoi1s/AfterAFDC/ 
.'\ftcr'k 20AFDC.htm (last visited Feb. 8. 2003) (documenting state increases in earned-income disregards and 
consequences for '"work plus welfare'· combinations). Revisions to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act arc now 
under consideration in Congress (though temporarily stalled in the Senate). and President Bush has 
recommended strengthening the statute"s work requirements. See Mike Allen, Bush Pushes Bigger Workload 
fen Wefj(u·e Recipients. WASH. POST, May 14, 2002, at AS; Robert Pear. House Pmses a Welfclre Bill 1vitli 
Srricta Rules on Work. N.Y. TIMES. May 17, 2002. at A I: Shawn Frcmstacl et a!., Sulll!ii{IIT CoinJWrison of 
TANF Reaurlwri~ation Pu>~'isions: Bills Passed bv Senmc Finuncc Collunirree ond the House of 
Rerresenwrin:s, and Relared Pmrosols. at http://www.cbpp.org/7-2-02tanf.pclf (last updated on August 9. 
2002): see also Robert Pear. House Endorses Srricler \Vork Rulesfi1r rile Poor, N.Y. T!M[S, Feb. I-I, 2003, at 
25. 
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As argued previously ,' the various reforms introd uced by the enactment of 
T ANF represent a convergence towards a consensus model of "conditional 
reciprocity" under whi ch individuals are expected to co ntribute to their ow n 
support through paid empl oy ment if they are ab le, with the government owin g 
nothing to those who could contribute but do not. This model allows 
indi v idual s to establi sh themse lves as "dese rving·' of pub lic ass istance by 
making a reasonabl e contributi on to the ir own eco nomic support, but obligates 
the government to ·'m :1 ke up the difference' ' if complete self-sufficiency ca nnot 
be atta ined throu gh rcason::tb !e , good fa ith efforts ." 
Fe w outside th e academy ope nly ques ti on the reigning tenet that the 
government should he lp onl y those who help themse lves . Politically there is 
w idespread acceptance of the idea that the ··quid pro quo" for public assi stance 
is the willingness to pe rform some kind of ga inful act ivity . Objectio ns to 
we lfare reform are rare ly couched as a full fro nt:.tl assault on the idea that 
government should require work as a condition of welfare,' and unqualified 
arguments that public ass istance should be made ava il ab le to the poor-or to 
everyone-regardless of work effort s are rare ly vo iced in the United States 
today.
6 
See Amy Wax. A ReciJnocol \Veljirre Progru111. 8 VA. J. Soc. PoL ·Y & L. 477 (2001) [herein after. 
Wax. A Reciprocal We/jim· Progru111 l; Amy Wax. Rerhinking Wclfirre Rigl11s: Reciprocitr Norms, Reocril'e 
Arrirudes. and rile Polilical EuJ/IOIIrY oj' Weljirre Rej(mn. 63 L\ IV & (Ot\TE\11'. PROBS. 7.57 (2000) [hereinafter. 
Wax. Rerlrinking Welfare Riglrrs]. 
4 The principal federal cash transl'er program. TANF. is struc tured to supplement earn ings through wo rk . 
Another large federal poor relie f program. the Earned Income Tax Credil. provides a refundab le tax credit fo r 
workers onl y. States have also created myriad "work-support" and "workfare" programs to supplement and 
encourage employment in the paid ec,>nomy. See, e.g .. State Policy Documentation Project. \Vod 
Req11iren rorrs: Ad11lt Basic Ed11cmio11 (AIJE). ell http://www.spdp.org/tanflabe_cs l.pdf (last moditied Ocl. 
!999). 
5 Although this di stinction between the deserv ing and undeserving is virtually unchallenged in the 
politi ca l arena, a lively politica l deba te co ntinues about who actually fall s into these categories. Most critics of 
welfare refom1 question the applicati on of work requirements to mothers or so le caretakers of young children 
on the grounds that there arc too few jobs for the unskilled. that work requiremen ts harm chi ldren, or that 
mothers should be regarded as "working already ... See discuss ion inji-a pp. 33 -34. 
6 An exception is BRUCE i\CKERMAI'\ & A"il'E ALSTOTT. THE STAKlHOLDER SOCIETY 4 ( 1999) 
(proposing an $80,000 grant to all 21-year-olds). See also Forum , Deli1-ering a Basic lnco111e. BOSTON RE V .. 
Oct. -Nov. 2000, at 4 (various comment ators), reprinred in PHI LI PE V ,\N P.-\R I.I S, WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE 
LUNC H·? (2000): Michae l Kinsley. Tire Ulrinwre Block Gmnr, NEW YORKER. i'vlay 29. 1995 . at 36. 37 
(advocat ing a guaranteed income adminis tered as part of the income tax system). 
Although championed by Milton Friedman, see C..\PITALIS"I AND FREEDOM ( !962). and James Tobin (in 
the form of a refundable negative income tax) and brietly tloa ted by the Nixon administration in a means-
tested form under the rubric of the f'am il y Ass istance Plan. see DAN IEl. P. l'vl OYl\IHAN. THE POLITI CS OF A 
GUARANTEED IN CO'VIE: TH E NIXON i\ Di\·II NISTR.'ITIOI' AND TH E FA~II LY ASSISTA NCE PLAN ( 1973), guaranteed 
income programs have never played a prominent or sustained role in the i\me1·ican welfare debate. The case 
for an unconditional bas ic income (or "demogrant" ) and its means-tes ted variants has been aired more 
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This Article examines the nonnative noti on that is central to welfare 
refo rm: that individuals must work if they are able in order to receive public 
financial support. The goa l of the Article is to analyze the politi ca ll y 
influential conviction that we lfare without work is "unfair'' or "unjust" in light 
of ideas about just societies deve loped by liberal ega litarian theorists. Can the 
popular rejection of welfare without work be squared with more sophisticated 
theori es th at seek to set forth a blueprint for j ust societies '? Is it possible to say. 
on first pri nciples, what is wrong with "something for nothing"'7 
in examining thi s ques tion, this Article relics on a critical clistincticll1 
betwee n an unconditionaL or guaranteed. basic income (UB I), and public 
fi nanc ial assistance conditioned on work. Althou gh :;ociet ies confront a 
nuanced range of option s for designing public welfare programs, the cho ices 
considered here represent con ve ni ent polar opposites for the purpose of 
analysis. Universa l work requirements are the flip side of unconditional 
assistance. A soc iety committed to providing a basic minimum standard of 
li ving to everyone regardl ess of "cleservingness" will abandon work 
requirements as a qualificat ion for receiving public aid
7 
In contrast, a society 
committed to helping on ly the "deserving" as defined by principles of 
ex tensively in Europe. Sec e.g .. SAMUEL BRITI"c\N & STEVEN WEil fl, BEYO:'o! D THE WELFARE STATE: AI' 
EXA \·II NATIO:'oi OF BASIC !'\COME II' A i'vl c\RKET l::CO:'o!Oi\IY ( 1990 ) ( m ~king the case for basic incomes); TO:'o!Y 
FITZPATRICK. FREEDOM .-\ND SECURITY: Ai' ii"TRODUCTION TO THE BAS IC INCOME DEBATE. ( 1999 ): 
HICR\110\,'E PARKER. INSTEAD Of' TH I: DOLE: AN ENQL'IRY I :-.iTO THE INTEGRATIO:'oi OF Til E T AX AN D BENEFIT 
SYSTE[\1 ( 1939): PHILIPPE VA\,' P.-\IWS. RE.-\1. FIHTD0\1 FOR ALL: WHXr (If' AN YTHI NG) CAN J USTIFY 
CA PITALISM 32-35, 112 ( 1995 ) Jhcrcina i't c: r. V .. \N P.-\R IJS. REA L FREED0\·1 FOR ALLJ (arguing fo r a basic 
income sys tem with additi onal income prov ided tu workers to comport with the '·no ti on that workers shoul u be 
adequately rewarded' ' ): TONY W.·\ LTER , BAS IC h OAIE: FREED0\ 1 FROM POVERTY, FREED0.\1 TO WORf.: 
( 1989) : Philippe Van Parijs, CmllJielillg .lit sli(icuriolls o( !iosic In come. ill ARGU ING FOR BASIC 1.:-.iCOME: 
[THI C \L FOL;NDATIONS FOR A RADICA L REFOR\1 (Van Parij s eel .. Verso 1992) (summarizing the va tying 
justifications set fot1h by proponents o f~ bas ic inco me and prov iding examples of ac tual implementations) . 
Although the idea of a uni versa l minimum has greate r currency in Europe, no European country has adopted 
an ac ross -the-board guaranteed income poli cy. Sec. e.g ., Robert E. Goodin, Work ond Weljitre: Tmmrd a 
Posr-Prnducr ivi.11 We/f(rre Reg i111e, 31 BKIT . .1. POL. Sc i. 1:<, 38 (:'00 1) (noting lhat th e Netherlands, although 
coming closes t, has incrcasingiy moved towards a system where " [eJve•yone is being pressed to do some 
work. ') . Many European coun tries provide cash subs idies of varying generos ity 10 fam ili es with children, the 
unemployed. and the di sabled through programs that would he considered Ia :-- by American standards. 
Disabi lity criteria, for example, arc app lied loosel y and unemploy ment benetits are often granted without 
ca reful scrutiny of the reasons for jobless ness. !d. at 37 I remark ing th at di sabi li ty benefits were even used to 
"buy out" surplus labor in the Netherlands). 
7 A program that guarantees bas ic income without work requirements- in contrast to one that requires 
work - can be ei ther means-tested or non-means -tcsled. In the latter case, everyone would rece ive a basic 
demugranl, regardless of level of earned income. In the former case , on ly the poor would receive aid, bu t 
ass i s t ~m ce would be offered regardl ess of th e reason for poverty. "n1osc poor through misfortune or by choice 
would be trcalcd the same. The uneclu ca ted single mother. the di sabled fo rmer steelworker, 1he educated 
bohemian performance artist. and the footl oose drifter. would all qualify for a check from the government. 
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conditional reciproc ity will reject the optio n o f es tabli sh ing a minimum level 
of cash assistance for all and will require the able-bodied to work for their 
benefits . 
This di sc uss ion shows th at anothe r way to ask whet he r liberal soc iet ies 
should adopt polici es that condition public ass istance on work is to ana lyze 
whether an unconditional basic income is more consistent than work 
requirements with fundamental principles for governing just soc iet ies . 
Objections commonly vo iced against unconditional ass is tance genera ll y and 
income guarantees in particular arc that they "exploit" workers, li cense "free 
riding ," unfairly favor idle free loaders ove r upstanding, industrious citizens. 
run contrary to sound noti ons of "desert." and violate basic principles of soc ial 
reciprocity. Drawing on the work of libe ral egalitarian political theorists such 
as John Rawl s, Ronald Dworkin . Philippe Van Parij s, E li zabeth Anderson, and 
othe rs, this Article investigates whether sense can be made of these objections 
within the analyti c frameworks established by standard liberal theories of 
justice, with an e mphasi s on co ntractari an approaches so dominant in this 
arena. Should an uncondition a l income be a central feature of a truly just 
society, or would basic tenets common to such soc ieties rule o ut this 
arrangement? Alternatively, should a guaranteed, universal basic income be 
regarded as one option amon g many that comport with basic principles of 
justice and that a fair society mig ht choose to adopt? If so, under what 
conditions? 
The Article does not attempt an exhaustive exploration of issues bearing on 
the design of fair systems of resource allocation or of just social wel fare 
policies. Although it draws on more general analyses of allocational issues as 
well as on specific di scussion s of the fairness of guaranteed benefits and work 
requirements, its focus is on a choice between starkly contrasting options for 
public welfare policy that confronts western liberal societi es today. The goal is 
to bring together and sy nthes ize theoretical approaches with the ai m of 
determining whether common intuitions are vindicated by, or are consistent 
with , the basic commitments that inform conceptions of just societies within 
the liberal theoretical framework . 
The Article concludes that, al though the work of liberal theorists offers 
valuable perspectives on the normative question of w hether just societies 
should guarantee everyone minimal financial support, a definitive answer 
remains elusive. Any notion th at transferring earnings from workers to able-
bodied nonworkers is "unfair ,'' " unjust,'' or exploitative, is difficult to de ri ve 
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from the fundamental building blocks for liberal fo rmulati ons of j ust soc ie ties. 
Libera l egalitarians start from a baseline of equal initial shares of reso urces, 
skepticism about desert, and an obl igation to hold persons harmless fo r 
unlucky outcomes an d endowments (including bad upbringi ng , lack of ta lent, 
ancl even unprod uct ive temperament) that does not clearl y y ie ld a bed rock 
obli gati on to work for a living. Rather. argume nts about the fairn ess or 
unfairnes~ of placing conditions on the redi st ribution of resources tend to 
smuggle in under ivecl . foundat ional, morali s tic assumpti ons that rest on the ir 
ow n int rin s ic appeal. If these comm itments are indeed sui generis . they rnu st 
e ithe r comm~mc! o ur asse nt or fail on the ir ow n te rm s. 
The Art ic le conc ludes by drawing on an evolutionary analysis that 
specul ates on the ori gins of the politicall y prevailing view that gran ting 
benefits regard less of work licenses unfai r '·free riding.' ' T he thes is, set forth 
in prev ious work, is that the widespread tende ncy to express moralis tic 
disapprova l of the "undeserving"-defined as those who draw o n group assets 
w ithout making reasonable efforts to contribute to their ow n self-support-
may have originated in the adaptive advantages enjoyed by cultures that 
cliscouragecl free riding on collective resources .
5 
T he Article examines the 
implicat ions of this conjecture for theories of justice and most especially for 
the development of contractarian approaches that dominate liberal po litical 
thoug ht. It speculates that the tension between the stance dic tated by liberal 
theories and ordinary persons ' notions of fairness may be due to the fai lure of 
contractar ian hypotheticals to capture the condi tions that gave rise to the basic 
structu re of our moral sentiments . Hostility to freeloading may have emerged 
as a feature of hum an psychology or culture from a competitive process that 
p itted indiv idual s or groups with different behavioral strateg ies against one 
another in round after round of competition. These processes are best captured 
by dynamic, iterative models. The logic of evolutionary development is 
3 Sec Wax,;\ Reciprocal Welfare Program , supra note 3. at 483: Wax. Rethinking Welfare Rights. supm 
note 3. at ~66-67 . Recent empirical data confirms that the tendency to punish free riding, norm vio lat ions. and 
some l·unns of selfish and nonreciprocal behav ior, even at great personal cost, is a widespread and robust 
feature uf human psychology. See, e.g .. Ernst Fchr & Simon Gaclner. Altruistic Punis!tmenr in Hun wns, 4 15 
NxruRE U7. 137 (2002) [hereinafter, Fehr & Gachter, Altruistic Pun ishmen t in Humansj (showing that 
cooperation ··nourishes if altru is ti c punishment is poss ible ' ' ): Ernst Fehr & Simon Gacht~r . Cooperation ond 
Punishment i11 PuiJ/ic Goods Erperiments , 90 AM. ECOI' . REV. 980, 993 (2000) (prov id ing evidence that 
pu ni ,; hmcnt occu rs, despite personal costs, and intensifies the "more an indi vidual nega ti vely deviates from the 
contributions of the other group members ."); Karl Sigmu nd et al.. Th e ECO II O!Ilics of Fair PluY, 
SCIENT IFIC A, I.. Jan. 2002. at 83 . 87 (explaining human altruism as a function of "ach ieving biological success 
in complex soc ial networks"): see olso PAUL RUB IN, DARWtN IAC< POLIT ICS : THE EVOLUTIO NA RY ORIGINS OF 
FREEDm J40. 67-72 (2002). 
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fundamentally at odds wi th the static. one-shot thought experiments that liberal 
theorists favor. The Arti c le spt.::culatcs on the implications of this explanation 
for the diverge nce betwee n principles derived from ratio nal analysis and the 
rea liti es o f politi ca l psychology. 
l. HOvV TOT! !ii'-:K f\ i·10UT WOR K R EQUIREMENTS AN D GUA RA NTEED lNCOi\llE 
Argumc·ms for or aga inst the opposed possibiliti es of universal guaran teed 
inco me for ;dl ur work requirements for the abl e-bodi ed can be divi ded into 
those grounded in consequen ti a list or pragmatic co ncern s and those based on 
judgments thcJ\ itn~ norm ative, mora listic , or presc rip ti ve in form. The first set 
of object ion::; iooks to the economic, perso nal, and soc ial consequences of 
doling out pubii c ass istance with no st rings attached . T he second set of 
objec tions, ··.vh i! e no t heedless of practical economic and soc ial consequences, 
trea ts those L1ctors as informing ultimate judgments about fairness. Moralisti c 
and pragmatic approaches often proceed from the starting point of a market-
based economy. A lthoug h egalitarian liberal theory is centrally concerned 
with critiquing the marke t and its outcomes, most liberal theorists accept 
markets as a basic instituti on of economic life and assign them a central role in 
regulating exchange . ge nerating resources , and distributing wealth. The 
re iuc tance to jetti son thi s institution means that most di scussions of 
redi str ibution assume pub li c welfare programs w ill operate in conjunction w ith 
some kind of market-bnsed sys tem of allocation. 
The arguments that the re is something fundam entally wrong with 
unconditional basic income programs are often couched in terms that are 
mora listic, prescriptive , and universalizable: they ass ume or assert basic norms 
of conduct applicable to all. Pragmatic and consequentialist arguments, in 
co ntrast, em phasize outco mes that are linked to largel y uncontested social 
goals, such as max imi zation of wealth or well-be ing, efficiency, human self-
development, sociall y constructive behaviors, or soc ial harmony. A princi pal 
focus on the conseq uentiali st side is the size of the pie : the key issues are the 
effec t of a tax and trans fe r system on economic efficiency and the overall 
amount of resources available for distribution within society. This type of 
analysis speculates on the incentives created by di sturbing market allocations 
and on how behavior res po nds to those changes. Obviously, money to fund a 
massive redistributive undertaking like an unconditional basic income mu st 
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come from somewhere. Proponents generally ass ume it will come mainly 
from taxes on workers' income, and it will flow out either to the poor (if the 
program is means-tes ted) or to eve ryo ne (if it is not). The an a lys is mu st take 
into account individual s' beha vio ra l reactions as members o f two (vari ab ly 
overlapping) groups: those who re linquish wealth o r earnings (by paying taxes) 
and th ose who receive resou rces (by getting bene fits). The co nsequentiali st ' s 
job is to predict and canvass tho se res ponses, indi vidually and in the aggregate, 
and to assess their effec ts on the func ti o ning of the econom y. on the well -be ing 
o f indi vidual s and famili es, and o n cultural and soci a l life. 
The critical behavioral question s concern work and productivity: will the 
taxes and the benefits cau se peo ple to work Je ss?~ Which people and how 
much less? How high will the marg inal tax rate c limb? Will the resuitant rate 
structure e nd up discouraging work on the part of the most prociucti ve pe rsons 
with the greatest earning power. or will it have more impact lower down on the 
income scale? And what effect will the promised benefits have on peopl e 's 
work effort? Common sense sugges ts that a bas ic income is most likely to 
induce persons with lower earning power to cut back or quit work altogethe r. 
But common sense may deceive. A non-means-tested guaranteed basic income 
may allow persons with meager earning potenti al to "price themselves into a 
job," by relieving them of having to rely on inadequate earnings alone.
10 
But 
how many of the lowest paid or idle wi ll actua ll y respond in thi s way, and to 
what extent? 
In working through these issues, the devil is in the details, and a ll questions 
are ultimately empirica l. Everything depends on specifics , including the 
design of the benefits program, the structure and vitality of the economy, and 
the vagaries of human labor market and capital investment behavior. The 
actual mix of effects will depend on whether the guarantee is means-tes ted or 
not (since means-tested programs tend to increase effec tive marginal tax rates 
for low earners), and on whether the amount of the demogrant is more or less 
than enough for a minimally decent standard of living . It will turn on highly 
contingent details of the structure of existing labor markets, including how 
9 See. e.g., ARTH UR 0KUN, EQUA l.ITY AND EFFICIENCY: T i lE BIG TRADEOFF 96-98 ( !975 ) (nol ing the 
di!Ticu lty of assess ing such cos ts) . For a descripti on o f an attempt to answer thi s quest ion empirical ly, see 
MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFAR E: TilE POLITICAL. ECONO/\IY OF W ELFARE REFORM IN TilE UNITED STATES 102-
27 ( 1978) (describing and summing up the maj or resul ts and methodolog ical problems of basic income 
ex periments run by the Department of Health and Human Serv ices in the 1970s). 
10 Bri an Ba1Ty, Su1Ye.'" Art ide. Real Freedo111 and Basic Income, 4 J. POL . P1111.. 2-12, 243 ( 1996) ( .. Basic 
i ncome puts a noor under a!l earn ings. thus nu king j obs payi ng less than a l ivi ng wage viab le.··). 
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much those on the lowest rung of the job market can expect to earn, how many 
people occupy that position and others arrayed above it, the size of the gap 
between what most jobs pay and the guaranteed income amount, and how hard 
it is to climb the job Ltclcier and exceed the basic income amount. It will also 
turn on idiosyncratic re.~ponses to material incentives, which vary greatly as 
between inclividuals-rr;sponses economists denominate as income and 
substitution effects. Eve n people with similar earning power and economic 
prospects have very different tclStcs for leisure, work, and what money can buy. 
This means that paniculctr individuals will vary widely in their behavioral 
response to the chcmgcs in the costs of leisure that unearned cash grants create, 
or to shifts in effecti v1: marginal tax rates that redistributive programs generate 
both at the low and high end of the income scale.
11 
\Vhile guaranteed income 
may cause low-earners to work more or less , the large tax burden necessary to 
sustain such a massive program will hit hardest at the top of the income scale. 
This could have variable effects on persons with the greatest earning power, 
but may cause many of them to work, spend, save, or invest less than they 




More broadly, a guaranteed income policy could have myriad far-reaching 
and interesting effects on our social, cultural, and economic life. The 
availability of a ''free lunch'' large enough to enable people to quit the paid 
labor force without starving will likely roil low-wage labor markets, with 
potential repercussions for producers and consumers. Some individuals may 
experience a substantial positive income effect, which will raise their effective 
reservation wage for a range of jobs. Hamburger t1ippers and other low-wage 
and low-skill service workers may become harder to find at prevailing wage 
11 Robert H. FroPlk explain" 
As every basic economics textbook makes clear. ... a fall in the after-tax wage rate simply does 
not lead to an unambiguous prcdictiun about the quantity of effort supplied. Thus, whereas a 
lower real wage constitutes a reductiun in the reward for effort and hence an incentive to work 
less. it also exerts an opposing efkct: By making the individual poorer than before. it provides an 
incentive to work more to reco up his loss. Economic thcury is completely silent on the question of 
which of these t11u opposing effects will dominate. The case for [any particular outcome] must 
therefore be made on empirical grounds. 
ROBERT H. FRANK. LUXL'RY FEVER: WI tY i'v!OI'EY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 228-29 ( \999). See 
o/so FR.\"'CINE BL!IU ET AL .. THE ECOI'O\IICS Or iVI!'X WOMEI'. AND WORK I 01-02, 120 (3d ed. \998) 
(ckscribing the opposing behavioral tendencies ot· substitutiun e ffects-which cause work effort to decrease as 
wage rates ancl effective returns from work decline-and income effects- which cause work effort to increase 
1' Sec in/iu note 16 anJ accompanying discussion. 
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rate s. and employers may find themselves paying more. This cou ld make li fe 
h ~uckr for vvodc ing families employing domestic help. or drive some employers 
of !0\.v -wage workers out of bu siness. Consumers of serv ices or products 
provickd by !ow-wage workers (a group that inc ludes many low-wage vvorkers 
t ht~cn:-: c l ve :.;) may end up paying more. On the other hand, part- time options 
in;\y b,;c()me mor'~ attractive and financially feas ible for a gre<lte r number of 
indi\·id ua!s. as workers will be less concerned with finding jobs that pay 
enough to support an individual or family . i\ greater willingness to work part-
time n;ight a pancl the effective labor pooL thus potenti ;dl y driv ing clown 
,; e; c::.·: i::~m p loyers flexible enough to employ c: e,·e ral part-time workers in lieu 
uf ~! full -t i1ne worker might benefit from that shi ft in worker be havior. Two 
pa rt -t im ~: nannies, effective ly subsid ized by a basic income, might be will ing to 
\vo rl-; ft) r les:' money overall than one full-tim e caretaker. although the leve l of 
t~txation necessary to sustain the income subsidy might make it harder for well-
oft fztn1 i!ies to afford help. It is impossible to say before the fac t which of 
these effects will dominate. 
Also to be considered are the costs and drawbacks of alternati ve poor re lief 
policies a guaranteed income might supplant. Programs that condition benefits 
on "true need" carry irreducible administrative costs associated with sorting 
would-be recipients into those who are unable to make a living despite best 
efforts and those who fal l outside that categoryL' Conditiona l benefits create 
perverse incentives for workers to qualify as deserving. A universal work 
requirement may also force the government to take on the cumbersome role of 
~.: mployer of last resort by creating workfare pos itions.
11 
The value of lost 
le isure entailed by the enforcemen t of work among the un willing and the costs 
1:; Sec ,:-\nne L. AistotL ~Vork \'S. Freedom: A /)h era/ Clwll t!nge to Employment Suhsidics, lOS Y ALE L.J. 
')6 7. 972 . I 0.\3-42 ( 1999) (contrasti ng unconditional cash grant· s case o f administration with the co mplexit ies 
of qu;diticd programs ): 8 ;11Ty. Sllflrtl note 10, at 245-46 (discussi ng cl ra wb;1cks of programs based on 
contribut ions or other quali fications): T. Bes lcy & Stephen Coate. The Des ign of" lnco111e Moin tenanci' 
Pmgu11n1nes . 62 REV . ECON. STUD. 187 ( 1995) [hereinafter Bcsl y & Conte, lncolll e Muintcnwzcc Prog ran1s i: 
T. 3csky & Stephen Coate, Wo rkjizre Versus Wc!fizre: lncentil·e ;\rg unzellfs/(n \Vurk Requirc111cnts in Pm·ertY 
:\1/ct·iarion Progrwm, 82 ;\,\1. [ CON. REV. 249, 250 ( 1992) (noting the clifticulty in determining whether 
pcrsu ns :'<:ek ing aiel have deliberately reduced hours or chosen not to work altogethe r): Craig Brett, \·VIw 
Should be on \Vorkj(Jre" , 50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 607 ( 1998): Akx is DeTocqucville, Memoirs on 
i'ouf' cri.\111 . reprin ted in Pull. INTEREST. Winter 1983. at I 02. Il l (lament ing that ea rl y English cond itional 
hcnci'its pmgrams failed because "[n]othing is so dirticult to di stinguish as the nu ances which separate 
unmerited misfortune from an adversity produced by vices"). 
1 ~ !\·latihew Diller. Working \Virlwur a Job: Tile Social Messoges of rile Nnr \Vorkfczre. 9 STAN. L. & 
Po!. 'Y RE V. 19. 27 ( 1993) (d iscuss ing the potentia l creati on of a "workfare caste" unde rmining traditi onal 
cmpluyn1e1H ). 
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of employ ing persons w ith ve ry low ability and poor work hab its '' must also be 
taken in to accoun t. Finally, the effects of a lte rnative poor re lief programs on 
those at the top of the income scale must be compared . As already no ted, the 
tax inc rease that a basic income program w ill al most certainly enta il cou ld 
cause h igh-earners to work and in vest less, which may reduce the total size of 
the pic. These behav ioral effects are by no means inev itable , however.
1
(· 
That the freedom to work less could also have profound consequences for 
personali ty , characte r, and community li fe g ives ri se to bo th fear and hope. 
Many persons, tempted by id leness and dep ri ve d of the disc ipl ine of paid 
work, may fall into disorder, m ischief, vice, or ano mi .-:: . A pessimistic 
elaboration of the result ing dire socia l conseq uences underwrites the 
paremalis tic case for programs that prornote. e ncourage, and reward work.' ' 
On the other hand, some peop le might fi nd the ir lives enriched by the 
poss ibilities fo r unin terrupted leisure and previously unimaginable freedom . 
More poor women can leave hu sbands who abuse (or mere ly annoy) them, 
more mothers (and fat hers) can choose to dedicate themse lves to their children 
(or to themselves), more people can walk away from oppress ive "dead-end" 
jobs, aspiring nove lists (good, bad, or indiffe rent) can sec ure long-dreamed-of 
time to write, and anticonsumeris t beachcombers can spend their days surfing 
off Malibu . The view that guaranteed income opens des irable and humane 
possibi li ties proceeds from an Aristoteli an vision that exalts creati ve leisure 
and disparages a perfec tioni st work ethic that sees econo mically exigen t labor 
as bes t realizing hu man pote n tia l. 1 ~ But whether the Ari stote lian vision or the 
15 Besley & Coate. Income t'v!ointenonce Pwgmlils . supm no te 13. at 189 (""Poverty seems uni versally to 
be measured withou t trying to gauge the va lue ol· any lei sure enjoyed by the poor. Nor does one hear that a 
benetit o f many systems of poor support is th ~1t the recipients enjoy so much leisure ' ' ' ). See olso Kins ley. 
supm note 6, at 36 (suggesting that work requ irements will actually make wcl l.are JllOre expensi ve). 
l o See supra discuss ion pp. I 0-11: see also . e.g .. Liam Mu•·phy & Thomas Nagel , T HE IV!YTH OF 
O WN ERSHIP 135-39 (2002) (d iscussing emp ir ical ~v i dence for responses to taxa tion) : Joel Slemrod, DoEs 
ATLAS SHRUG "' (2000) (di scuss ing ev idence for and against pred icted reductions in high-earn<:!rs· effort. 
sav ings. and investment in response to taxes on wealth and income). 
l i See, e.g .. ED" IUI\D PHELPS , RE WARDING WORK: How TO RESTORE PARTICIPATION AND SELF-SUPPORT 
IN FREE ENTERPRI SE 36-48 ( 1997) (out lin ing the damage clone to families. neighborhoods. and soc iety by 
serious economic disadvantage and unemployment). 
18 For a cultural and histori ca l discuss ion of attitudes towards work, see JOANI\E B . CIULLA. T HE 
WORKING LIFE: T HE PROM ISE AN D B ETR,\ Y.·\L OF MODERN W OR K (200 1) (drawing on hi story, my thology. pop 
culture, management th eory. and practical experience): H.·\NN,\ H ARENDT. TH E Hu;vtA N CONDITION 71- 1 17 
( 1959) (discussing labor ): ANDREW LEVINE, RETHIC.: KING L JJ3ER .A L EQUALITY: FROM A ""UTOPI AN'" POINT OF 
VI EW 13-32 ( 1998) (defending a ri ght not to work based on differing concejJtions of the good life that 
emphas ize work or leisure); V AN PAR IJS. REAL FREEDOM FOR AI.L. supm note 6, at 92-130 (confront ing the 
opposing values of devotion to high income and devotion to leisure); A lstott , supra note 13. at 989-90 
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pessimistic , paternalistic one is closer to the truth Il lU SI await the k st of 
experience. Neither can be vindicated ahead of time. and the dominance of 
either depends on dynamic cultural effects that are contingen t and 
unpredictable. 
i\lthough it may be argued that the American experience with vl'cl so 
far provides little support for an optimistic vievv. a r:lcli cal clepartun-: "rom 
policies may yield greater vindication . AFDC is notorious for its <1 :-;soc imion 
with severe social disorganization. dcspomknc y. and patholog y, but it is h:_trd 
to knmv whether the culprit is the clement of ·'something for nothin g·· :_o. ; •; 'tch. 
or the preexisting cultural and social malaise ui· the per~uns \vho qctcl L l'i~ d 
these benefits coupled with the stigma of being earmarked as a soci al tailur'--'· 
A universal grant might carry very different culwral baggage and could we ll 
have less corrosive and demoralizing effects. 
In sum, although armchair speculation about the consequences of imagined 
tax and transfer programs can be useful , it is important to remembe r that 
incentives are not behavior. The magnitude, direction, and distribution of 
resulting trends simply cannot be predicted ahead of time. HO'-N each person 
would actually respond if everyone woke up tomorrow to the prospect of a 
yearly check from the government for $15,000 is something we might not wish 
to find out. But we can make suqxisingly few definitive predictions until it 
actually happens. 
The important point for our purposes is that even a rather generous 
unconditional basic income would not inevitably entail a downward spi ral into 
economic collapse and social destitution. That program is not inconsistent in 
theory with a stable economy, substantial prosperity, and high labor market 
participation rates. It is easy to imagine scenarios in which the great majority 
of people would continue to work and work hard in the teeth of even a 
substantial income guarantee. That is most likely to happen if the economy is 
robust enough to offer people of ordinary ability substantial intrinsic and 
monetary rewards from work, and most people are inclined to seek those 
rewards. In short, the behavioral effects of even a significant program of 
economic redistribution could well be fairly modest. 
(rej ecting the communitarian claim that "community values require hard worK--): Claus Olk. rut/ 
Enzplovmem: Asking rhe Wrong Quesrion ?, 42 DISSEC:T 77 ( 1995 ). 
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A ltho ugh the precise beha vioral effects of 1\FDC on wo rk and childbearing 
are a subject of great controversy,
19 
sixty years of experience with that program 
be li e the predict ion that making cash assi s tance widely ava ilable fo r the as king 
\viii necessaril y cause dram ati c. ad ve rse changes in behavio r. A FDC was not a 
universal bene fit. It was rest ri c ted almost exc lu sive ly to s ingl e pare nts w ith 
children. However , the program incorporated no requireme nt that rec ipi ents 
demonstrate "desert" by pro vin g their in ab ility to earn a livin g or to help 
the mse lves . Dependenc y. and thu s desert , was presumed. A nd altho ugh 
A. FDC ciid grow s teadil y and re lentless ly in the fo ur decades a ft e r its 
enactment before leve ling otl in the 1980s'"- and even as su min~ that the 
existence of the program it se lf contributed to rhi:; ~ruw th-thc we l f~ 1rc rolls 
always included but a s mall fr act ion of the potentially e li g ible populatio n. The 
reaso n fo r thi s is obv ious : most people dec ided no t to take the ste ps necessary 
to qualify for AFDC. AFDC was avail abl e to lo w inco me Ltmili es w ith 
children abandoned by or deprived of the support o f one parent. Thus, 
quali fy ing for AFDC required becoming a s in gle parent and being poor. But 
most peop le chose either not to be single, or no t to be a parent, o r to avoid 
po verty . M ore particularly , the g reat majority o f American women voluntarily 
disqualified themselves from AFDC by getting manied , earning a liv ing, or 
relying for the support of their children on private sources of fundin g such as 
fath ers. husbands. or other famil y members. It perhaps belabors the obv ious to 
say that, becau se most people by their own motion took the mse lves out of the 
running for these benefits, the program was se lf-iimiting and its cost always 
modest compared to what it could have been and compared to some other 
contemporaneous government benefits programs .'
1 
In sum. not everyone 
respo nded to the incentives created by AFDC by chang ing behavior. 
1 ~ Co111pore CHARLES M URRAY. L OSING GROUND: A!VI ci< ICAN SOCL\1 . POLICY . 1950-1 980. at 9 ( 1984) 
(arguing that AFDC rul es made receiving wel fa re more attrac ti v~ than working ). H'ilil ANDREW J. CHt:RLIN. 
T HE CHi\NGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY I . 26 ( 1988) (citing broader economic and cultural 
trends as the dominant factors in growth of the AFDC program ). wul David T. Ell wood & Lawrence H. 
Summers. Is Wt.:!(n re Real /\· rile Proble111 ?. 83 PtJB. INTEREST 57 ( 19861 (tl ncl ing litt le ev idence that soc ial 
we lfare pol i c i ~s increased the unemploymen t rate by reducing work incent ives ). 
211 SAR A. LEVITAN ET AL .• PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR. 70-76 (7 th eel. 1998). The cost o f the 
program increased only about S 13 billion from 1960 to 1993 and enrollment has never exceeded abo ut 14 
million p~rso ns. /d. at 70-71. 
21 See [\'!EMBERS OF HOUSE COWvl. Ot\ WAYS AND M L\t\S . 106TII CONG .. 2000 GREEN BOOK, 
8 .'\ CKGROUND MATER IAL AN D D ATA ON PROGRAMS W iTHIN THE JURISDICTI ON OF THE COMMITTEE ON \VA YS 
MW MEANS. ami/able ar http://www.utclal las.edu/-jargo/green2000/contents. hunl (last v isited Feb . S. 2003) 
The pe"k in total expenditures for AFDC occun ed in 1995 at $30.1 billion and dec lined to 521.5 billion for the 
1998 tlsca l year. id. at 397. 404 tbl.7-1 5, wi th enrollment declinin g to about seven million rccipi enl s. 1d at 
.1 76 tbl.7-4 . Meanwhi le, M edicare . for ex ample. reached a cos t o f S 132 bill ion in 1999 . id. at I 00 tbl.2-l. w ith 
about 39 mi l lion rec ipients. /d. at 98. See also LE VITAN, supra note 20. 
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This discussion suggests that the prediction that a universal guaranteed 
income program is destined to send the economy into a downward spiral of 
ruin. inefficiency, and :;ocial chaos cannot be justified a priori and could easily 
prove untrue. Yet it is not hard to understand why dire :;ccnarios might 
dominate: the idea of a basic income guarantee generate s widcspre<!d 
uneasiness and indigilation . ancl support for welfare work requirements i:..; 
staunch among the ge ne ral population. It is mo re acce ptable en matte rs of 
policy to predict ne::uttivc economic consequences than to expre ss negative 
emotions, and easier to s~ t y ·' It can ' t work' ' than " I disapprove.'' Because UBI 
strikes some as unsavmy r; r c' V <:: n vagur~ly immoral, it must follow <hat it will 
pro"-e ruinous , disastrou';, or imposs ible to maintain . But it cloesn · t follow that 
the normative and the po '.i t ive will align. /;. UB I might be smtccinab!e and 
economically feasible an d might have few if any detrime ntal effects. T he 
benefits of providing the se resources might outweigh the drawbacks-or they 
might not. Once again, the actual consequences depend on circumstances and 
on numerous contingent and e ver-changing facts about human preferences and 
tastes, about the shape of the economy, and about the world we live in. We 
can speculate at length but can say little with confidence ahead of time about 
what a UBI world would actually look like. 
B. Is a Guaranteed Jncoille Fair 7 
Leaving aside the possibility that an unconditional income guarantee in 
some circumstances might prove more efficient and less expensive overall than 
commonly proposed alternatives including mandatory work for welfare, what 
is left of the case against the UBI and in favor o f work requirements as the 
condition for receiving cash assistance? If we as a society can afford some 
kind of UBI, if its effects on labor markets would be minimal or at least 
tolerable, and if many people would benefit from it (or would think they do) 
even if others pay higher taxes to foot the bill, what is the basis for resistance'7 
One intuition is that, even assuming this rosy pic ture is realistic, a UBI 
should be rejected--and work requirements or a work test for public support 
imposed-because unconditional transfers are somehow unfair. T hey violate 
fundamental notions of reciprocity, mutual obligation, and the duty to "do 
one's part." They permit nonworkers to "free ride" on workers and allow the 
idle to exploit the productive . This "exploitation" or "reciprocity" objection 
can be, and has been, stated in various ways. Exhortative and normative 
formulations abound and are ce lebrated in story and parable. Although 
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academics and soc ial thinkers are divided on this Issue, many align wit h 
popular views to dismiss unconditional public aid as uufair. John E istc! hcts 
stated, for example, that unconditional public ass istance "goes against a widely 
accepted notion of justice: it is unfai r for able-bod ied people to li ve oJ'f th,: 
labor of others. Most workers wo uld. correctly in my opinion, •;ee th e p ;·opo:~a l 
as a recipe for exp loitation of the industrious by th e lazy."
2
' Deborah Stone 
suggests that ' ·soc ieties depend 0 11 their members tO perform work of SOi11 <.' 
kind ; in varying degrees, people are expected to be self-sut'fici': nt and to 
produce ~t little bit ex tra to track, se! l, or give to others in order to improv•.:: th·.: 
condition of society as a whole.'' '" Wi lli am Galston speaks of the "sim pk: h:: 
profound idea of ["rec iprocity] .. that people who receive b•:nt: ii b shmd<i 
make cuntribut ions-if they are able." '' Robert Ellickson re f>: rs tu ' ih<.: 
traditi ona l informal norm that an employable person has a dut y to be in th· 
work.force ... :c(. Stuan White asserts that " those who wi ll ingly enjoy the 
economic benefi ts of social cooperation have a correspond ing obligation to 
make a productive contribu tion, if they are so able, to the cooperc1tive 
community which provides these benefits,"
27 
and expresses the fear th~1t 
unconditional benefits "will lead to the exploi tation of productive, tax-paying 
citizens by those who, while capable of working, instead choose to live oft 
their [benefits]." 'K Elizabeth Anderson writes disapprovingly of guaranteed 
income as "indul g[ing] the tastes of the lazy and irresponsib le at the expense of 
others who need ass istance. "c
9 
She recommends that ab le-bodied adults' 
"access to a decen t income ... be conditioned on responsib le performance of 
one' s duties in one's job, assuming a job was avail able ."'') Joanne Ci ullci 
summarizes the lesson of th e parable of the grasshopper and the ant by quoting 
the ant' s own words: ' 'If you were foolish enough to sing <:~ i I the summer, you 
must dance supperless to bed in wi nter."" Even Philippe Van Parij s. the most 
~ 2 See discuss ion inji-o pp. 31 -33 (prov iding examples of academi cs who see condiriono/ public aid ao; 
unfair J. 
2 ~ Jon Elster. Comment 011 ran der Veen ond Van Pari):·;. 15 THEORY & Soc· Y 709. 7 i 9 ( l l)07). 
2~ DEBORAH A . STONE, THE: DISABLED STATE 15 ( 1984 ). 
25 \Vi l!iam A. Galston, \11/wr Abour Reciprocir,· Y. BOSTON REV., Oct. -Nov. 2000. at 9. n •eri!J/ cd in \,Ill 
Parijs. Sllf!J'U note 6. at 29. 
26 Robert C. Ellickson. Tile Unrenoble Cosejinan Uncondirionol Rigilrro Sil elre r. 15 HAR V. J.L. & Pl'B . 
PoL'Y 17, 2 1 ( 1992). 
~7 Slllan Whi te, Lil>eml Equaliry. Erploirarion. und rile Case jiH an Uncvndirional Basic lnco!ilc , -!5 Po! .. 
STL'D 3 12, 3 17 (1997). 
2t-: !d. at 312. 
2~ Eli zabeth S. Anderso n. \VIwrls rh e Poinr of Equalin·~ . 109 ETHICS 287. 328 ( ICJR9) . 
.\0 /d. 
31 CiUL.L.\, SIIJ!ru note 18, at 10 (quoling AESOP' s FABLES (G. F. Townsend trans .. 1924)). 
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vigorous proponent ol' a basic income policy, worries endlessly that "the Little 
Red Hen was right in turning clown the animals who wanted to share the bread 
she made after having ignored all her requests for help in making it."'" 
These formulations fine! echoes in popular attitudes as revealed by 
empirical work in the field. Voter surveys, focus groups. and data collected by 
social psychologists reveal that the categories of the deserving and undeserving 
recipients of group resources arc firmly entrenched in public thinking about 
redistribution. Most people c.tancl ready to assist others through centralized 
public welfare programs. but the willingne:-;s is conditional on the recipient's 
blameless inability to achie\ c self-sufficiency despite reasonable, good faith 
efforts.'' Persons who depend unnecessarily on collective largesse are not 
viewed as entitled to assist~mce. although they may become the objects of 
charitable beneficence or pity. Because they are regarded as violating 
generalized norms of conduct to which all are expected to adhere, these 
persons elicit moralistic "reactive attitudes," including indignation, 
disapproval, and resentment.'' 
32 V.-\N PARIJS. REAL FRICElXJl\1 fOR AlL .111111D note 6. at 133. For other recent expressions of the 
.. c.xploitation objection .. to unconditional public aid in the context of defending work requirements and the 
deserving/undeserving distinction in welfare policy, sec. e.g., MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 137 
( 199:2) (noting the undeserving citizcn·.s reliance on welfare as a subject of scorn): LAWRENCE iVIL\D, BEYOND 
ENTITLE\IENT: THE SOCIAL 0BL.fC;·\TIO'i OF CiTIZlcNSI liP ( ll)S6 ); LAWRENCE MEAD. THE NEW POLITICS OF 
POVERTY: THE NONWORKii\C; PooR 1:\ i\.viERIC-\ 61-65 ( 199:2) (noting that nonworking poor are viewed as 
undeserving in the face of a general trend of increased workforce par1icipation); DENNIS T!-IOJv!PSON & AlviY 
GL'Ti\1,\NN. DEt~otOCRACY AND DISACiREFtloii:N"I ( 1996) 
.1l See MARTIN GILEi\S, WHY ;\xiERICANS H.-\TE WEL.F,\RE: RM'E. MEDIA, ,\ND THE POLITICS OF 
.-\i\TIPOVERTY POLICY 2 (1999) (noting that hostility to welfare is not based on opposition to the general 
.. 1>rinciple of govemrnent support for the needy"' but rather on the "perception that most . [recipients] are 
unckserving .. ); DAVID MILLER. PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 76 ( 1999) (deriving such from public opinion 
data); Lauren D. Appelbaum, Tlze !nfluence of Perceived Deserving ness on Polin• Decisions Regarding Aid to 
the Poor, 22 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 419 (2001) (noting that .. [ljhe determination of fault for poverty may 
play an important role in discussions around welfare policies," and providing evidence that liberal vs. 
conservative views correlate with judgments about how responsible lllOSt poor people are for their own 
predicament): Steve Farkas et a\.. The Values We Live Br: Wlwr Amcrimns Want jiwn Welfare Reform 16-17 
(Public Agenda llJ96) (providing cbta from a national public survey); Linda J. Skitb & Philip E. Tetlock, Of 
Anrs and CrasshOJ!I'ers: The Political Psw-lwlog.1· of Allocating Public A.vsisrance, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 205, 219 (B. A. !'vlellers & J. Baron eels., 1993) 
(reporting that in a study involving the allocation of public assistance to AIDS patients. notions of 
responsibility explained most decisions to give aiel): Wax, Rerhin/.:ing Welj(rre Rights, supra note 3, at 271-74. 
3~ See. e.g., MILLER, supro note 33. at 76 (pointing out that the nineteenth-century conflict between "the 
deserving and the undeserving poor is still alive and well"); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equalitr 
Passe" Homo Reciprocans ond rile Furure ofEgo!irariwr Polirics. 23 B. REV. 6, 26 (1998) (observing that in 
sun·eys and experiments people have a propensity to punish violators of such norms): see also Skitka & 
T etlock. -'"l'ro note 33, at 216. 
2{)0_";J SOMETHINCi FOR NOT!-!!:-JC 17 
Once agam. the concerns of ordinary voters seem to be the same as the 
concerns expressed above: that such arrangements will license "exploitation" 
and 'tree ri d ing." Although a ll workers would receive benefits under a truly 
universal (non-means-tested) guaranteed income program, all nonworkers 
would as we ll. A means-tested but otherwise unconditional program would 
allow pe:·sons to c!r:tw benefits by ceasing to be a worker and becoming a 
nonworker at will. A:.;surning something like a free or lightly regulated market 
for labor. both types of UBI programs would effectively transfer some portion 
of the market cct1nings of industrious and pruductive persons to those who 
work !es:-; m not :.tt ~t!!. It is tempting tu de~;cribc this situation a~, 
"exploitatative" of workers by nornvorkcrs. \vi th nomvorkers acting as "free 
riders" on the efforts or others. 
This description might strike some as transparently valid and self-evident. 
but It ts not. Although intuitions about which situations are exploitative are 
commonplace, formulating exact criteria for identifying exploitative 
relationships is notoriously difficult, and that task will not be undertaken 
here. Likewise with free riding. Although ordinary persons possess some 
notion of who is a free rider and who is not. coming up with a rigorous 
definition of free riding demands technical forays into microeconomics , 
bargaining theory, and moral philosophy. Indeed, the accounts of free riding 
that most concern law and economics scholars resist easy application to the 
case of unconditional basic income. The nature of the resources transferred 
through a UBI, and the political setting in which the supposed "free riding" 
takes place, present particularly puzzling challenges. 
The claim of exploitation by free riders is most familiar in the context of 
nonexcludable public goods, where sharing is unavoidable given the nature of 
the commodity and the relationship between the persons who supply and enjoy 
it. Clean air and clean water are familiar examples. Persons who want to 
breathe clean air cannot easily exclude others. The choice to produce and 
enjoy a benefit entails supplying it to persons who bear none of the costs. A 
somewhat different-and more problematic-situation arises where the "free 
·'5 For extensive discussion. see 8 -\RR.\R ,\ H. FRIED. THE PROGRESSIVF. ASS.•\ULT 0:--i LAISSEZ FAIRE: 
ROBERT HALE ,\ND TilE FIRST L\W M\D ECONOMICS fvlOVBIENT 59-62 I 1998) (discussing exploitation in the 
economic and labor market sphere): ALAN WERTHEIMER. EXPLOITXno;-.; l 0-12 ( 1996) I providing 16 different 
and in large part incompatible definitions of exploitation): David P. Bryden. R~defi'ning Ruj>C. 3 BL;FF. CRIC--1. 
L REv. 317--+10 (2000) !discussing the difliculties uf identifying exploitative personal and sexual 
relationships): Amy Wax. Bmsuining in rlu: Silmhm o( rile Horker: is There {/ Furure ji1r (~11iirorian 
Morriug,C:'. S-+ V.'\. L Rr:v. 50') I l ')98) le.;;ploring different notions of cxploit~ttion in marriage and private 
relationships). 
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rid ing '' is not mandated by ineluctable structural features of the shar~d physical 
or social world but is the byproduct of an associat ion or transaction th at is 
itself optional and thus vo luntari ly entered in to by the persons claiming to be 
·'exp loited. '' One such situati on occurs when individuals with divergent tastes 
for le isure and order cohabit-a circumstance that is a commonplace of family 
life. Vo lun tary cohabitation can be modeled as a "chicken" game that can 
produce an ~quilibrium in whi ch one person does most of the work and others 
enjoy large net benefits despite little or no investment. Philippe Van Parijs 
provides an example as follow s: 
Some years ago, I spe nt a fev: months with my fami ly in a house we 
were sharing with my father-in-law. Very soon. one fe atu re of our 
daily routine started disturbing rne great! y. I not iced that my father-
in-law was quite sensitive to the fl oor getting dirty, far more sen sitive 
at any rate than I was myse lf. As soon as du st started covering the 
lounge tloor, he wou ld take out the vacuum cleaner and deal with it, 
long before I wou ld start thinking it was necessary. The result. of 
course. was that the tl oor was tidied up for me beyond my wishes, 
witho ut my doing anything for it. This bothered me because I could 
not help feeling it was unfair. . I had to concede ... such a 
situation , if continued-and taken in isolation from other aspects of 
the interaction-was w~fai r.'" 
This example diverges from the classic situation of non-excludable public 
goods because the player who makes the !ion· s share contribution presumably 
cou ld choose to end the association . If he does not, th at must be because the 
cohabitation arrangement is Pareto-superior to li ving apart and all players elect 
to continue the relationship desp ite the supposed "exploitation. " That the 
supposed ly exploited individual gains from the relationsh ip and could choose 
to walk away makes it particularly hard to argue for outs ide intervention or for 
placing such deals off limits. 
00 Philippe Va n Parijs, Free·Riding Versus f?enr.S/I{{rin g: Should E1·eu Dcn·h/ Ciaurilie r Sllf'f'Orl an 
Uncondiriona/ Busic Income" , in ETHICS . RATIONALITY, AND ECONOM IC BEHAVIOUR 159, !59 !Farina et al. 
eels. 1996) (admitting that his conclusions were ··particularly annoying because of a puzzling connection with 
an idea which I was beginning to explore at the time and to wh ich I soon became committed to the point of 
spending a considerable amount of time advoca ting it in all sorts of circles''-that is. th e un iversal basic 
income). 
For a speci fic game·theoret ic ex ample of a ·'chicken game .. as played within fa milies, see the ··s lob .. and 
' ·nea t .. example in Wax, supra note 35, at 555~59: sec al so Joan Wi lliams. Is Coverrure Dead." Beyond u New 
Tlzeorr ofA/iznom·. 82 G EO. L.J. 2227 , 2240-41 ( 1994) (desc ribing working couple "s \\Tangling over child care 
as a ··chicken" game in which mothers end up providing mos t of the care). 
I 
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The type of "free riding" entailed by an unconditional public benefit 
arguab ly differs in important ways both from non-excludable public goods and 
from persons making unequa l contributions to a mu tually benefic ial 
arrange ment. \:Vorkers' support of able-bodied nonworh:ers is ;1e ither an 
ineluctable structural feat ure of the production of a va luable collective good. 
nor the byproduct of the diffe ring preferences and resulti ng bargai ning 
pos itions of parties engaged tn a Pareto-superior- th at IS. mutua ll y 
benefic ial-course of cleating . Rather, it would appear to be a purely optional 
featu re of our communal association an d political li fe- an arrangement th:tt \\'C 
cou ld freely choose to adopt or not without fac ing up to any structural or 
preference-driven hare! choices. In ou r system, cash ass istance is a ccmpictcly 
exc ludab le and divisible good. And there is no chi cken game becau se free 
ri ding coul d cease \v ithout making the exploitee! "v ict ims'' abso lutt: ly worse 
off. The government could simp ly dec line to enact a tax or effec t a transfer to 
persons who woul d otherwise rece ive benefit s. Persons would keep the money 
they earn on the open market, and all would be le ft to fend fo r themse lves.'' 
The rea l question of in te rest, and the one that is central to this Arti cle. is a 
normative and political one: how should our view of what constitutes ·'free 
riding," and our understanding whether and when "free riding" is unjust or 
unfa ir, influence our political choice whether to adopt an unconditional bas ic 
income program for alP How might we go about dec iding whether to vote fo r 
or aga inst a program in which workers in some sense "share" their earnings 
with others who do not work fo r pay7 The answer must take in to account that, 
once enacted , such a program would put all citizens to a structural choice not 
wholl y unli ke that facing Van Parij s's compulsively neat fa ther-in-l aw : a bas ic 
income tax and transfer reg ime will effectivel y operate to hold some citizens 
hostage to their own des ire to get ahead by forcin g them to contribute to the 
37 In Van Parijs ' s exampk, one way to avo id the quand ary wou ld be to ca ll off the ch icken game 
altogether. ll1e part ies cou ld part ways by Van Parijs electing to take leave of his father- in-law's house or by 
his fat her-in-bw asking him to go. If the parti es stopped li ving together. both would lose the benefi ts of 
cohabitat ion. Alternatively, Van Parij s could stay and one or both of the parties coul d dec ick willfull v to 
ignore their own preferences-which would e ffect ive ly alter the payoffs to trans form the ch icken game out of 
ex istence. In the guaranteed income case. however. neither measure would b.: necessary. The citizenry cou ld 
just refuse to enac t the program. 
Although basic income might be Kalclor-H icks efficient in that the benet1ts to rec ipients might outweigh 
losses to taxpaye rs. it is hard to argue that f t·er.mne in soc iety would be better off with a basic income program 
than withou t it. That is. it is unli ke ly that a guaranteed income program wou ld be stric tl y Pareto-superi or to its 
absence. To be sure . the choice be tween bas ic income ancl no public we lfare program at all is not ve ry 
rea listic. As the foregoing di scuss ion sugges ts. bas ic income might be more efficient than feasible po li cy 
alternatives. But th at does not undermine the ro int: Expl oitee! taxpayers lose nothing if a basic income 
program is never enacted ancl resources are never shared with the less fortunate. 
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less ambiti ous as the price of generating more earnings for themselves. The 
robust , vvidcspread oppos ition to putting the mo::;t industrious workers in such a 
pos ition ra ises the ques ti on of where that opposit ion comes and whether it 
should be pe rmitted to inform our political choices . Are these values to be 
regarded as the approp ri ate starting point for ck termining what is to be 
regarded as fa ir"' Can an analysis that purports to se t forth basic princi ples of a 
just society be valid if it fli es in th e face of deep-seated and common intui tions 
about exploitation '' Can a soc iety be j ust that mandates, or even 
accommodates. an arrange men t that so many ordinary· people find u n pa l a tab l e'~ 
Or should the gcJal of any an al ys is be to ckvelop a framework that permi ts a 
c;-itique of eve ryday ztttituc!es with the aim of unm as king them as unjustifi ed 
and irratio nal form s of prejudice to be supe;·seclecl by more refined 
u nclerstand ings ·) 
These questions are key to ckc idi ng whether condition al or unconditional 
redistributive schemes bes t comport with just soci eties. The remainder of the 
Arti cle undertakes to consider how prin ciples of justice developed by li beral 
egalita ri an politica l theori sts might deal with the choice between unconditional 
benefits and benefits cond itioned on work. Because most theorists considered 
here address this specific question only briefl y and in pass ing, the analys is 
extrapolates from more ge neral discuss ions. The next Part begins with an 
ex ploration of fundamental assumptions that form the starting point fo r 
deriving principles fo r just social arrangements. It then takes up in more detail 
the work of specific commentators as applied to the particular question at hand. 
II. LUCK EG."'. LlTr\R IAN ISM AND THE PROBLEi'viAT ICS OF W OR KER DESERT 
The work of dominant theori sts who seek to discover bas ic pri nciples of 
justice proceeds from an egalitarian vis ion that sees soc iety' s fundamental aim 
as rectifying inequalities. Not al l inequalit ies are suspect or illegit imate. Only 
d ifferences that are ·'arbitrary from a mora! point of view" warrant correc tive 
intervention. A just syste m would be one that wo uld aim to ensure that the 
distribution of resources '·was not propelled by factors due to [undeservedj 
luck, on th e grounds th at luck is morall y arbitrary and ought not to influence 
one's prospects."'s The most common dev ice for rectifying ill egitimate 
·'8 Sca na Sh illrin. Egali tari anism . Choice-Se nsitivi ty. and Accommoda ti on 2 (\-Jar. 2. 20021. m ·oiluh/c w 
http://www. law.nyu.edu/cl pp t/progran t200 1/rcad ings/sh i tlrin/cgalitarian is m.pd f (un publ ished draft. on lik 
with aut hor). Se~ also Larry Alexander & ivlainton :ichwarzschild. l.ibcmlislll. Ncllrmfin·, and Eq11ulin· of 
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inequalities 1s a sharing of the costs of misfortune through a system of 
collective compensation that holds individuals harmless for luck's ill effects. 
On the luck egalittrian view, luck-insensitive choices gene t-,1le no claims for 
collective compenscttion. Rather, it is perfectly reasonable for individuals to 
bear the costs of their deliberate decisions within an otherwi se fair context and 
it would be unfair to expect others to do so for them. 
At first blush. luck egalitarianism would seem to yield Zi simple answer to 
the question of whether a just society would require work fur public assi :;Ltnce 
or wouicl guarantee thctt assistance unconditionally. If factors outside 'l 
person's control prevent him from holding a job or earning a living. then 
society ought to compensate that person for the results. But if someo ne 
decides to forgo employment or refuses to work towards hi s own support, then 
society owes him nothing: he should be charged with the consequences of his 
actions. 
This simple conclusion gives way to complications that arise from both 
empirical and theoretical concerns. The implications of this paradigm are 
unclear within a market economy such as ours that appears to be characterized 
by residual unemployment. Although economists disagree about how much 
observed unemployment is "behavioral" rather than "structural,"
4
u few believe 
that joblessness could be pushed to zero. Assuming a commitment to a luck 
egalitarian ethos, how does intransigent structural unemployment bear on the 
fairness of imposing work requirements on "able-bodied" poor? Although 
structural unemployment is not in any sense jobless workers' "fault," the 
implications of its existence for the decision to impose work requirements is 
ambiguous. The pressures exerted by welfare work requirements. by sending 
\Ve/f(m~ 1·s. Equolin· of" Resources, 16 Pi tiL. & PUB. AFF. SS (1987 ): Andcro;on . . IIIJI W note 29. c1t 290-307 
(describing luck egalitarianism ). 
_v) Tl;e litera;urc on luck egalitarianism is enorn1ous and the idea that society owes rcrsons a duty of 
compensation for unchosen misfortune has generated endless discussion. Fur a review ot· important work in 
the field. see, e.g. , MILLER. SUJ>m note 33; ERIC RAKOWSKI. EQUAL JL ;STICE ( 1991 ): Daniel iVlarkovits. Hr!\1' 
Much Redislri/J/1/ion Should There !Jc "· 112 YALE LJ. (forthcoming Jun e 20m): S:unucl Scheftler, Who! is 
Egoli!orioni.l·tn ". 31 PIIIL. PUB. AFc. 5 (2003). 
40 Sec. e.g .. Philip Harvey, An Anoll·si.l oflhc Princiral S!rmegies !ho!l!o\'e Influ enced !he Dn·eloJIIIZC/11 
o(Amcriuzn EmJII0\'11/CIII and Social Welfizre Lcz11· During !he 201/z Cnzllzrv. 21 BERKELEY J. E\IP. & LA8. L 
677. 730-32 (2000) (noting di sagreement over whether joblessness could be signifi cantly reclucccl if "job 
seekers demonstrated a greater commitment to finding jobs and performing them aclequatciy." or if more 
resources were devoted to retraining and education). For a pessimistic view of the potential efkcts of more 
extensive trc1ining. see James Heckman, Doing ir Riglz1: Jo/J Training IIIIi/ Educ'Uiion. 86 PUR. ll'TEREST 86. 86 
(1999) (arguing that extensive retraining to raise skill s would be prohibiti vel y expensive and largely 
i ncffecti ve). 
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eve ryone scrambling to get jobs . are designed to separate victims of bad luck 
from those who bear some respo nsibility for their fate. The conclusion that 
work requirements in the face of structural unemployment is fundan1enta ll y 
unfair assumes that the only people w ho remain unemployed under the 
pressure of longstanding work requirements are those who re<tlly cannot find 
jobs. But th is conclusion is not necessarily valid. First, some people rnay have 
such a pronounced work aversion that they will w ill fully avoid jobs even in th ·::: 
face of destitution."
1 
Seconcl. the job market is not sta tic. A n emp loyment 
rnmket in wh ich there ure more employees than jobs is like a game or 1n:; sica l 
c hairs that never ends <mel th at can be played fast or s lowly. A person· ~; ch a:lC•.:: 
of holding a job at any time is not just a function of the nu mber of position:~ 
and \voulcl-be workers , but a lso of ''how rapidly jobs ' turn over.,.,, tv1ore 
turnover means that more people are empl oyed (and unemployed) at lc<.ht some 
o f the time. The ques tion co mes down to how much sharing , as opposed to 
how much " hogging," w ill occur in the job market. High turnover rates !ec:d to 
more sharing of existing jobs among would-be job holders, with more epi sodes 
of hiring and job loss punctuated by spells of unemployment. Although 
characterized by lower earn ings and more job instabi lity-which are distressful 
and soc ially disruptive- a higher turnover market potentially gives all willing 
workers the chance to jo in the ranks of the productive and to contribute 
something to self-support, even if they cannot achieve full economic 
independence. Un der this sce nari o, luck egalitmian fairness would not require 
droppin g work req uirements altogether, but rather recommends government 
subsidies of !ow-wage workers that would ensure every worker and hi s or her 
fami ly a tolerable standard of li ving . Indeed, our current welfare system is 
co nverging, however h::dtingly, towards such a system of supported or 
compensated work.u 
On a more theoretical leve l, the problems with the luck egalitarian 
choice/chance distinction that are pertinent to the policy question here go 
deeper. Holding people responsible for life choices only squares with 
egali tariani sm if thos-:: deci sions proceed from fa ir star1ing points that in 
themselves satisfy the demands of the luck egalitarian framework. Since real 
peop le differ substantia lly in their unchosen endowments-external, material , 
and intrinsic-applying the cho ice/chance paradigm to determine who 
.J i See discussion. infi·o pp. 53-54 (disc uss ing Dworkin's comments on the least aclvantagecl idiers) 
-+ 2 Harvey , supra note 40. at 733 . 
'·' See Wax. A Reci;m>cal We!fitre Prog rwn, supra note 3. at 506-08 (documenting pmgrams that provid e 
income supplements for earnings that fall short of subsistence). 
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'·deserves" vv hat in the real world is fraught with difficulty: every cho ice, and 
hence the outcome of every choice, is to so me extent the product of unearned 
antecedents and accidental feJ tures of the world outside the pertinent agent' s 
controL Indeed , the questi on of \Vhet her it is possible to formu late a coherent 
notion of individual dcsc r ~ to which ju ~: t arrangements must respond i ~; 
arguably the mo:;t centr<il to liberal poli tic<d theory , and one that be<1r•; 
cri tically on the practical dc:': ign of redistribu ti ve ::chemes.
44 
John Ra\vl s ha ~: tj ~~ \~ n r~u1 HJUs i y intl uent iai on this issue. On the b~! s is of ~; n 
oft-qu oted passage in A Tll eor\ n/.!u.\ iice, Rawls is commonly held to tah· i. h t: 
position thJt person:; ::tre ~c:fft: c t i \·:.:l y responsible for very litt le of wh at th : y do . 
and hence cle:;ervc no more tlnn 1:an be j ustifi ed on grounds unrelated tc' 
ind ividua l desert. Ravv ls ib SeiT'. th at "one of the fixed points of our consiclcn:::d 
j udg ments [i s] that no one deserves his place in the distribut ion of nat iv,:; 
endowments, any more than one deserves one 's initial starting place in 
society."
4
' Rawls goes on to deny that any person deserves even "the superior 
character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abi li ties. """ 
Rather, personal charac ter ·'depends in large part upon fortunate family and 
social circumstances for which [a personj . . . can claim no credit. "-
17 
Based on 
these remarks, Rawls is ·widely understood to reject any foundational, pre-
institutional notion of personal "desert."
1
s Because, for Rawls , all choices are 
hopelessly tainted by arbitrary preconditions and uncbosen antecedents. he 
disavows reliance on a robust cho ice/chance distinction in constructing rule s 
for distr ibution of socia l goods.-!'' Rather, hi s method is to first decide on other 
grounds what a j ust soc iety \voul d look like. What people deserve is then what 
they can legitimately claim within a framework that sati sfi es principles of 
j ustice. 
-l .i On desert genera ll y, sc:c , e.g .. J OE L F EI:.! BERG , D O ICJG ACJD D ESERV ING : E SSA YS ON T ilE T II EOR Y Of 
RESPONSIBILITY 55 ( 1970) (anal yzing th e: concc:ption of desert ): M IL LER. sut>ru note :n, at 13 1-55 (a rguing 
that there is in fact a sound concepti on of desert) : G EORGE S llt:R . D ES ERT 2~-J 6 ( 19871 (rev iewing and 
criticizing Rawls's anti -desert argument ) . 
.\S J O HN RAW LS. A TII EO R Y OF J l' ST ICE I 0--1- ( 1971 ). 
-L1 /d. 
.\7 "'-
-I~ See, e.g . . Samuel Schcftkr. .!mricu ullli Dn err i11 Liberal Tlrcon . 88 Ci\ 1. . L. R EV. 965 . 966 !2000) 
(disc w;s ing Rawls' s reject ion of the idea or ·•prc-inst itution;il .. dese rt as follow ing fro m his view tha t .. lt lh •: rc 
is no independent princip le of desert tha t prov ides a nonnati ve standard for the design of soci ai institution s 
themselves .. ). 
-I<J Bur sec discuss ion infi-o PP- --1- /; --+Y (noting the tension be tween di savowa l o r desert and Rawis"s 
holding persons ,-,;,;pons ible for .. cxpeas ivc tastes" · as wd l as for criminal cond uc t). 
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Based on this passage alone, the dec ision to work or not would appear to be 
like any other that arises from th e mi x of characterolog ical and beh avioral 
traits th at are given to us. It is hard to see how Rawls could countenance any 
diffe ren ces in entitlements to ass istance art SIIH! from conduct-based 
di st inctions be tween "deserving" an d "u nclcsen ing .. i~ld i v iclu a l s . ' 0 In contrJst 
with Raw ls. other liberal ega litari ans stru gg le to reta in some concept of desert 
by try ing to identi fy choices anci outco mes fo r wh ich ind ividu als can fai rl y be 
held respons ible.;
1 
As with Rawls, th e focu:; is on the ch arac teri sti cs and 
antecedents that influence choices and the determ in ants of rea l- worl d 
co nsequences or choices . Ronald Dwork in. for t..'.\a mple, d istingu ishes 
be tween fixed attri butes and condi tio ns of upb ringing (s uc h as tal ents and 
abilities deve loped throu gh earl y ed ucation). for which indi viduals arc 
arguabl y blameless, and tas tes, prefe rences . and e \crtions. which are so caught 
up with our identity and our vision of a worth whil e life th at they must be 
regarded as amenable to influence or contro l by the autonomous self5 c Others, 
like G.A. Cohen, view at least some tastes, such as the des ire to perfo rm 
certain kinds of work, as endowments for which persons cannot ri ghtly be held 
res ponsible.;' This di vision of opinion among luck ega litarians bears directly 
on the ques ti on whether society should hole! pe rsons to work requirements and 
charge them with full responsibility for the effort they put forth in the labor 
market. Specifically, should they bear the market-based costs of choos ing to 
exert no effort at all by refusing to work in exc hange for government help? 
The strongest luck ega litarian case against an income guarantee would 
seem to start from the stark fact of an "inexorable 7.ero": leav ing as ide any 
"undeserved" diversity in job rewards and preferences, those who dec ide to 
50 See di scuss ion inji-a pp. 42-43. 
:il See, e.g., RONA LD DWORKIN, SOVER EJG,\1 VIRTU E: T il E THEORY .-\Nll PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 73 -78 
(2000) (maki ng a d isti nc tion between ··brute luck .. and .. opti on luL· k .. ): R.-\ KOIVSK I, supra note 39. a l 74 
(defending an "equal ity of fonu ne" whereby inequalit ies arising t't·om .. variations in people's op tion luck are 
moral ly unobject ionable"): Richard J. Arneson. Libero /i.l.,n. Disfl'ilmril·c Su!Jjecrivis111. und Equol OpflOrllfnity 
Jin· We/fiire. 19 PHI L. & PUB. Arr. 158, 174-83 (I 090) (qaJi ng that it is a '·commonsense c laim .. that 
ind ividuals can and shou ld be held so lely res ponsib le for ccn ain cho ices): G.A. Cohen, On rlre Currencr o{ 
Egulirorian .!usrice . 99 ETHICS 906, 914 ( 1989) ('To the extent that pcopk arc indeed responsible for thei r 
tas tes, the relevant welfare de ficits do not command the attention ol" justi ce ... ): T. M. Scanl on. Pref"ercnce and 
Urgenn· . 72 J. PHI L. 655. 658-60 ( 1975) (arguing for an object ive view of the grounds for redi s tributi on 
independen t of a person· s tastes). 
Sc See. e.g .. DWORKIN. SIIJ>m no te 5 1. at R 1-83. ;\ l ihnu~h Dworkin is ambivaklll about social 
responsibility to compen sate for differences in tal ent , see di scuss ion inji"ll pp. 53 -54. he ultimately holds that 
societ ies shou ld str ive to make outcomes .. talent- insens it ive .. and ··ambit ion-sens iti ve ... DWORKIN. supra no te 
51, at 89. 
53 Cohen . . 1/lf lro note 5 1, at 928-29. 
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seek work on the market at l ea~t take positive steps towards achieving se lf-
support. Those who fail to take a job. assuming one is avail ab le, do not. Most 
people con make some productive effort if they so choose. so the dec ision to 
make that effort wou ld appear to be an example of responsible cho ice if 
anyt hing is.'" 
The simplicity of this conclu:;ion gives way to complications under further 
:-,crutiny. The deci sion to expend e ffort is a function of tra its and tastes li ke 
(l•:ersion to work, how hard work is fu r us. and what kinds of work we like to 
du. The qual ity of a person' s p·.: rfollll~tnce. the kinds of jobs ava il able to him. 
<llld the intrinsic anci extrinsic re wards he reaps from employment, will all be 
ztffccted by fixed enclowmcnts m inborn. unchoscn "acc iden ts of birth ." Some 
people may find it diffic ul t. st ress fuL or unp leasant to work for pay in any 
capacity or in the jobs they can obtai n give n their abilities. Other persons may 
find it eas ier to work hard , long. ur wdl. Some may be industriou s and 
conscientious and possess grea t powers of concentration. Others may have a 
pronounced aversion to work of any kind , may value idleness or freedom, may 
prefer nonremunerative acti vities. or may suffer terrible spiritual and 
psychological pain from having to go to work every day. Even short of hard 
determin ism, the liberal egalitarian debate shows how much room there is to 
argue over whether the factors that influence persons to obtain or maintain paid 
employment, or that determine the personal costs of those choices, are ones for 
which persons can be held full y respons ible. It seems unfair to hold persons 
who find work hard, tedious. unpleasant, and unrewarding to the same 
requirements as persons for whom work is pleasant. satisfying, interesting, and 
lucrative. Why is soc iety no less responsible fo r mitigating these differences in 
personal costs than it is for assuaging other unfortunate endowments such as 
physica l handicaps, personal deficiencies, and mental affl ict ions? 
The unfairness of holding diverse workers to the consequences of their 
work behavior is further exacerba ted by the wildl y erratic nature of the market 
returns on individual effort. One intuition underlying the common hostility to 
programs that offer "something for nothing"- and which is thought to warrant 
different treatment for workers and nonworkers- is that the former expend at 
).J Heather Mil ne. Deserr. E:j/im oil(/ F.quofir,·. 3 J. API'. PHIL. 235. 236 ( 1986) (argu ing for an egalitarian 
version ot" dese rt theory with an emphasis 0 11 effo rt rather than successful contribut ion). Bur see Nien- He 
Hsieh. •Vinm! Dnerr. Foim ess ond Legirinwre 1:.\.fh'Cio rion s in rite /V!arker, S J. POL. PHIL. 91. 106-07 (2000) 
tsHgges ring that cffot"t is nor a va lid basis for dese rt in the market context due to a lack of proportionality 
her ween the effort expended and rhe resulting frui ts of onc ·s labor). 
~}/-
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leas t some effort wh c: reas the latter do not. " But the role of effort in the 
operat ion of labor markets is elusive at best. And however we choose to define 
that clement , the rewards of work bear little relat ionship to it. Is effort a matter 
of time spent work ing? Persons working very sim ilar hours rou tinely earn 
\v ildly disparate rewards. Does it have to do with time spent acquiring skilis to 
do thr:c v..-·ork? T here is no proporti onality there as pc~ rson s with less educati on 
or tr<tin ing often ea rn more th an their more educated counterparts. Although 
some fo rms of work that are unpleasant or risky cttrry ~1 salary premium, some 
of the mos t enjoyab le and in trin sicall y rewardi ng \VO t"l\. is amo ng the highest 
paicl . People choose a line of work in part bec a ~ t s c their tastes and talents 
a li o\v Ihem to produce more wi th less effort. Indeed . pegg ing rewards to effo rt 
is very inefficient because it creates an incenti ve to choose jobs that requi re 
uw rc exertion or that generate more disutili ty or unpleJsantness per uni t of 
output. Workers are unli ke ly to be most effecti ve at jobs tha t cost them more 
to do .'" 
There are yet other factors bearing on market outcomes that reveal how 
thoroughly arbitrary and unchosen elements infect the structure of marke t 
rewards from beginning to end. Worker characteristics and exertions have 
value in the market and produce more or less lucrat ive outcomes, but only to 
the extent that they match up with the demands fo r goods and services. But 
there seems nothing for which potential providers of goods and services are 
less responsible th an whether people want what they have to offer. If two 
persons of equal ta lent prefer different jobs, it is hard to see how each is 
responsible for one earning ten times more than the other since neither created 
the viciss itudes of consumer demand or the size of the labor supply available to 
meet it. Even if all workers were otherwise equal in resources and upbringing, 
these unchosen differentials would persist.
57 
55 See lvi ilne . sur ra note 54, at 240 (''Only in sofar as effort is expended in produ cin g the achi even1ent o r 
contribution. or in acqu iring a sl il l. is there the basis of a dese rt -cl aim ... ). 
56 See. e.g .. FEINB ERG. supra note 44. at 55: MILLER. supra note 3?: . at I SJ-3-+ (following Hayek's point 
th<H e ffort rewards result in bizarre consequences at times, but still iden ti fying effort as aj{tcrvr in dete rmining 
a pcrson·s rewards). 
57 There is a large literat ure on ' 'job rents" and the distri but ion of scarcit y- based rewards within market 
economi cs. See. e.g. , FRIE D. sup ra note 35. at 143-59 (summarizing the development of rent theory): DAVID 
G.·IUTHiloR. !\!ORALS BY Ac;REEMENT ( 1986) ; VA N PARlJS, REA L FREEDOM FOR AL L. supra note 6. at 90-9 1, 
108- !9 (stating that job rents would exist even with identica lly skill ed perso ns unde r perfectly competiti ve 
c:onditi ons) : see 1tlso James C. Dick, Hmv to Ju stifv o Dislribu tion o{ Eomings. -+ PHI L & PUB. AFF. 248. 269 
I !975 ) (argui ng that the large rents in the current rates of remuneration fo r worlers in short supply '·could be 
dras tical ly reclucecl without ill effec ts on the supply of labor" ): Barbara Fried, Wilt Clunnherloin ReFisiled: 
No: ick ·s .. Ju stice in Trun s(er .. and 1/i e Probielll o( Morke t-Bosed Dis!ri/; f{fion. 24 PHIL. & PUB . AFF. 226, 242 
( ! 905 ) (show ing that a Loclc~ n ri ghts argument could support either Chambe rl ain' s fu ll rights to all he was 
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A ny defense of the pro position that worke rs dese rve something whe reas 
nonworkers should get nothin g thus runs up again st the w ildly erratic nature of 
the rewards that markets ass ign to work. T he arb itrarin ess of labor market 
returns is part of the larger prob lem of "mora l luck. ·· o r the lack of co ntrol ove r 
consequ ences that fl ow from human actio n ge ne r~tll y . Eve n if cho ices are in 
so me se nse autonomous, the outcomes of our dec is io ns are unchosen and give n 
because they are rad ica ll y condi tioned by exte rn a l fac to rs that we have no hand 
in se lec ti ng. i\iloreover, many action s are not tightly li nked to co nseq ue nces . 
but in voh·e risk and gamble . If things go sour for us despi te prudent conduct 
and best eilorts, do we so mehow "deserve" the disaster. such that a just soc iety 
need not come to our a iel '! A lthough some be li e' c that we should be he ld 
responsible for adverse o utcomes if we could avoid the gamble or insure 
against it , othe rs contest that we should be forced to li ve w ith the consequences 
of ri sk- taking, w hether prudent or imprudent, that turn s out badl y .'' 
T hese observations have led some Iibera! egali ta rian s to conclude that, at 
leas t w ith respect to market outcomes, the distinction be tween responsible 
choices and bad luck is inherently unstable. Because market compensation is 
fundamentally heedless of any meaningful dist inct ion between luck and human 
agency, the structure of returns to labor on the market can make no claim to 
paid or ;;oc icty"s claim on surplus value) ; Nien -H e Hsieh. supra note 5-+. at 109 (no ting that ordinary market 
co mpensat ion results in people ··more often than not be[ing] paid more th:tn they arc sa id to cl cserYe .. ): Juli an 
Lamont. Pmhle111s fo r Eflnrr-Bascd Disrriburion Principles. I~ J. A PP LIED PH IL. ~ 1 5 ( 1995): Er ic !VIack. 
Caurhier on Rig/us and Economic Renrs, 9 Soc. PHIL. & PoL ·Y 17 1 ( 1992): Jeff H. Re iman. l he Labor Theon· 
of ril e Difli>mlcc Principle. 12 PIIIL. & PUB. AFF. 133. 142 ( 1983 ). 
58 The question of how st ringent ly soc iety should hold persons responsib le for bad outcomes of pa>l 
choices bc:u·s direc tl y on the design of we lfare policy. The path-ckpcndcncy of personal ci rcumstances mean;; 
tlwt past reproduct ive and educa ti onal choices may gener::~te in tractable nbs t:1clcs to self-sufficiency in the 
future-obstacles thai do not yie ld to present efforts. The refusal to otTer aid under these circumstances has 
been cri ticized as unduly harsh and counterproductive because it makes no prov ision for fresh starts and 
forg iveness and undermines important social goals. Compare, e.g .. ROBERT GOOD IN. R teASO NS FOR W ELFARE: 
TH E POUTICAL THEORY OF THE WELFARE S"L\TE 295 ( 1933) (suggesting thai social policy shou ld alleviate 
some instances o f suffering of those who brought misfortune upon themse lves) . Anderson. supro note 29. 
Rohert Good in. Negaring Posiril ·e Deserr Claims , 13 POL. T HEORY 575. 586 ( 1985) (noting that at times 
··needs trump clcsens""). and Shiffl·in , supra note 38 , at 30 (arguing thai wel fare pol icy should eschew a st rict 
"" luck egalitarian .. framework). ll'irh D WORKIN. supra note 5 1, at 287 (ta king the posi tion that people shou ld 
not be relieved of responsibil ity "" fl owing from their own choice;;" ·). R,\KOWSKI. supra note 39. at 73 -37 
(arguing that inequalities resulting from poor choices are morall y unobjectionable) . and Richard J. Arneson . 
Luc/.: Eg alirarianism and Priorirorianism, II 0 ETHICS 339. 349 (2()00) (not ing that a soc ial commitment to 
compensalc for· bad choices. or even fo r some forms of bad luck, can unfairl y dra in or even ""swallow[] up all 
soc ial resources""). For :1 recent di sc uss ion of the puzzle surrounding the ··rnoral luck"" that links act ions to the 
outcomes of r·isky cho ices or gambles. sec Kasper Lippert-Rasmu ssen. Egali rariunis111. Oprion Luc/.: and 
Re.\'j)(JIIsibilir\' . Ill ETHICS 548 (200 I). For a discussion of fre sh starts and second chances within a sys tem 
that acknowledges personal responsibility. see Wax. A Reciprocal We/fore Program. supra note 3. at497-500. 
28 h\ IOR Y L.-\ \V JOURNAL !Vol 52 
being inherently ju::;t. But if market-based all ocations bear no re lation sh ip to 
any coherent notion of desert-if there is no rhyme or reason to the pattern of 
returns to labor-then there may be no reason to honor those pattern s in any 
respect even to the ex tent or denying social support to those \v ho r,_-:fu se to 
labor at all. Liam Murphy cll1d ;\ndrew Lev ine have gone so far as w derive 
from the market's erratic all()ca ti ons a reducrio ud ubsurdwn on the i:;sue here: 
whether the government shoulcl require work fo r benefits or should gu,tr,tntee a 
li ving to all. For them , th,tr persons do not "deserve" the rew cmls th ey obtctin 
from wo:·k !'atal ly undermines the leg itimacy of the ex pectation th,tr an:.·onc 
work or u/1. if the rewards ass ign ,::d to work are not systcmaticL~il y :c l, ttc:d to 
effort or anythiil g ,; Jse fur'' hich indi viduals can be held responsible. hm\ do<::s 
it follow that some work should get something and no work should g1:::t 
noth in g·) 
Le vine. fo r example. emphas izes that work-based producti vity is 11 0 t just a 
function of un ehoscn suppl y and demand , but also of inherited technolog ica l 
know-how and collectively maintained infrastructure for which most persons 
pay no compensat ion and which are confened on everyone gratis. For Levine , 
this insight makes nonsense of the notion of free riding by some members of 
soc iety on others. because free ridin g on unearned benefits is rife: '·free riding 
and being free ridden upon are inevitable fac ts of social life.""' Si nce free 
riding on others' past and present contributions is '·an ongoing ven ture, 
existing across both space and time, paying one's own way is an unrea lizable 
goa l.''"
0 
!n light of this. li vi ng off income derived from collective resources 
cannot be se lective ly condemned unless it can be distinguished in princip le 
from other forms of free riding that are inherent in labor markets and in all 
producti ve endeavors. Because such distinctions cannot be maintained, a 
u n i versa! obligat ion to make a productive contribution to the eo llec ti ve 
enterpri se cannot stand as a fundamental precept of social or col lec tive 
governance. Levine claims that "reciprocity is an impossible standard to meet 
.. . with a degree of specific ity sufficient for justifying income inequaliti es ... r'1 
Since we can never determine what amount constitutes a "fair" return for any 
particular contribution, it follows that we cannot pronounce upon the fairnes s 
of banding ou t compensation desp ite the absence of any contribution at all. r'2 
)lJ Andn.::,,· I "c\·inc. Nt ' l\·ouling !}Ton. 7 J. POL. PHIL --+04-,-+! 0 ( 1999). 
(10 /d. 
(>I ld.at.J09 
6 ~ Sec L~, · i nc . su1u·u nolc 59. at -li0- 11 (d iscussing Lhc di fficuilics of ascertaining v::l uc:-: with in 
trans~ctionsl: sec u/so LE VI~L. surru note IS. at 29-3 1 (noting that the payotls for conlribuJions depend on 
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Likewise. Liam Murphy also questions the coherence of any "pre-
institutional" notion of desert for rewards assigned within markets. ''' That 
defect is not cured by the equalization of resources in starting points so long as 
people differ in talents and tastes affecting costs of labor supplied and the 
demands for what labor produces. Because "[r]eturns to labor arc unjustly 
distributed even in competitive markets in which equality of upportunity and 
resources is presupposed, .. it makes no sense to say that the rewards thctt attach 
to work are "deserved" in any fundamental or nonderivative sense. ''! But then 
it follows that there c<tn be no basic unfairness or injustice in ~tssigning 
resources regardless of whether any work is performed at all. Any objection 
that might be made to the confiscation and redistribution of earnings can 
readily be parried by poiming to the unearned conditions for market success. 
As Murphy states, there is no reason to assume that ''getting some thing for 
doing nothing is always more significant morally than getting more than one 
deserves for doing something.''''' Rather, "[a]n assumption that the first kind of 
undeserved income [redistribution to the voluntarily idle] is more worthy of 
redress than the second [undeserved pay for workers] could be based only on 
confusion caused by the greater salience of income, all of which is unclescrvec!, 
as comparee! to income, some (possibl[y] very great) part of which is 
uncleserved."r.
6 
For Murphy, as for Levine, the lack of any coherent basis for 
counting market rewards as deserved must silence any complaint that transfers 
from workers to nonworkers are unfair. To put it bluntly, because no reward is 
deserved, no reward can be undeserved. Valid principles of limitation on just 
allocations of resources generally cannot be grounded 
relationship of inputs to outputs in the market system. 
exist, they must derive from elsewhere. 
in anything like the 
If those limitations 
what others do so that there is "no way to coordinate individuals· behaviors that is not significantly 
redistt·ibuti ve ''). 
63 Liam 13. Murphy. Libert\', Equolit\'. Well-Being: Rakowski on Wealth Transfer 'fir.wtion. 51 T ,\X L. 
REV. 473,491 (!996) (noting that market outcomes do not justly track contributions to the social good). 
64 !d. at 491. 
(;) !d. 
66 !d. In response to this argument. G.A. Cohen comments: 
If Rawls is right that not all effort is deserving, then. we might agree. not ail effort deserves 
reward. But why should it follow that dTort deserves no reward at all'' The pt·actical difficulty ot· 
telling how much of it merits reward hardly justifies rew~mling it at a rate of 0 percent. as opposed 
to at a rate somewhere between 0 percent and I 00 percent. 
Cohen, supra note 51. at 915. Sec also VAN P,\RJJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL, supm note 6. at 112 (nuting that 
a guaranteed basic income is not inconsistent with greater rewards for more effort. but only with denying any 
rewards for no effort). 
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!!1. WHAT COUNTS AS WORK? THE PUZZLE OF WORK 0 UTSfDE THE MARKET 
'{ et ano ther ~;et of vo ices can be heard to di sparage the logic of providing 
compensation only for labor market work. Fe mini st critics draw strength from 
the argumen t that market-based reward s have nothing to do wi th desert and 
thus can be altered at w ill with out injustice to anyone. Indeed, the feminist 
contention is that the collective refusal to reu ll ocate re sources generated on 
rnarkets to those who operate outside it is itse lf unjust. Most feminist write rs 
in thi s ve in. although ge nera ll y di scla in !ul of distinctions between the 
'"cles::rving'' and "undeserving.'· clo not aspir<: t(J o ffer a gl obal or rigorous 
critique of the concept of desert itself. Rath er. their motivati on is to broade n 
the Ccltegory of persons who are regarded as deserv ing of soc iety's approbation 
and materi::tl supp011. 
The common thread is the objection that welfa re work requi rements s light 
the kinds of domestic and caretaking tasks traditionally performed by women. 
Because many nonworkers with whom the welfare system is concerned are 
caretakers of young children, critics maintain that welfare work rules threaten 
to burden women disproportionately and to discourage the performance of 
nonmonet ized domestic functions. Indeed, the crux of the debate over how the 
welfare sys tem should treat "caretaking units''-usually single mothers and 
their ch ildren-centers on what should count as work. The oft-heard claim is 
that care taking performed without pay is no less socially useful than work 
nerformecl for wages and should be rewarded. Society should offer collective 
~upj)Ort to those who care for others. 07 
67 See. e.g., SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF. T HE FE:VIINI01E ECONO,v!Y AND ECONOM IC MAN 182-1 83 ( 1997) 
(tracing the historical roots of the de valuation of women 's reproductive and caretak ing work): ANN 
CRITTl'-'DE<-1, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 186 (2001) (argu ing that the welfare state con tributes to the 
"femin iza tion of poveny"): M ARTitA FINE:Vt.·\N, THE NEUTERED MOTIIER. TilE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 ( 1995) (calling for recognition of caretaking as work and a major 
contribution to soc iety): EVA F. KITTAY, Lov~::·s LAI:lOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY. AND DEPENDENCY 
10'1 (! 999) (placing imponance on the publi c acknowledgment of th e "value of receiving care and giving care" 
so that th~ burdens and co~as would be shared): Anderson. supm note 29. at 323-25 (loca ting the problem as 
confusing the economy with the market sec tor): Anne L A lstott. No Ex it: Just ice for Caretakers 6 (June 4, 
2002) (propo:.;ing an annual gram to carewkers to be used fo r child care. persona l education. or retirement 
savings) (unpublished manuscript. on file with author): Martha C. Nussbaum, Disabled Li1·es: Who Cares:' 
N Y. REV. OF BOOKS (200 I ). available ar htLp://www.nybooks. com/art icles/ai1icl e-preview')article_ id = 13956 
(book review or· Kittay arguing that a theory of justice must extend its scope to the fami ly and include care as a 
primary good). For a cogent critique of the feminist "ethic of care. " see WILL KY~ t LICKA , CONTEMPORAR Y 
PO!.ITIC\L PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 262-86 ( 1990). 
I 
200.1] SO !v1 ETHINCi FOR NOTHING 'I _11 
The principal problem with the assertion that society should support 
caretakers and their dependents is that it threatens to prove too much. Any 
recommendation that resources be reserved for these individuals begs the 
question of why other persons \Vho volunteer to generate a variety of goods 
and services that either appear to create value or require effortful exertion 
cannot also lay claim to soci'd support. Consider the example of the third rate 
artist, cleclicated to his craft. who labors strenuously at his sc ulptural creations 
in his basement studio. What e\actly is he doing down there'7 Can vve deny 
that he ·'works harcrr We know !hat he enjoys his work-that is, that he ge t'; 
··consumption value" from the performance--because he choose~; to scu lpt 
rather than to do something more lucrative. But neither consumption value nor 
choice distinguish his case from that of many others in the paid economy, 
including law profes~;cm; . Yet 1.ve harbor the intuition that we owe him 
nothing. But why treat d second-rate single mother differently than a third-rate 
vi sua l artist? That no one want; to buy the artist's creations is impm1ant to us. 
It counts as good evidence that they are of little value to anyone but the artist 
himself. T hat no one wants to pay the mother to raise the child may indicate 
something similar, however callous that sounds. 
This discussion suggests that those who bemoan society's treatment of 
caretaking must supply a theory of compensation or sociai reciprocity that 
disposes of demands to subsidize a range of nonmarket activities. What is 
needed is nothing less than a comprehensive theory of what work is and of 
what society owes to its meinbers based on how they choose to spend their 
time. Yet the preceding discu~;sion suggests that such a theory eludes us. Does 
work include "[clleaning one' s clients ' shoes, cleaning one's children's shoes, 
cleaning one's own shoes, cleaning one's doll's shoes?""o If market measures 
of work are too narrow and should not be the test, then what measure should be 
put in its place and what criteria should be used? And how are we to 
determine the magnitude of any subsidy that is due? Is the answer partial 
suppo11, full support, or more? Should the caretaking unit be maintained at 
subsistence level or should it be granted something cioser to a middle-class 
existence? 
That the "unemployed"'--that is, persons outside the market-are rarely 
ever completely idle confounds the problem. Few people "[lie] in bed all day 
and drink[] beer all night."
1
'" Rather, those without paid jobs "almost always 
60 
VAN PARUS, REAL FREEDOM fOR 1\LL. SlljJin note 6, at 97. 
"'
1 .Joseph H. Carcns. Rig/us and Duties in ur1 Egulitorion Societr, 14 POL. THEORY 31,36 ( 1986). 
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·work· according to so me legitimate understandi ngs of the te rm "
70 
and many 
occupy themselves in part with the very same domestic tasks that are the 
mainstay of the traditi onal caretaker 's life . T o confine "work" to the market 
and the rest to le isure goes agains t the strong intu it io n th at muc h th at is clo ne 
outs ide the market-most no tably caring for children and keeping hou se- is 
not acc urate ly characteri zed as le isure, but rea ll y is work. Is it important to 
this intuiti on that, a lth ough a mother enjoys ·'consumpti on valu e." th e child 
~a i ns some thing too') A !thou g h the require me nt th at the perfo rmer benefit 
so meone o th e r th an himself offers so me promise ul' a lim itin g princ ip le, it 
would no t disqu a li fy many extra-market acti viti es L.tr afield of caretak in g for 
public subsidy. 
A lth ough the market as a reference point is c la imed to produce too narrow 
a measure of w hat is soci all y useful , the abse nce of c lear benchmarks once 
markets are left behind tempts us to justify the c laim for subs idy by pointing to 
a market fa ilure of so me kind-a reason, for exa mple, why the artist' s produ ct 
is ig nored by woul d-be purchasers despite its va lue , or why no one s teps 
forward to bankroll the mother-child duo despite the va lue fo r others or for 
society. One possibl e account is grounded in the assertion th at childrearing 
generates mild positive "externalities" that benefit all of society and for which 
soci ety should compensate caretakers. As suggested elsewhere, however, that 
rationale arguably would not justify the government pay ing full fre ig ht for 
caretakers and the ir children.
7 1 
Another defense looks to the transactio nal 
impediments to compensation for care across ge nerati o ns 
7
" or within the 
70 LEVINE, Sllf>ra note IS, at 15. 
71 Amy L. Wax. Is There a Caring Crisis ? 16 YA LE J. ON RF.G . 327 . :HI (1999) (rev iewing S HI RLLoY P. 
BURC GRAF. TilE FEM ININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MA N (1997)): .'\my L. Wax. Caring Enough: Sex Noles. 
Work. and Taxing Women, 44 VtLL L. REV. 495, 5 14 ( 1999) (sugges ting that parents ' consumption va lu e in 
their children ou tweighs the benefi ts to all of soc iety) : Amy L. Wax. A Recipmcol We/ji1u' Progmm, supm 
note 3. at 492. The extern ali ties from chi ldreari ng are grea tl y en hanced in modern weste rn soc ieties by large 
public pension systems. whi ch cunently operate on a pay-as-you -go basis_ These pens ions effect a subsidy to 
the elderly thai is paid for by other people's children. See. e.g .. BL;RGGRAF. supm note fi7. at 76 (ques tioning 
if such a scheme is fair for ch ildren who did not ask to be born ). Nonetheless. most of the benctlts o f the elTon 
parents and oth u caretal-:ers expend are enj oyed by private individua ls-that is, the parents themse lves and 
their offspring. 
72 The argu ment is that because we all received care as chi ldren fro m others that enab led us to become 
funct ioning indepe ndent ad ults. we now co ll ecti ve ly owe the same to ris ing generations . See. e.g., KITT,\ Y. 
supra note 67, at I 07. I 07-09 (arguing for an ex tended not ion of reciprocity to avoid "chronologica l 
unfairness"): ALAS DAIR 1VI AC INTYRE. DEPENDENT RATI ONAL ANI~·I;\I .S 100-01 ( 1999) (asse rting th at what we 
receive in terms of care and education form s the bas is for what is owed to t'uturc generati ons ). Bur see ROBERT 
NOZI CK. ANARCIIY. STATE AND UTOPI A 78-84 (1974) (rejecting compensa tion for unso ught hene llls): 
RAKOWSK I. supra note 39. at !53-54 (arguing that. because unasked-for benefi ts produce no obli ga[ ions. 
soc iety owes parents no compensa tion or gratitude fo r producing the nex t generation). 
7_\ 
pctrc nt-chi lcl unit. for the benefits to children at parents · expe nse. Bu t. once 
~ tg Jin . these observations can be extended to argue fo r collectivizing almost 
unything. V/e reap the benefits o r ail soc ial contri bu ti ons that have go ne 
bc fo t"e us. We are the rec ipients of a myriad of val uab le gifts from past 
gener:tt iuns and present hu manity. Enforc ing a payback fo r all these 
,_::nl l <t !lc ,~ me : !ts creates an account ing nightlllare and begs the question of why 
c't re takc ,·s should be sing led out among other t>c nefac tors for a steaclv stream 
(,;· r ::: c ip;\x:;.d returns. 
;:·,:m in i st writing on thi :; subject m;tni k.;t s cl wholesale hostilitv to an 
<.:: •.: ui! 'j i1J ic approach that sees the a lte rnati \e~; of markets or market failure as 
c; :hctusting the analytic uni verse . It rej ect~; the meth od of carefully identify ing 
the e ieme nts of value generated by tradit ionally fema le ac ti vities and then 
ass igning costs an d bene fi ts to discrete soc ial actors. Seana Shi ffrin and 
E li zd bcth A!lderson, for example . rc l"use ro buy in to a luck egalitari an 
i"ramcvvork that worries obsessively over the choices fo r whi ch indi viduals can 
be held responsible and that proceeds with a compul sive accounting of the 
benefits and costs those choices ge nerate. For these authors, thi s approach is 
mi sguided in generating harsh policies that sli ght important soci al goals. 
Rather, the central concern should be to identify the soc ial circumstances most 
conducive to human nouri shing and to cheri shed va lues of autonomy, digni ty, 
and deliberati ve integrity and then to un de rtake to create the desired conditi ons 
with any resources at our disposal. For Eli zabeth Anderson, in particul ar, the 
paramou nt airn is to spare every pe rson the hu mili ati o n. sti gma, and 
pO\ve rlessness of abject materi al want. Since the harmful consequences of 
unmet need are unrelated to how those needs arose or how they would be 
priced on the market, it is unnecessary to delve in to the genesis of any person's 
dile rn ma. For Anderso n, "[t] he proper ... aim of ega litarian justice is not to 
e liminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppress ion, 
which by definiti on is soc iall y im posecl.'.n Ending oppress ion does not require 
that ··everyone get[] what they morall y deserve .' ' but rather that steps be taken 
to ···cno: ate a com mun ity in which people stand in relati ons of equ ality to 
others .-'75 
,._, 8L.' RCJCI R.-\ F. SllfJUI note 67 . ar 69-S 1 ( ~ u gg c ~ ting . bu r dc~c r i b ing the di ffi cult ies o f. an arrangement 
whereby child ren wo uld comrcn,;at c the ir invc ,; ting parent,; 11·ith dividends based on their success in the 
m:t rkct pl acc) . 
"l.J. .-\ ncl ·..:·r:--on. sut'ro note 29, ~I t 2 8~ . 
!5 Jd ~ ~ ! 2{)0 . Fo r s imi lar ar:;umcnts, set: GOOD !:\ . \'UflU l no te 5~ . 
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What are the implications of Anderson's vision for the central issue here: 
whethe r soc ieties should require work as a condition of assistance') Although 
)\nderson does not see the vindication of moral desert as the aim of a jw;t 
society and rejects the market-centered premises of a luck egalitarian 
framework, she nonetheless denies that "in an egalitarian society everyone 
·-;omchow could have a right to rece ive goods without anyone ha ving <m 
obligat ion to produce them .··
7
" She asserts th at help in achiev ing basic 
"funct ioning:-:· shoul d be '·conditional on participati ng in the productive 
systern·· and that "citizen:; do not owe one another the real freedo m to function 
c\S bt.;<:.ch bums ."" Dc:;pit::~ these :; tatements, Anderson do~:·: not appear to 
endorse wel fare v;ork requirements as written into current Lm'- Although she 
does not exp ress ly advocate full public support for all caretaking units either, 
her as,:ertion that "non -wage-earn ing dependent caretakers anc.l childre:·1 ... [do 
not] fall outside the purview of society as [aj system of coopcr<ttion'' implies 
that such support should be forthcoming. 7~ After noting that society benefits 
from traditional feminine activ ities, she states that "no ro le in the productive 
systern [should] be assigned such inadequate benefits that, given the risks and 
requiremen ts of the job, people could be deprived of the social conditions of 
their freedo m because they have fulfilled its requirements."7y In sum, although 
Anderson expressly disavows an unconditional basic income guarantee, her 
rhetoric suggests she would embrace the functional equi valent for those she 
regards as assuming an approved '·role in the productive system." She appears 
to believe that traditional caretakers play that role. 
Anderson's approach, like that of other "ethic of care" feminists, is 
que:;tion-begging in many respects. As a matter of theory, Anclec;on fail s to 
explain how her rejection of "something for nothing" basic income fits in with 
her disavowal of causal responsibility and moral desert as principles governing 
the di stribution of resources. She also does not discuss why unconditional 
benefits are inconsistent wi th the goals of equal dignity and an "end to 
oppression" that she identifies as central to social policy. She fails to consider, 
fo r exam ple, whether a uni versal expectation of work might not operate as a 
form of oppression for the least sk illed and poorest endowed citizens, or 
whether the absence of an option to reject jobs a worker considers too menial 
is degrading in itself. Also, Anderson never fully grapples with the issue of 
76 Anderson . supra note 29. Jt 32 1. 
77 !d. Cf Goodin. Sllf>ra note 6. at 15 - 18 (discussing the post-procluctivi st rej ect ion ol· an expectation of 
ranicipa!ionl. 
7 ~ r\ndcrson su;nu note 29. at .32J. 
7~ !d. at 325. 
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what sorts of activities qualify as more than ''noth ing" for purposes ot 
triggering entitlement to the soc ial minimum. Although, for Anderson. 
entitlement arises from ful fillin g a "role in the producti ve system,' ' she offers 
no specific criteri a for wh ich acti vit ies fill that bill. She thi nks that caretaking 
is a prime candidate. hut offers no theoretical framework for deal ing with 
claims for support hom other qLwrters . What becomes of the hard-working. 
third-rate artist in her unive rs e'~ These issues Anderson leaves unresolved. 
IV. CO\iTR. ,-".CL\ R!.-\ N APPRO.\CHES TO CO'JDIT!ON,--\L AND 
U>K'ONDIT fONAL BENEFITS 
The conceptual puzz les explored so far compl icate the choice between 
prov iding a basic income fo r al l and tying public ass istance to fuifi lling market 
work requirements. As noted, the main ch allenge that confronts luck 
egalitarians in trying to ground just distributions in a conceptually coherent 
distinction between choice and chance stems from the difficulties inherent in 
identi fy ing choices un tai nted by luck . Yet if responsibility or desert is too 
eiusive a ground for distribution, where should we turn? To help finesse th is 
conundrum and bring more determinacy to the debate, theorists like Ronald 
Dworkin , John Rawls, and Philippe Van Parij s have adopted a contractarian 
approach to the question of 'which outcomes of transactional systems should 
remain undisturbed and wh ich should give rise to co llective reallocations. The 
contractarian framework has bee n described by David Miller as based on 
"claims that valid principles of justice are those that would be agreed on by 
people under certain ideal cond iti ons . "~o Those ideal condi ti ons are generaily 
taken to include hypothetical initial equality and parti al ignorance about 
subsequent outcomes, including participants' "personal characteristi cs" and 
subsequent "place in soc iety ."" 1 The principles of justice are those that rational 
individuals would collect ively adopt to regulate their common practices and 
would be able to accept ·'once the veil of ignorance is li fted and peop le are 
restored to full know ledge" both of their circumstances and of the ir 
"'conceptions of the good. ,,~o 
The next Part examines some contractarian approaches for the purpose of 
investigating the relationship between theoretical visions of a just society and 
the claim that public ass istance without work is "unfair" or "unjust. " In his 
Sll MILLER, supm note 33. at 57. 
XI /d. lit 8 1. 
S2 /d. at 57 . 
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central work, A Theory of Jusricc, John Rawls derives basic principles of 
organization by imagining the social arrangements rh,tt individuals \voulcl 
choose from an "original position" behind a ·'ve il of ignorance .. in which 
endowments and social position arc unknown. Although the basic libertie s and 
resource-based difference principle he derives ctrguably would not force a 
categorical choice in all cases between the two soc ial welfare possibilities 
under consideration here, Rawls has curiously re:.;i stecl this conc lusion by 
coming out against unconditional basic income in other writings. Ro nald 
Dworkin posits a hypothetical insurance mark•.:t in \vhich particip2u~ts c:re 
endowed equally and allowed to engage in market crctdes. He askc.; '-:'l"hic:;-, 
outcomes we would collectively WLIIT<'llt our~el ves ctgainst if we k_ne \v our 
talents and tastes but not how the economy would reward them . T he device 
sets the stage for asking a version of the quc~;tiun at issue here: vv hether people 
would vote ex ante for a basic income arrangement in w hich they were, in 
effect, held harmless by the group for voluntary unemployment. or '.-vhether 
they would prefer to inhabit a society in which those who refused to \Vork were 
left to their own devices. Like Rawls, Dworkin is inconsistent in h is treatment 
of the issue: although his insurance scheme would not ap pear to rule out the 
choice to supply a basic income, his more specific discussion of welfare policy 
strongly suggests that a guaranteed basic income is neither required nor even 
permitted under his scheme. Finally , Van Parijs al:-;o begins with a 
hypothetical formulation that assigns individual s equal material shares cmd 
equal intrinsic endowments, but disparages work requirements from two 
directions: by pointing to the undeserved .. rents " that accrue to a ll jobholders. 
to the detriment of the unemployed, by virtue of the ineluctable structu re of 
any free market; and by identifying as a central goal of social life the 
maximization of "real freedom for all ," which he defines as "the greatest 
possible opportunity to do whatever [oneJ might want to do.'''' 
Of these three theorists, only the last, Philippe Van Parijs, unequivocally 
embraces a guaranteed income arrangement. To the extent they address the 
issue at all, both Dworkin and Rawls cast aspe rsions on the suggestion that a 
basic income guarantee is required by, or even consis tent with, principles of 
justice. As the discussion below suggests, however, Dworkin's and Rawls's 
resistance is in tension with other aspects of their analysi s. Raw ls 's 
contractarian framework, which builds on an express rejection of a primary 
concept of desert, is difficult to reconcile with his avowed hostility to the idea 
of an unconditional income. Although Dworkin does not disparage desert 
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outright and stri ves to maintain a stabl e line be tween choice and brute luck, his 
rules for just distribution ultimately rely on a contractarian hypothetical 
insurance device that, despite Dworkin's protes tations to the contrary, need not 
ru le o ut a uni versa l and unco nditi o nal bas ic income guarantee. Like many 
o rd in ary vo ters. Rawl s and Dwo rkin give in to the e leme ntal intuition th~tt 
·'somet hing for noth ing" cannot poss ibly be " fair" or "just,' ' eve n thou gh that 
view is d ifficult tu reco nc ile with th e basic comm itments that o therwi se inform 
their fr<tm eworks fo r just soc ieti es . 
A . l?.cni'ls 's Origin ul Position: Stufe rs ofi'Mulihu ond Skid Rmv Bu111s 
A lthough John Raw ls shares Lev ine' s and Murphy's nihilistic viev; o f 
desert as attached to market re wards,x" he is less pointed on the ques ti on of the 
efforts indi vidu a ls mu st make in exchange fo r resource allocations w ithin jus t 
soci eties . !n A Theory of lusrice, he offers a general desc ripti o n of society as a 
system of rec iprocal cooperation for the commo n good, but does not apply the 
idea of reciprocity at the retail leve l to recogni ze an express obligation to work. 
Rather, the concept of reciproci ty moti vates Rawls's basic procedure for 
deri ving fu ndamenta l principles of justice. Rawls asks what rules rational , 
self-interested, and morally autonomous individuals, placed in an "orig inal 
position" without knowledge of their endowments and future social pos iti on, 
would choose to li ve by. He concludes that they would agree to basic li berti es 
for all , fair equality of opportunity, and a sys tem of distribution for primary 
goods, o r basic material reso urces , that is governed by the minim ax or 
difference principle, which dictates that ineq ualities in resource allocati o n be 
permitted only if the leas t-well-off members o f society benefit. 
As the economist Edmund Phe lps has noted, Rawl s recognizes th at the 
'"socia l surplus ' gene rated by the interaction of people' s diverse talents and 
skills within ... the ... economy ... can be legitimately redistributed, s ince 
the way a free market would di stribute it is morally arbitrary."
85 
But Rawl s 
never openly states w he ther a portio n of the surplus is "owed only to those 
who, being able and willing, participate and contribute at leas t something to 
the economy ' s pie" o r whether those who refuse to contribute would also 
receive something.
8
" In designatin g the category of "the leas t advantaged,'' 
X-1 See supra pp. 3 1-33 . 
R) Ed mund S. Phelps, Subsidi:e \Voges, BOSTO N REV., Oct.-Nov. 2000, at 12- 13. In extensive 
conversations and corresponcknce with Rawl s, Phelps could not induce Rawl s to "endorse" or to "protest" 
ei th er altern3t ive of unconditiona l benefits or public aiel com ingent on work. !d. at 13 n.l. 
S6 /d. 
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Rawls om its any mention of how the leas t well off got to be that way and \Vhy 
they remain so. Those who can be vie wed as placing themselves in this 
category by their own choice- who decide , fo r example , to " lliel in bed all day 
and drink[] beer ai l night""' instead of pursuing gainfu l employment-appear 
no less entitled to be rnade better off as the price for inequali ty than those \Vho 
suffer deprivations through no f<,u! t of theit· own. 
In other writings. however. Rawls equivoc ates on the ques tion of who 
iJelongs in the ·' te<;st ad \·anUtged" category. In A f-(ontion ConceiJiion of 
Equolitr, he states thar the category o f the wurst-o n· includes '·the overL:p 
betvveen those who are k ast l"clVOred by eac h of the thret.: main kind~' of 
contingencies iinc!udingj . perso us whu:'e fan1il y <~nd c kt ~; s or i g in ~; are more 
disadvantaged than others. whose natltr<ll endowment:; have pe rmitted th em to 
fare less well , and whose fortune and luck have been relatively less favo rable 
."'' At least one commentator has suggested that , although A Tlze01y of 
Jus tice defines the least advantaged '·so lel y in terms of their current economic 
conditions," Rawls's later formulation is a "moralistic . desert -based account" 
that focuses on the causal antecedents of des ti tu tion and restricts the category 
to those who would be conventionally regarded as deserving victims because 
not personally res ponsible fur their fate .'y However, Rawls does not follow up 
on the implications of thi s arguably narrower formulation nor expand on its 
implications for the permissible design of social welfare programs. 
Although Rawls' s dominant formu!Jtion in A Theo n of" Justice fails to 
make express distinctions among categories of the most deprived, he has 
addressed the question whether a just society should expec t work from the able 
bodied in a di fferent context. His position is stated in his answer to an 
objection advanced by the economist Richard Musgrave that Rawls' s 
nonwelfarist principle for distribution , which looks to '·prirnary goods" rather 
than to subjective well-being or utility as the measure of just allocation, entails 
the inequitable treatment of persons with similar native capacities but different 
preferences for work. Musgrave argued that by leaving individuals free to 
choose what jobs they will take and how bard they \v itl work , and by taxing 
only monetary income to effect resource all ocations, Rawls ' s social order 
~7 Carcns. SliJi ra note 69. at ~6. 
~X John Rawls, A Kalllian Concepriun ofElfll"lill" ( 1975). reJninred in J0 11 :-: R AWLS : COLLECTED P.-\PER.S 
258-59 (Samuel Freeman eel .. 1999). 
::iY VValter E. Schaller. Ra~t ·!s, 1/ie DUTen:'nu:· Principle, and Economic incq!wliry. 79 PAC. PH IL. Q. 368. 
3 70 ( I 998). See (1 /so Roy C. Vi•.:athcrforcL Discussions Definin g rl1e Leos! i\drontugcd. in EQ UALITY .AND 
LiBERTY: ANAL YZING R AWLS AND NOZICK 37, 3:) (J. A ngelo Corktt eel.. i 99 I ). 
I 
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favors those ·'among inc!ivicluais with equal earnings ability ... with a high 
preference for leisure:·'"' That is. the hardest ·workers earn more money anci 
pay more taxe:;, while persons 1vho work little and choose to consume leisure 
~ \)I 
keep more value tor themselves. 
In response to this critique. Raw!:; propo•;,.:':s to add leisure to the list of 
"primary good/' that art~ to be distributed in acccrclance with the difference:: 
principJc. t-Ie explains: 
might be included 
in the [prlrnary goods] index a~-: l~~i~~urc. -rhu:~c \vho ~1rc un\villing to 
\\/Ork \vou!cl ha\/C a sr_ancLtrd '.vorking t.L:ty· uf extra ieisure, and this 
e;,t,·a leisure its·::lf would be stipulated as equivalent to the index of 
pnmary goods of the least advantaged. So those who surf all day off 
Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be 
entitled to nublic funds. This merelv indicates ... that if necessarv 
the list of p~·imary goods can in principle be expanded 9 " ~ 
In Political Liberolism, Rawls repeats the suggestion that "twenty-four 
hours less a standard working clay might be included in the index as leisure.''9 ' 
He adds that ''[t]hose vvho were unwilling to work under conditions where 
90 R.A. Musgrave, il/uximin. Uncaruinrr. und rl1e Leisure Trwlc-OfT S~ Q.J. EcoN. 625. 629, 632 1 197-+1 
!providing further that .. [w[hile a person's welfare clcpcnJs lln his consumption of both goods and leisure. the 
nature of things is such that reJistribution can he expedited through the transi'cr of goods or income only .. ) . 
. 'iee u/so Richard J. Arneson. !'roJ>crtr Rig/us in Pcr.1nns. 9 So c. PHIL.. & PoL· Y 20 I. 215-16 (I ')92) 
(concurring with ~mel further developing i'vlusgravc·s ohjeL·tion). 
<JI This critique is the llip side of the \\'ell-known ubjcctinn that using subjective metrics like welfare ur 
wcll-hcing rather tlun objective n1casurcs of resources as th~ currency of egalitarian justice threatens tu 
.. c1dave the talented .. by crediting the happy and well-endowed with the advantages they enjoy. thereby 
forcing them to work to subsidize the talentkss and miserable. See, e.g .. DWORKIN. SIIJ>ro note 51. at 90. 89-
99 (objecting to the ··slavery of the talented .. ); RAKOWSKI. SIIJ!W note 39. at 120-21. 128 (criticizing Dworkin's 
hypothetical insurance scheme as still leading to the. enslavement of talent): VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR 
ALL. mpm note 6. at 65 (objecting to any requirement forcing one to have less leisure in consequence of more 
native talent): Richard J. Arneson, EquolitY wu/ Equal Of'f'Orrunit\'.fi>r \Ve/fare. 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 90 ( 1989) 
(divorcing the expensive preference ol· a wlcntcd person's taste for personal liberty from the class of voluntary 
expensive preferences). For a defense of enslaving the talented. sec !:larry, supra note 10. at 271-72. Rawls 
avoids this problem by rejecting a wclfarisl approach to redistribution and using objectively measured 
.. prima1·y goods ... rather than subjective utility. as the benchmark of well-being and the currency of allocation. 
But in avoiding forcing ··those with greater talents to work for the less favored" Rawls gives a leg up to 
.. recluses. saints. and (nonconsulting) scholars who eam but little and hence will not have to contribute 
greatly ... Musgrave, supru note 90. at 6~2. Musgrave·s alternative proposal returns to a welfarist approach: he 
suggests using lump-sum taxation w equalize some combination of .. goods and leisure potentials, .. based on 
unrealized ability to work and enjoy. /d For a similar suggestion. sec Daniel N. Shaviro. !nequo!in·. Weolrli. 
ill IIi Enrlo11·1nenr. 53 TAX L. REV. 397. -~ 12-16 (2000) (proposing a tax based on endowments). 
~ 2 John Rawls, T11e Priorin· oji?iglir und Idem of rile Good, 17 PHIL. & Plill. AFF. 251. 257 n.7 ( 1988). 
'!.1 .IOI·IC: RAWLS. POLITICAL LiBERi\LISi\1 181-82 n.9 ( 1993). 
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there is much work that needs to be done (1 assume that positi ons and jobs are 
not scarce or rationed) would have ext ra leisure stipulated as equal to the index 
of the least advantaged."')" Alt hough Rawls doe::; not e laborate further. his 
comments ::;eem to suggest that employable persons who refuse to work at al l, 
by arrogat in g to themselves '·ext ra" primary goods in the form of a full day' s 
worth of le isure, should be regarded as engag ing in a form of '·se lf-help· · th at 
lifts them abo ve the leas t advantaged, thu s disqualifying the m fro m any furth e r 
mandatory public assistance. That such persons may st ill be finan c ially poor to 
the po in t of starvation does not make them cand i date~ for the bottom rung 
category, and thus docs not entitle them to impro vement of the ir lot under the 
clille rence principle. It is ope n to them to track some or all of their extra e ight 
hours of leisure for the material goods that would re li eve th e ir destitution. 
Rawl s's remarks a lso suggest that. if relinquishing thi s ext ra le is ure in favor of 
paid employment would still leave someone unable to " make e nds meet" 
because he earned too little to survive, he would then qualify as among the 
leas t ad vantaged and lay claim to more resources from others. By implication, 
that c laim could be made only by those unable to better their situatio n by 
workin g harder, either because they were already putting in a reasonabl e work 
effort or were unable to work very much or at all. 
If this gloss on Rawls is accurate, then his answer to Mu sgrave suggests 
that a just soc iety could require the able-bodied to work- and \vork "full-
time''- for public assistance and could fairly refuse to provide basic income to 
voluntary idle rs. But Raw ls's recommendation to add le isure to the lis t of 
pr imary goods fits uneas ily with o ther elements of hi s sc heme. FirsL even if 
inc luding le isure on the li st makes sense-if only because, assum ing a system 
of free occupational choice (to whic h Rawls and o ther li bera l theorists seem 
committed), individual s can appropriate more benefits to themselves at will 
s imply by choosing to be unemployed-it is unclear why Rawls distinguishes 
between those who exceed the six teen-hour standard all otment of leisure 
through vo luntary idleness and those who are relegated to excess ive leisure 
through in voluntary unemployment. Assuming material resources are 
othe rw ise equal (as between, for example, the willfully idle beach bum and the 
skid row bum who tries and fai ls to get a job), it is not obvious why the latter 
would be counted among the least advantaged and the former should not. 
Rawls's dominant framework, which defines the least advantaged solely in 
terms of resources possessed and not how those resources are acquired or lost, 
and which denies any role to fault, desert, or agency, provides no clear basis 
~.J !d. at 182 n.9. 
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for distingui shing between these cases. Both persons have paltry material 
resources and abundant lei sure time. Incleecl, they arc equivalent on everything 
except happiness or preference satisfaction.
90 
The beach bum enjoys greater 
subjective welfare or we ll-being, since , despite his poverty-and unlike the 
involuntarily jobless skid ro w burn-he is doing what he wants to do. But why 
should it matter th~lt the beach bum likes it that way and indeed eschews 
alternatives. whereas the skid rmv bum is miserable and would embrace the 
very option-employment- - the first person despises? To distinguish these 
individual s llll the basi s ot· individual preference satisfaction indulges th e very 
we ifari st. or subjectivist. 1n c ~ t.~me of well-being that Rawls is at pains tu reject. 
Another way of unde rs t ~mding Rawls's suggestion that leisure be incluclccl 
in the index of primary goods is that it serves as a device for IT-importing 
fundamentally desert-based considerations into a framework that expressly 
disavows reliance on any underived or pre-institutional notion of de sert. By 
denying assi stance to those who refuse to work, designating leisure as a 
primary good has the effect of making work-directed effort something for 
which individuals can take credit and upon which distributive decisions should 
be based. This analytic move suggests that, notwithstanding Raw Is ' s view that 
desert is incoherent unless established through idealized consensus , he is 
curiously dissatisfied with a distributional result that wanders too far afield of 
ordinary notions of deservingness. Because Rawls balks at treating the 
voluntary , well-endowed idler the same as the involuntarily unemployed, he 
comes up with a jerry-rigged solution-adding leisure to primary goods while 
simultaneously (and implicitly) discounting the value of excess wzchosen 
leisure-that effectively incorporates a perfectionist, Calvinist work ethic into 
his liberal scheme. 
Are there alternative ways to derive a work requirement from the basic 
elements of Rawls's framework without adding leisure to primary goods? One 
possibility is that the difference principle itself might dictate the result if 
universal work for the able-bodied could be expected to generate more material 
resources available for distribution to the least advantaged than alternatives.
96 
90 Another possi bil ity is that the existence of the opportunity to engage in gainful employment might be 
counted in itse lf as a ··resource bcnertt .. that would rut the beach bum ahead of the skid row bum and make the 
former more adv antaged. Rall'ls hints at this possibility in the footnote in Politico/ Li/Jeru/i.\'111 in whi ch he 
expressly diqinguishes between those who are ::~t leisure from choice, and those who are involuntarily 
unemployed. See id. 
96 See DWCJIU.:E\. Sllf'ro note 'i I. :tt ~31) (suggesting that. when choosing between a program under which 
'·onl y those \\ho allen1 pt tn worh: receive welfare"' and one in which "everyone who does not work. for 
whatever re~"ons . receives beneilrs."· the former might bettet· vindicate Rawls·s difference principle "'because 
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But. as already noted, whether work requirements would maximize wealth in 
all circumstances is unclear: the burdens ancl expense of administering such a 
system, and the perverse incentives on rec ipients to prove themselves exempt, 
might ear into the benefits of expecting work from ewryone. If this did not 
happen, however, the difference principie n1ight rule out a basic guaranteed 
income, since that program would then gen,.:rale fewer resources to give to the 
least well-off. That proscription would not be ~t matter of basic principle, but 
rather of economic contingency. 
T hei·e Jre other ways of analyzing the difference principle that might yield 
the opposite result. Sorne peuple n1ay be :) zJ indolent or so vvork averse that 
they will stubbornly refuse to get a job despite complete destitution and the 
threat of losing government help . Within the context of a public welfare 
sysrem that offers aid only to the ·'deserving,·· these persons place themselves 
among the least-advantaged by choice. But if we take Rawls at his word on 
desert , choice or chance should not matter. Moreover, that some person's 
work aversion makes their poverty "worth it" to them is inelevant to their 
degree of disadvantage and their eligibility for special solicitude within 
Rawls's scheme. If a work-for-welfare regime would indeed generate such a 
group of truly destitute individuals impervious to expectations and incentives, 
then it can be argued that a basic income scheme is mandated by the difference 
principle because it would make this group better off (since at least they would 
have basic resources). That is, because some especially recalcitrant persons 
would be worse off under work-for-benefits than with an unconditional basic 
income program, we ought to elect the latter even if the work disincentives it 
generates reduces the sum total of wealth.n 
An approach that counts poor work-refuseniks among the least advantaged, 
although at odds with Rawls's suggestion that leisure should count as a 
primary good, is arguably more consistent with his discussion of the difference 
principle in A Theory of Justice.~8 A definition of the least advantaged that 
the worst-off group in any society would be bcuer oil if its economic system provided incemivcs to work fm 
all who can work'"). 
'!7 This appears to be what Dworkin is getting at in his brief remarks on how Rawls's difference principle 
would regard the alternatives or· unconditional welfare bendlts and bcnctlts conditioned on work. He stales 
somewhat cryptically that "'some people ... would su strongly prefer· idleness that they would be financially 
better off under a scheme that did not punish that choice.·· DWURKIN. supra note 51. at 331. He explains 
t"urthcr that "'[ijt might be that no group in the second program [guaranteed income] is as badly off as the 
stipulated worst-off group in the first one [work-for-welfare]. in which case the difference principle would 
recommend the second program." !d. 
9~ R·\ wr.s. supra note 45. 
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looks to resource endow ment \as op posed to preference sa ti sfaction) and that i:-.: 
heed less of fauit. causation. or performance wouid seem m e11taii d 
responsibility to improve the lut of the most work-averse if at all poss ibk . But 
that result throws in to sharp relief the tension between Raw ls's commitment to 
equalizing resources in the forrn of pi·imary goods- a commitment th~tc s~: l f­
conscious ly refu ses to compen::-:~tk "expensive tast:.::s '' and that in:..;ish thai: 
tastes be satisfied ou t o!· the :~Ltncbrd aJtotment--and a difference princip k: 
that, regard less of desert. •:~rt"e c: tivcly holds the least-advantaged harm ~c·::-:: fc)r 
preference-driven c hoices .'l'' Cr;u n tl ng persons \vho are poor b:~cau~~~: th~:: y 
refu se to \VOrk JS antung tl >~: le:Js l ~~d ,·antaged is tantarTlount to c -:_ -!l~np l-:n :;~ tting 
then1 for the1r aversion tc \\'Ork ~lnd their taste for leisure . It i ~-~ \.1 furrn r:'! 
compensation for expe n::-;i\ e tastes . Yet those who stand above the k~;::t 
ad vantaged and choose L) \v· urk les:;- or spend mor;.;-for s i mil~tr pn.:f:.: renc::-
based reasons are entitled to r:o compensation or relief from th::: financia l 
consequences of their decisions. Th us, Rawls looks both ways on preference-
driven choices. 
Yet even if the category of the leas t advantaged should not be deemed to 
include all persons who make themselves poor by avoiding work, there is st ill 
an argument to be made that a guaranteed income is better for the least-
advantaged, including perhaps some of the least-able working poor, than aid 
conditioned on work. Low-skilled employees may not be worse offfinonciollv 
than they would be with basic income alone, but they could well be fc:r less 
happy and less free . What Rawls ignores is that people who take jobs under the 
constraint of work-for-welfare could arguably be regarded as among the most 
wretched of the earth. Many "bottom rung" workers labor at miserable. 
tedious, mind-numbing, or degrnding jobs. Basic income would enabic the 
most dejected an d oppressed workers to quit or work Jess. G iving thc~;e 
persons "something fo r nothing" is a plausible and effective way of alleviating 
one possible source of their misery , which is work. A just society committed 
'N Rawl s defends himse lf against the objec tion from some quarters that the use of primary gonds 'IS the 
currency of distributive justi ce docs not del c;wug /1 to accommodate those with expensive tastes by stating th:tt 
"as moral persons citi zens ha' e some part in formin g and cu lti vat ing their fin al ends and prdercn,:cs" · and hy 
denying "that c iti zens· preferences arc beyond their control as propensities or cra vings . .·· .John Rawb. 
Social UnifY and PrimwT Goods. in U T JLITA RI Ai' ISi\·1 AND BEYOND I 59, 168-69 (A martya Sen & fk rn ard 
Wil liams eels., 1982). But. as G.A . Cohen notes. Rawls's ·'piclllre of the indi vidual as responsibly guid ing his 
own taste formation is hard to reconcile with c laims Rawl s elsewhere uses in a fundamental way:· including 
the "skepticism which he ex presses about ext ra reward for ex tra effort." Cohen, S llf>ril note 51. at 9 1-L s~c 
uisu KYi\ILICKA . SllfHU note 67 . at 75 (noling the tension between Rawls· s view tlwt " we ~1re respon,ihlc fur 
the costs of our cho ices· an <.l ihe fa il ure of the di fference pri nciple to "make ~illY ... dist inct ion hct wc~n 
chosen and unchosen inequa lit ies" ·). 
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to a difference principle might therefore recognize ~m obligcltion to enhance the 
well-being of abject "wage slaves'' as the price uf uth<.:rs being better off. 
Rawls's framework cannot easily accommodate an argument of this kind. 
which is grounded in a notion of well-being that i'> -~ubjective rather than 
objective and resource-based. That some pr:opk do h'ttcful work or hate the 
jobs they do wuulcl get little weight within hi s clistributi Vl~ scheme except. 
perhaps, at the e.'\tremes of jobs that are wholly in c un~i-;tent with dignity and 
self-respect. The question is not wlwth e r some pct-'->lltlS in society are 
unhappy. but whether they have fewer prim~uy th~m the rest. But a 
worker who suffers a deficiency in primdry ,_,tn a lw ays be-: he tpec! by cl 
material transfer to supplement the resources he ;-::·ocure:-; through his own 
efforts. If a job does not pay enough to achieve a minim~tlly decent stand ard of 
living, then assistance should take the form of cold cash or supplementation of 
earnings (such as our system currently provides thruugh welfare-plus-work, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, wage supplements , and various other forms of 
assistance for workers). Alternatively. we should put our efforts into 
improving working conditions. But the way to go is to throw money at the 
problem, not to relieve able-bodied persons of the expectation of labor. On this 
view, alleviating disadvantage never requires excusing the refusal to make any 
effort at all, and thus would appear not to mandate a guaranteed basic income 
as a matter of fundamental justice. 
In sum, it is difficult to establish whether Rawls ' s theory of justice would 
mandate work for the able-bodied, or would permit or require unconditional 
benefits for all. On the one hand, Rawls's disparagement of desert as a basis 
for resource distribution would appear to require societies to make the idle 
poor less poor, regardless of why they are poor. A guaranteed income is the 
best way to clo this. On the other hand, Raw ls himself has rejected this 
position by suggesting that leisure be considered a "primary good" with which 
the voluntarily idle must be considered well-enclowecl. A guaran teed income 
then becomes unnecessary to, or even inconsistent vvith. Rawls's scheme. 
100 But perhaps no (legal) job within a market economy that pays enough for minimal self-support ought 
to be regarded as so distressing. degrading. or intolerable that it automatically places the person who peri'orms 
il among the least well off. See. e.g .. PHELPS. supra note 17. at ! 1-15 (listing the intellectual and social 
benefits of work); Phelps. supra note 85, at 13 (positioning factclry workers as better off than the surfer;. 
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f-J . Dvvorkin 's Hypothetico/ lnsumnce Sche111e 
Another framework that mi ght yield a choice betwee n conditional and 
un co nd itional we lfare is Ronald Dwork in ·s scheme fo r eqalitarian di stributi ve 
justice. 
10 1 
To de ri ve principles that operate in a just sociecy, Dworkin imagines 
a desert island on which all inhabit:llltS receive initia l equa l shares of found 
material resources. T hi s eq uali ty forms the starting po int for an auct ion, whi ch 
is des igned to mimic a fre e 1narl--:et . in which c iti;ens use the ir ini tia l 
endow ments to bid for resources and th e prod ucts created with them . In usin g 
th is device to defend the ju s ti c~..~ of marl\.et outco mes w ithi n a fram cwori-.: or 
·:~q u ai opportunity, Dworl--:in as serts tlEit the resource all ocation that resu lts 
l·rorn the aucti on over time villllicttes eq uality '·ove r entire lives" because it 
ensures that people will " pay th e: pr ice of the life they have dec ided to lead. 
measured in what others give up in orde r that they can do so .' .10' Honoring 
choices-including market-bas·~d dec isions-and the consequences of such 
choices is "equ ality-mai ntaining .. because the results of voluntary transactions 
reflect the value and cost of exc hanged commod ities and services to other 
persons. It fo ll ows that the outcomes of chosen ri sks and ga mbles, including 
the risks taken through trade and economic enterprise, should be left 
undi sturbed. Dworkin explains that "the possibility of loss was part of the li fe 
[market participants] chose ... it was the fair price of the possibility of 
., JOJ 
gam. 
Justice is thus consi stent wit h holding pc:ople to results of voluntary actions 
from ideal ized conditions that m i rn ic fai r starting points. But what are those 
ideal co nditions and what starting po ints are fair ? A key problem for Dworkin 
is th at real life differs from his hypothetical: actual people clo not begin life 
with eq ual material shares, nor do they possess identical intrinsic endowments. 
We come to the market with different attributes, talents, desires, aversions, 
ambiti ons, and preferences. Dworkin cannot avoid identifying which 
antecedents of choice must be equali zed to charge people fairl y with the 
consequences of their actions and to make good on the claim that market 
transactions are fairly ''equality maintaining." 
In attempting to get at the conditions that would be equi valent to fa ir 
starting points, Dworkin distingui shes between "option luck" and "brute luck." 
·'Option luck is a matter of how de liberate ancl calculated gambles turn out-
101 See OWOR KJ:-J , supra note 51, at 65-7 1. 
102 !d. a t 74. 
103 !d. at 74-75. 
,, 
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whether someone gains or loses through accepting ''n isolated risk he or she 
should have anticipated and might have declined .-- il" " Brute luck is a matter of 
how risks fall out that me not in [some] sense deliberate gambles."'"' Brute 
luck appears to be a category reserved for evcnb th a t cannot be influenced or 
'l' ' ";r',~rl' 'nv t'l~ ' 1l.r'tl.'11' c: C'10l.CeS IOi• "D,vo•·k·!·" 'l'''l h·1· ,. ,.,.;;;,,\ '1Cf.:J1')WJ e d uP r]•"t __ ,<..._/l•~L-\._ -,/ I'-~-....~._ u l ~· I Ji._ 11 (Jt-v- •- ,, '-\.\._\'.-. t.! \_ O'-- L lL-L 
' ' • J I '1 d. . lilJ . ' , · ) . orute :jnu opt:o;1 tUCt: o en mto one anotl1e r 1v :Ln r~:xn Cltegory t 1re::!tenmg 
to swallow the other. On the one hand , ~tli mi s fortun,~s othe r than pure 
accidents uf birth or defects in upbringing czm in snn :e :-;':n:-;e be regarded as 
causally linked to volitional acts, hovvever improb:\bl y . ir:clirc:ctly, or tenuously. 
(Even being hit by a meteorite is the " res u lt'' of 1: :; ourselves in the vvrong 
; ' . ) IU' D f'' . I I ' " . . . I . ,. ptace at tne \vrong t1n1e . e 1111ng ~\Jrutc 1UC\ to 1ncluci:: on<y' IT1isrortunej 
that would befall us "no matter what" seems too narn>'ii. On the o ther h;:md, 
that cl gambk knowingly made turns out badly can. in >;unle sense , be p:;garded 
as a matter of brute luck too, in that the gambler cannot fix the gamble's actual 
]] I) 
outcome. 
Assum.ing that the line between brute and option luck can be made 
reasonably precise, Dworkin suggests that the outcomes of exchanges are just 
if some way can be found to compensate for differential results clue to brute 
luck. Only differences clue to unavoidable risks or misfortunes qualify for 
collective warrant But Dworkin does not see society as duty-bound to hold 
persons bZtnnless for all types of bad brute luck: The pos:;;ibility of anticipating 
and insuring against some unavoidable risks effec tively transforms some brute 
luck into option luck, 
Dworkin cannot avoid identifying which attributes or conditions must be 
equa l or equalized to make good on the claim that transactions are "equality 
maintaining" and to charge people fairly with the consequences of their 
!().j /d. at 73. 
]().) /d. 
101
' Sec id. at 73-74 (citing ~xampks such as being hit by a meteorite). 
1117 Sec. e.g., R,\KOWSKI, supra not<; 39, at 75 (noting that past voluntary decisions can make the ultimate 
difference in th~ occurrence of bad brute luck situations): Richard .l. ,\rne:;on. Egolirori(/ni.lln ond rile 
U/1(/e.\cr\'ing Poor. 5 .1. POL. PHIL. 327, 331-33 ( 1997): Cohen, .IUJ>m note 51. at 911 (noting the grey area 
between fault and bad luck): Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 58. at 549-57 (attempting to distinguish between 
differential option and differential brute luck). 
!OS Sec RAKOWSKI, SUJ>ru note 39. at 75-77. 
lll
9 Moreover, whether a misfonune is avoidable-and a matter of option luck rather than brute luck-is 
sensitive to descriptive formulation and to state of knowkdgc. There are ways of describing a risk that makes 
it seem unavoidable (''the risk of a tlood destroying my business .. ) or potentially avoidable by making a 
different choice ("a 20'/c- chance of a tlood destroying a business located in this tlood plain"). 
110 See Lippen-Rasmussen, supra note 58, at 573-74 (discussing "regulative" control over outcomes). 
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act iv ities in the world. He devo tes co nside rab le energy to the issu e o f \vhich 
spec ifi c attributes of persons are cand idates for effec tive equali~;:d ti un. 
Partic ul arl y important is Dworkin' s treatment of the factors that make fo r 
. I . I l l occupattona or econormc success. Like Raw ls, he acknmvledges that 
te ndenc ies to persevere and work hard are hi ghly intlu encecl by in nate 
e ndowments and genet ic accidents o f birth o 'er w hic h person:; exe rcise li tt le 
co ntrol. But he also in s ists that ta lents and the e1b ility t \) ex plo it th:::m are 
d ifficult to disentangle from ambi tion an cl other el ements of our identity <h at 
:, ~:-,: inex tricabl y caught up w ith our v ~liu c~ . p lans. and concept ions of the goqd 
liL: .
11
' T his leads him to assimilate ::; orne dete rmin ants o f j ob succ,:s,; :u;d 
\ : ~trn i ng powe r to tastes and preference ~ and to resi st a full -blovm com rnitm ent 
tu soc ial correction for their effects. in the e nd. he sugges ts that proper regard 
for a principled distinction between brute luck and option lu ck arguab ly 
recommends a system that "leave[s l each person with the income he woul d 
have had if, counterfactu a ll y, all ta lents fo r production had been equal. " but 
does not disturb differences traceable to occupational choice , " ambition,'' and 
" industry." Nonetheless, as explained more full y below, D workin avo ids 
concluding that a just society must hold all persons harml ess for perceived lack 
of talent. Indeed, Dworkin 's ambivalence about collecti ve co mpensation fo r 
ta lent differentials find s expressio n in his reliance on a hypothetica l in surance 
scheme, wh ich employs as the ultimate test of justice the degree to which the 
group would collec ti vely agree to compensate its members for part icular 
shortcomings. He concludes, in effect, that compensat ion wou ld be 
fo rthcom ing only for extreme lack o f talent.
111 
Although the line Dworkin draws betwee n natura l tal ent and effort-based 
att ributes can be questioned,
11
-l hi s position would seem to bode ili fo r an y 
c laim th at an uncondition al guaranteed inco me for the able-bodied wou ld be 
111 Sa DwoRKIN , supru note 5 1, at 92 ( .. We want ILl tine! some way to disti ng uish fair from unfair 
differences in wealth generated by differences in occupati on.""). 
11 2 See id. at 9 1 (' "Talents are nuttured and developed. not d iscovered full -b lown. and people choose 
wh ich takn ts to deve lop in response to their be li efs about what so t1 of person it is best to be ... ). 
113 Se~ inji·a pp. 48-50 (discussion of hypothet ical insmance paradigm). 
Il-l See. e.g., Cohen. supra note 51, at 928-29 (noting that beh ind etlo tt-bascd attribu tes are unchosen 
preferences ); see also R AKOWSKI , supra note 39. at 11 0 ( .. It is impo n ant ... not to o vers ta te the cxtl' nt to 
which fortitude. concentrat ion, pe rseveran ce, and whatever other auributes compri se the more amorphous 
quality of effort are charac teristi cs within a person\ control. The abilities with which people are born . 
frequentl y affect ... th eir consequent desire- and over time their capac ity-to strive and succeed ... ). For a 
genera l critique of Dwork.in "s approach. see Symposium 011 Ronald D11·or/.:in ·s Sorereig11 Vinue . I 13 ETHICS 5 
(2002 ). 
Et\!IORY LAW JOUR Ni\ L 
consistent with justice. let alone required by it.
11 5 
Dworkin 's discussion of 
:1ttributes that inform earning power suggests that "[ljaz ine s~ or an Jversion to 
a cenain type of work cannot furnish title to the rew<trds of another' s 
exert ions ... 11 " The consequences of the decision not to take a job (assuming 
one i:; ava ilable ) woul d seem to be as close to the core of opt ion luck as one 
cou id get. 
On the other hand. there are aspects of Dworkin' s l·r,une,vu rk for justi ce 
tl"lt creme t;-cJuhlc fm the pos ition that no forms of opt ion luck should be 
cancl icLttcs for cu llccri, .... , compensation. To clea! with un equal cndmvmt~nts 
like 11<tturc!l tal·.:nt :wd to sidestep the need definiti,·e ly tu cl<t.ss ify such 
an ri bu te:-.: ac; "bru tt._·.. ur ··uption.. luck, Dworkin ckve lop.-; :.1 h ypotheti Cd I 
in ::; ur<lnce scheme th:;t recognizes a social obligation to cornpensJte for 
cletic i e ncie ~ only to th e ex tent that idealized persons ignor,mt of their future 
pos it ion in soc iety would agree to insure against them. as~uming eve ryone had 
to p ~ty the cost of that insurance. As elaborated more full y below, the 
operation of that scheme potentially undermines his position. grounded in first 
principles, that holding people harmless for the costs of their voluntary 
choices- including the choice not to work-is inconsistent with a just regime. 
Indeed. Dworkin ' s express views on specific questions of welfare policy , 
although perhaps mandated by an absolutist position that holding people 
harmless for differential option luck is unjust because it vio lates principles of 
equ,llity '·over whole li ves.'' cannot easi ly be squared with his insurance-based 
analys is. An uncondit ional basic income-and the correspondi ng re laxa ti on of 
an y un ive rsal expectation of work for the able- bodied- may be more 
cons istent with Dworkin 's insurance framework. In genera l. the conclusions 
that emerge from hypothetical collective decision making do not necessarily 
respect a principled line between brute and option luck : as ever; Dworkin 
ac kn owledges. some form s of brute luck will not be in sured against. But 
Dworkin seems less willing to recognize that some forms of option luck 
(including , as suggested below, the results of some decisions to be idle) may be 
held harmless by ideal decisionmakers, at least in some circumstances. 
Conced ing that some personal characteristics that influence market success 
wou ld at least be candidates fo r equalization throu gh resource reallocation, 
Dworkin tries to get at what form s of redistribution would be just by imagining 
II ) Dworkin's suggestion thai compensati on for option luck violates principles of equality over lifet imes 
impli es that government warrants against option luck~including, arguably , a hasic income guarantee thai 
c!'kCiively cushions decisions to work k ss hard~are not merely permissive, but might he 1·ukd out as unjusr. 
! If• RAKOWSKI, SIIJ>m note 39. at lOS (d iscuss ing Dworkin's position). 
I 
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wh ich cond iti ons rari o1w l actors would insure themse lves ageti nst ex ante i!" 
they were cogni zant of the workings of markets. the general occupalion~tl 
stru ctu re, ~tnd their own talents, ambitions, ~tnd preferences, but were ig norant 
o!" the pos ition and economic fortune these woui cl yie ld in the re,tl -\vorlcl.
11 7 
He 
:; uggests that the test of whether justi ce rquircs or permits the group ttl 
t:ompeiisatc those who do poorl y in the market is '" heth•:r pe rson :: operctti:lg 
unde1· idc:Lil co ndition~; wou ld collecti\·ely choose to purch~i';e insurance aga ins t 
thche uutcomcs . A dec ision to insure \VO ul cl req uire eve ryone to p<ty 
'·premi tl!lls" . out o r the resources they generated through th i~i r m~trkd activity 
r·· ,., ... ,. ,. ·,h~· 1'l''·t of Clll11pCt1S' 'ti.I1 (T pe1·•on· · \" 11l" c· 111T, ,· th,, il .l " ' ".'' 'l. -'\'<"'' 1t 11 ·' 1 h .. • ~'- -' -'-1\ '-'1 tt \.. ..._I , ) , ~ L~ ;::; ,.J •• • ) • \. .'·-' ~i t'-- ~ 1~ _, .. • Lt l•-'-- \.... ..... ! . ._ . I ,, ~J 
hyputh<: t! c<tl recog nize ~ that the bill fur hold ing pcupk klrmles..; lor ce rta in 
deficiencies or fo rms of bad luck must be jXtid by ew~ryone. includi iig the 
pcrS£.1!lS who potent iall y stand to benefit fro m th at commitment prior to their 
quali fy ing for compensat ion. Thus. what ac tors i!l the hypothet ica l would 
choose willultim:ltely be influenced by the prem iu ms they wou ld be willing to 
pay in li ght of their expected insurance c!iviclc ncl we ighted by the probability of 
the eli gible event.. Dworkin ultimately concludes th at, because the cost of a 
more ge nerous system of coverage and redistribution will outweigh the 
benefits for most people, the hypothetical clec isionmakers will elect to cover no 
more than the inability to earn up to a decent minimum amount and will 
impleme nt that decis ion through a progressive income tax scherne. 11'J 
The ins urance hypothetical in vites us to ask the part icul ar question at issue 
here: whether a just soc iety would require the ab le-bocli ecl to work as <1 
conditi on of rece iving pub lic aiel , or would provi de an unconditi ona l basic 
mcome. The test would be whether rational actors with ord inary prudence. 
ignorant of their earning power and future occupational prospec ts . would vote 
co llecti ve ly to cover themselves against the consequences of choos ing not to 
work fo r pay. At first glance, the answer seems obvious .. Our ordinary 
11 7 I)WOR Kh , Sllf >m note 51, at 94 ("\The hypotheti ca l dee i sionnta~er\ \.;null's the pmj eL'ted incume 
structure but is .. ra Ji c~tl l y uncertain what income leve l his cm n talents l\'O u!d permit him to occupy. "! . 
IlK Insurance could be: provided "against l'a iling to have an opport unity tu earn \\ ' h:~ t cve r k1·el of incumc .. 
wit hin the projected struc ture, the: po licyholder names .. in which case the insurance company wi ll pay the 
pul icyho lckr the Jillerenec between that coverage level and the income he does in !'act have an uppu rtunity tu 
ea rn." Althuugh "[pjremiums wi ll va ry with th e level u!' cove r~tge chosen .. .. the premiums must "be the same 
fur everyone at any part icul ar coverage level. "' Then the ques ti on hccomcs ··t h!ovv· much or such insura nce 
would the ... \pa rti ci pan ts]. on ave rage .. buy, at what spec ified level of income cc>v·e rage . and at what cos t·>·· 
II'! ld at 97-99 (s tressing tha t the " lower the income lev·d chosen as the covered ris~, ... the lllllrc likel y th at 
its bu rden can be fu lfi lled th rough the insurance scheme and tha t tlwsc earning abuv·e thai Jev·cJ v,·i[ J not he' 
c.\Cc'-' ivc ly penalized by pay ing hi gher premi ums fo r vv·hat they already !Ja,·e ). 
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understanding of insurance: is that it is available only aga inst conditions that 
represe nt risks ·'beyond one's control. " That would rul e out the possibility or 
vot ing to warrant people ag ~!inst an event-voluntary unemp loy ment- that 
isn't rea ll y a ·'r isk'' at a ll. but results from a deliberate dec ision that, by 
hypothes is. is wi thin each pc r:;on·s power to make or not Indeed. in hi s 
d isc uss ion of welfare po!icy D'.vorki n docs ask a var iati on on this question. and 
answers it as one mig ht c:\pect.
1
:u In addressi ng the iss ue of whic h labo r 
market ri sks \voul cl be in surr2ci z1.ga ins t vvithin his hypothet ical wor ld. Dwork in 
leaves open the possibility of insurance for some forms of inl'Oiu:zi,'lr\' 
unemp loy ment. He di smi ss::; •; \vith littk d isc ussion the possibi lir.y that hi ~; 
fra mev.<o rk would yi e ld ~t pledge to hold people harmless for dec iding not to 
work or not to work enoug h to ach ieve cl certain leve l of income . " 1 That 
position comports w ith D\vorkin's suggestion that option lu ck outcomes of 
del iberate cho ices should neve r be gro unds for soc ial co mpensation, w he reas 
brute luck warrants co mpe nsat io n to an ex tent determined by the opera tio n of 
I ' ' the insurance paradigm. --
In predicting hew hypothetical actors wo uld dec ide w hich circumstances 
g ive ri se to compensable claims against the group, however, Dworkin 
ultimately p laces pivotal reliance on the proj ected costliness of group 
compensation for particul ar shortfa lls. On this crite ri on, Dworkin concludes 
that there are some forms of "brute" bad luck-such as mild deficienci es in 
native talent- for w hi ch just socie ties would no t choose to compensate its 
citi zens. Dworkin suggests that shortcomings in native endow me nt that detrac t 
from earning power on the market should be compensab le onl y in e xtre me 
cases because more extensive coverage would almost certainl y be a bacl buy 
for everyone. Because med ioc re abi lity is quite co mmonplace, the chance of 
receiving co mpensation will be high, and the costs of paying compensation to 
those entitled to it would consume enormous resources.
123 
But that means that 
"the cos t of the premium will be extremely high as well ,"
124 
and will eat up a 
large portion of the earn ings of those better-endowed persons not in the 
120 See id. at 333 (ask ing ··what unemploy ment insurance people with a representative mi xture of the 
tastes anc.J ambitions most Americans have ... wou ld buy if they had the wealth that is average among us anc.J 
were act ing prudent ly") . 
12 1 See id. at 335-36 (s ta ting that ··any afforc.Jabk poli cy would stipul ate that the beneticiary . .. seek 
empl oyment .. . [and would I termin ate il' it is proved that he had been offered and dec lined a job"'). 
122 See Y.-\i\ P.-\RIJS. REAL FRE.EDO' I FOR ALL. supm note 6. at 65-72 (desc ri bing Dworkin's views). 
12 ' DWORKIN . . l'llpro note 5 l. at 06 (not ing that ve ry few will have maximum earning power and thus the 
funds necessary to make up the difference for everyone else will be extremely high). 
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position to collect.'" Because more generous coverage would entail, at most, a 
·'very large chance of a very small gain," '' (' rational actors \vould not choose to 
redistribute resources beyond what is necessary to provide a decent ·'tloor" or 
minimum level of support. 
Citing the moral hazard inherent in such an arrangement. Dworkin insists it 
follows inexorably from his analysis th~tt none of us would vote from the 
hypothetical ex ante position to guarante·~ everyone a decent share of resources 
regardless of willingness to work. But mor<1l hazard comes into the equation 
here as going to the cost of holding indivi duals h;trmless. Dworkin obviously 
relies on the prediction that , because perso ns could self-qu~dify for this form of 
compensation ond, arguably , opt out of P''ying positive premiums by Ltiling to 
generate any income whatsoever,
12
i the working population \voulcl have to 
devote too many resources to paying the premiums to bankroll the insured 
event. Workers would have to pay oppressive taxes and governments would 
slight other worthy projects so that able-bodied persons could choose to stop 
. I 'S 
workmg. -
To decide that voluntary unemployment v.:oulcl not be made an insurable 
event within Dworkin's paradigm requires us to conclude that persons would 
not commit themselves to paying the taxes necessary to make the system work 
if offered the option under hypothetical conditions of partial ignorance about 
their individual economic fate. We must conclude that rationally prudent 
persons would not vote for an unconditional basic income sufficient to support 
125 The relatively small number of people who fell above the (substantial) kvcl of earning power 
guaranteed by the insurance rule would have to work that much harder and longer just to keep up the premium 
payments (which would be collcctccl as taxes on earnings to fund compensatory payments to others who were 
not so talented). 
126 DwoRKIN. supra note 51. at 97. 
127 Presumably everyone would have to devote some portion of their original allotment of resources. or 
returns from investing !heir allotment. or some portion of their earnings. to paying these premiums. but mosl 
persons who elected to take advantage of the option to be unemployed would necessarily be unable to pay their 
share directly. Altematively. the requirement that everyone pay. by necessarily requiring that everyone work 
to raise the premiums, would seem to ncgalc tile very possibility of any voluntary unemployment 
compensation whatsoever. 
The problem with this conclusion is that it proves too much: The requirement that all persons actually 
pay the same premium on every type of insurance regardless of \\·hether they qualify for a payout or not would 
seem to rule out insurance against forms of brute luck (such as profound handicaps) that obviate work 
aliogether for the very persons who are the targeted beneficiaries. It would rule out insurance for involuntary 
unemployment as well. It is unlikely that Dworkin would agree with this result. But then there is no reason 
not to consider making insurance available for a lack of resources that is self-imposed. 
12S '"ce DWORKII'\, supm note 51. at IOL 335-40 !discussing !he ··morai hazard"' involved in 
unemployment insurance). 
Hv!ORY Lr\'vV JO ljRN.-\L [Vu l. ) 2 
dl rhos•: who elected to be idle or to work less hard than necessary to ach ieve 
bas ic self suffic iency . But if this conclusion is grounded in cost concerns. it is 
open to question. As ex plained earlier. the fi sca l and distributional 
conseqw.:nces of offeri ng a bas ic income th at makes it feasibl e to work less or 
not at ~ill i:.; ultimately an empirical question. What happens depends on how 
peop le \\ ill ac tuall y react if offered a minimum income guarantee . Thi s is a 
fun ct ion of continge nt facts Jbout human psychology, cultural norm s and 
values. the :;tate of the economy, and marke ts fur labor. ,'\ny prediction that 
this form uf insurance \\' ill not be chosen by hypothetical actors because. g ive n 
the pd r~tnicf e r:. ·.vithin which free markets uper<ttc. it will s1mply prove too 
cos tl y --~ t prL'diction upon which Dworkin must ultimatel y rely- is not 
grou nclcd in an y principled distinct ions betwee n option luck and brute luck, 
cho ice <Jncl chance. or endowments versus tastes. and indeed has nothing to do 
with those categories . Rather, it is ultimately based on projections abou t real-
world behavior under a system of allocation that , because it permits se lf-
qualification. generates moral hazard. As such. it is vulnerable to a 
demonstrat ion that the magnitude and costs of the moral hazard will not be as 
large as feared. And if they are not so large, then opting for in surance against 
the choice not to work or to work less might not be such a bad be t afte r all. 
This obse rvation points to a deeper tension in Dworkin' s analysis and 
highlights the potential di sconnect between the results yie lded by the 
hypot heti ca l insurance device and the egalitarian assumptions fro m which he 
seeks to deri ve just princi ples of resource di stribution. On the one hand. 
Dworkin seems to rul e insurance for option luck off limits ahead of time on the 
ground that tax ing everyone to pay for the poor outcomes of some people's 
voluntary choices is unfair and disturbs equa lity as between persons "over 
entire li ves .' ' On the other hand, in considering which social welfare policies 
just soc ieties should adopt, Dworkin does not reject insurance against willful 
unemployment (tantamount to a guaranteed income) out of hand as violating 
eq uality principles. Rather, he relies on the conclusio n th at this type of 
guarantee wi ll never be made on grounds of cost. But, as noted above, it is not 
clear what those costs will be. Although Dworkin resorts to the insurance 
paradigm as an alternative dev ice for sorting out borderline cases of brute and 
opti on luck and for identifying which brute luck outcomes just soc ieties should 
compensate . his analysis ends up begging the question of why equality 
princip les should stand in the way of insurance for all types of luck or even for 
th'~ de liberate expression of preferences. Dworkin never makes clear why the 
hypothetical insurance inquiry should not operate as a universal cri terion for 
soc ial responsibility-that is, why the consensus of impartial rational actors 
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should not be the sole and ultimate test of whether soc ial compensation sh,tll 
be due for contingenc ies of any kind. If hypothet ical decisicn1liukers 
co llectively decide to buy themse lves the freedom not to \VOrk when and if 
th ey choose-and are wi llin g and able to pay for the privilege-why alic)\v 
equ ality principles to stand in the way'> 
Dworkin's insurance dev ice wea kens hi s initial categorical pos ition th ~tt 
ft~ !l e d npt ion luck can neve r permit group compensatory action in the inte:·,_':;t:-: 
of JUSt ice because there are good reasons why hypothet ica l insurers m'' Y ,;k :~ t 
111 ex tcncl protection aga inst the consequences of at least so me kinds of ch:Jic: •:s . 
/\ !though Dw·orkin sugges ts that justice requires governmen ts to hold p•: r-;o:h 
harmless only for brute misfortunes for which no privctte insuranc:: is ct va ii ctb! e 
or can feasibly be obtained, in su rance in the real world is not confined to b r ut~ 
luck. Private insurance and government ass istance are availetble agai!lS l 
outcomes that reflect differential "option luck," including bad bus i11 <: ss 
dec isions (as vvith bankruptcy protection), destruction of property continge nt 
on calculated choices (as with insurance for property located in !loocl zones) 
and self-intlicted health ri sks and injuries (as with medical insurance). But if 
the latter eventualities can be covered through private markets or real-world 
political choices, why not by idealized collectives? As already noted, the link 
between human dec isions and their outcomes is highly variable. Since 
ordinary commercial insurance routinely covers choices that turn out badly. 
thi s suggests that insuring against more or less controll ab le ri sks is not always 
prohibitive or infeasible on grounds of cost. 
Thus, the explanation for why hypothetical insurers will not cover opti on 
luck-and would never cove r voluntary unemployment- cannot be th <l t :'uch 
insurance will necessarily prove cripplingly expensive . Although moral 
hazard can render some form s of insurance prohibitively costly, that is not 
always the case because moral hazard is not all or nothing, but is often a matter 
of degree . Just as instances of unalloyed brute luck are few and far betwee n, 
so ri sks of events over which beneficiaries have no control whatsoe ver are th e 
exception rather than the rule. And even when insureds have a high degree of 
control over the insurable event , the effects of mora l hazard may be se lf-
limiting. The fact that we could make some choices that woulcl impose large 
cos ts on others does not mean that we will make them because negati ve 
consequences that are not fully compensable restrai n us. People can choose 
whether to smoke or not. Yet many people will not smoke regardless of 
whether health insurance covers lung cancer becau se the benefits of health 
coverage do not make up for the unpleasantness of dying yo ung from a rapidly 
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fata l disease . As al ready noted, AFDC was hi storicall y ava ilable to anyo ne 
who tool\: the steps necessary to become a poor s ing le pare nt. Although the 
AFDC ro lls ::::rnv over the dec ades, the numbers never exceeded a small 
minority of f:1~n ili esJ '' ' Lil,::ew ise, a uni versal insurance fun d to cover the costs 
of pa id parent<li k;\ vt~ hardl y loo !,::s like " rea l" insurance because people can 
eas ily self-quality Cur bene rits by e lect ing to rcproc! uce ."
0 
Yet such a prog ram 
is unlike ly to raise <. he birth ra te because fac tors othe r than job benefits loon; 
f<tr lmger in the ck,:ision whether to have a ch il cl .
13
; 
In the same vein. the costs of covering vo!unt<try nonwo rk may be self-
limiting if mo;;t p,.::,; pk:·s rewards from working an~ large eno ugh and most 
people value those n:w:mls. As already noted, th at cou ld occur if most jobs in 
the economy offered compensation well above the subsistence leve l, and b::tsic 
income was set no htgher thiln that. In th ose ci rcumstances, the answer to the 
question whether the re will be too many free loaders and not eno ug h "suckers·' 
to keep the syste m arloat is '· pro babl y no t. " The s tate 's coerc ive power to tax, 
in combination w ith the rewards available o n the market, will lure (or bribe) 
large numbers of peop le in to the "suc ke r" role by making an offer they can't 
refuse: to transfer some of the ir earnings to others as the price of getting ahead. 
T hat deal may be galli ng, bu t it need not be ruinous. Whethe r a stable and 
reasonably prosperou s equilibrium will emerge depends on many contingent 
social fac ts. No defi ni tive answer can be gleaned from the hypothe tica l 
parad igm Dworkin has dev ised. 
1 2~ Sec di scussion Sllf'W p. 17 (sei Li ng out fac tors lim il ing .. self-qu ali fi ca ti on·· fo r AFDC) . 
!;O Sci!. e.g .. R ICIIARD .'\. EPST EIN. FOR BIDDEN GROUNDS: TilE CASE AGA INST E MPLOYME.'T 
OISC RI~IINATin'l L\WS .136-37 I I 992) (assert ing I ha t an ins urance scheme cove ring preg na ncy would not he 
sustain<1bk as it wo uld lead tu a ris e in costs in excess o f bcnd l ts). Rur see Samue l Issach<u·off & E lyse 
Rosenblum. Wo!!len IIIli! rhc \Vorkf'loce: Acconunodaring rhe Demands n.f PregnontT. 94 COL. L. REV. 2 154. 
22 14 ( 1994) !propos ing such a soc ia l insu rance sche me) . 
13 1 Coun tries with ge nerous paid parenta l leave po li c ies have among the lowest b inh rates in th e world. 
See. e.g .. U.S. Bureau of the Census. IDIJ Su111!narv Dcl!lograf'liic Dora/("· Del!lugrap!Jic !ndicorors: 2000 and 
2025 ( list ing Sweden · s birth rare ar 1.5 ch ildren per wo man , Netherlands s a t 1.6 , Germany·s at 1.4. and lta ly ·s 
a t 1.2). ur http://www.ce nsus .gov/ipc/ww w/ id bnew. html (last vis ited Oct. 30. 2002): U.S. Burea u of the 
Census. Report WP/!JS . World Popu lat ion Pro ti le: I 998 (U.S . Government Prin ti ng O ffi ce. WasiL D .C. 1999 ) 
(repo11ing that such European cou nt ries have a decl ini ng birth rate, far lowe r than less-deve loped coun tr ies and 
lower than even the rep lacement rate necessa ry to s ustai n popul ation levels ), at htt p://www.census.gov/ 
ipc/www/wp98.html (last visited Oc t. 30. 2002 ). Nevertheless , some European countries are instituting 
pare mal preference po lic ies in an ancmpt to offset the dec line in birth rates. See, e.g. Kajsa Sunds trom. Con 
Gnt·cm!nenis Influence Popu/orion Grmvr!J ?. OECD O BSERVER. Dec. 4. 200 I. at http://www.oecdobscrver 
org/news/f ull story.php/aid/563/Can_go vc rn m.:nts_ intluence_popu latio n_g row lh_ . html (last visited Oct. 30. 
2002) (disc uss ing Sweden ·s use o f ge nerous parental bcncilts and improved chil dca re to raise the birth ra te): 
U.S. Orllce of Personne l iv!anagcment. Report to Congress on Paid Parenta l Leave . No v. 21. 200 1. t il 
http ://ww\\.Opm.gov/oca/le:l\ e/ I-ITi'vi L/Pare nta iReport.ht m (last visited Oct. 30. 2002). 
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As noted, this suggestion that it might sometimes oe feasibie to warram 
collective ly against some choices and their consequences simply highli g hts the 
instability of the categories of brute and option luck and undermines the 
suggestion implicit in Dworkin's analysis that justice requires compensation 
for brute luck only (and then only to a limited extent). If justice consists of 
allocations that would be chosen ex ante by actors using the hypothetical 
insurance scheme. then compensation for some types of option luck may 
sometimes be what justice requires.
1
'' lncleecl. it is unclear why insurance 
choices macle in the hypothetical situation should not be the all-purpo~;e 
criterion for whether society should compensate people for bad outcomes of 
any kjncl. whether from hrute or option luck. Since most human decisions. 
whether prudent or reckless, involve g<tmbles, there seen1s to be no reason why 
hypothetical actors would categorically rule out protecting themselves against 
choices that go sour or carry costs. With its ultimate reliance on the bottom-
line criterion of rational actors' willingness to wager and pay, Dworkin's 
hypothetical decision-making scheme opens the door, at least potentially. to 
insurance against outcomes of all sorts of luck, option as well as brute.
1
" 
Dworkin's insurance device thus undermines the suggestion that failed option 
luck never permits collective compensation in the interests of justice. 
With respect to the choice between work requirements and guaranteed 
income, hypothetical insurers might choose to warrant society's members 
against the risk of having to work at dead-end, burdensome jobs-a risk that 
would turn out to be particularly onerous for the lazy and untalented. Even 
more boldly, the group might wish to secure to its members the possibility of 





IJ 2 See. e.g .. GOODIN. SUJ>m note 58, at 300 (arguing that failure to extend compensation in some cases 
where deliberately chosen courses of action lead to hac! outcomes .. would constitute a morally improper .. 
decision); Anderson, SliJiru note 29, at 309 (criticizing Dworkin·s option and brute luck distinction and 
hypothetical insurance scheme): Goodin. supru note 58. at 585 (making an expectations argument in which 
unlucky risk-takers may not deserve to suffer as much as they do): Shiffrin, SUJ>ro note 38, at 4 (concluding 
that ··measures of accommodation·· in which society absorbs some of the costs of others" free choices would 
help achieve and maintain a ··full, meaningful freedom'" and would foster tolerance of disparate lite choices). 
1.13 Indeed, one of Dworkin's reasons for adopting this device appears to be to relieve him of having to 
decide which form of luck talent clitlerences represent. See DWORKIN . . wpro note 51. at 77; discussion. supru 
text accompanying note 77. 
134 It can be argued that Dworkin constructs his hypothetical paradigm in a way that excludes the 
possibility of a collective choice to support the involuntarily unemployed through a basic income guarantee: he 
establishes that the hypothetical actors know their personal talents and pret'erences , but ;u·e unaware only of the 
market value of those characteristics. See id. at 94. It would violate the terms of his paradigm to permit 
decisionmakers to be ignorant of whether they arc leisure-loving or work-averse. But if everyone knew 
whether· he would personally prefer playing the beach bum to making a killing on Wall Street, everyone would 
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aga in, the objection that thi s \v ill bankrupt the system-that in surance agains t 
these options would not be a " good bet"-cannot form the basis for a 
ca tego ri cal opposition to thi s ru le of allocation nor to its ope rat io n within a just 
soc iety. We might rationally and imparti a ll y c hoose to guara ntee a bas ic 
income or give up on a perfect io ni st work ethic if that com mitme nt does not 
prove roo expe nsive o r req ui re us to sac ri fice too rn Jn y o the r m a terial goJ IS. 
The mo re afflu e nt a soc iety, the more iike ly th at these aspira ti o ns ca n be me r. "' 
It m ight be objec ted that perm itting col lective pro tect io n aga inst a n 
exagge rated love o f le isu re or aver:;ion tu wo rk proves ton mu c h: if society 
e lects to co mpensate fo r th e:-;c ··ex Jx nsivc tastes. " why not a ll oth<:rs'! If we 
hol d ha rmless for the des ire to be free of work. on what basis do we de ny 
resou rces to indulge the who le ra nge o r other des ires'! But the point of the 
insu rance hypothetic al is that it re li eves us of the need to come up w ith a 
princ ip led way to distinguish <tmo ng des ires and choices other rhan on the 
basis of how much money indulg ing rhose choices will cost, as tha t is assessed 
ahead of time under a range of poss ible cond itions. Dec is io nma ke rs must 
reac h a consensus that looks to the value of op ti ons to the gro up's members 
a nd the predicted burdens com pe nsation wi ll impose. T he choice-based 
sat isfac tion of preferences that are judged more va luable and prove less costly 
w ill be the ones the group will e lect to guarantee. Although this formulation 
ra ises awkward question s about how the judgments o f va lu e will be made, the 
po in t st ill holds th at the me re fac t of moral hazard is not an a priori bar to 
insu rance unless we s muggle in the no rm ati ve assum pti o n that bankrolling 
certa in cho ices reall y is inunorol o r unfa ir. But if our aim is to determine 
w he the r co llec ti ve support for the vo luntaril y idle is cons istent o r inconsis te nt 
w ith princ iples of justice, the conc lu s ion should no t be assumed . 
T hi s analysis sugges ts th at a hypotheti cal frame work th at attempts to 
determine what impartial ratio na l actors would in sure themselves against 
co llec ti ve ly yields no categori ca l answer to our qu es tio n whether suspending 
k now whether the insurance rule wou ld favo r h im over others. T hat knowledge would presumably negate the 
clement o r impart iality that is key to the va lidi ty o r the hypo thetica l dev ice , thus tainting any dec isio n 
regard ing basic income. But Dworkin 's cond ition th at we know o ur prefe re nces, incl ud ing our pre ferences 
regard ing work. j ust begs the q ues ti on of why \\' C should no! be ke pt in the dark about our actu al tas tes, 
regard less of whe ther we have some ro le in shaping o r indu lgi ng them. The questi on comes down, once aga in, 
to wh y we wo ul d on principle ru le out co llect ive compensatio n fo r choices that some people, g ive n the ir 
make up and preferences. might wish to make. 
t:l :i See LEV INE. SUf!rCI note I 8, at 3 1 (sugges tin g that whether j ustice req uires the o ffer of a guaranteed 
income may depend on level of affl uence); VAN PMW S, REAL FR EEDOM FOR ALL, supra no te 6, at 84 (pos iting 
that in some aftlue nt, healthy, d ive rse, aclvancecl ind ustri al societies of today , a susta in ab le basic income can 
be qui te substantial and even exceed what is cons idered necessary fo r the bare necess ities). 
I 
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work requirements and guaranteeing basic support fo r everyone constitutes 
objectionable free riding in the absence of some prior judgment about the 
intrinsic fairness of thi s arrangement. In D\vorkin 's case . that prior judgment 
depends on his broader generalizat ion that holding person s to the consequences 
of avoidable choices (includi ng the choice not to sup port onc:;eif by working at 
available jobs) iS ··eq uality prese rving -vv ithin a world that allo ws 
compensation for brute luc k differential s through an income wx scheme. In 
effec t, Dworkin's hypothetic<tl in surance constru ct ca nnot help but cycle back 
on <t set uf empirical as~u mpti o n~ thctt vary with circumst<litr>:-; and undermine 
the quest for principkd conc lusions. Unlcc;s \\ 'C <tssu :ne 'h'" the guaranteed 
inco rnc option is intrinsica lly unfair. the upshot depends only e n whether there 
would be too few work c' rs and too many idl e r ~, which doc~; not seem to be a 
matter of fairness at all but rather of vvh,tt happens whe n individuals act from 
self-interest under prevailing economic condit ions. The response is highl y 
contingent, which is not the form we hope a fundame ntal principle of 
a! locative justice will take. Arguabl y, then , the answer to the question posed in 
this Art icle for Dworkin- like the answer for Rawls-is ''it depends.' ' 
C. Von Parijs: Un eorned Assets and ''Real Freedo111for / \!1" 
Philippe Van Parijs has written extensively in defen se of a guaranteed basic 
income and in opposition to conditional forms of clistribution.
1
" ' Van Parijs 
begins by identifying "real freedom" as a fundamental good of liberal 
soc ieti es . Defined as ' ' the greatest possible opportuni ty to do whate ver [one J 
might want to do," 137 ''rea l freedom" is concern ed not onl y with ''the freedom 
to purchase or consume," but more broadly with "freedom to li ve as one might 
li ke to live."
1
" Borrowing contrac tarian clements from Dworkin and Rawl s, 
Van Parijs suggests that the most desirable society is one that not only secures 
basic rights and self-ownersh ip, but also that ·'leximins" real freedom- that is, 
that maximizes the minimum amount of real fre edom enjoyed by persons with 
the fewest advantages. The arrangement within a cap itali st system that will 
best accomplish thi s objecti ve-that is, that will give the least advantaged 
more real options than any others- is one that provides the highest sustainable 
basic income for alL 139 In sum, the imperati ve to maxirnize the minimum 
1-'6 S~e. e.g., VA!\ PA RIJS, REAL FREEDOI.-1 FOR ALL. .IIIJlm note 6; Philippe Van Parijs, Th e Second 
J'durriu ge of' JusTice ond Fj)icienC\', in ARC;U JNG FOR BASIC li'iCG:\ IE 2 !5. 227-3 -+ (Phi lippe Van P~u-ij s ed., 
1992). 
In V.'\N Pi\RIJS. RF.·\1. FR EED0\1 FOR ALL . . 111pm note 6. at 25. 
1.1 S M at 30. 
t.1~ !d. at 25 ("'A ba:; ic income secure' to those] with the leas t opponuniri e' _ [a set of[ opponunities 
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:.unou nt of .. real freedom·· mandates a basic income that allow ~; everyone the 
.: huice to make some degree of labor-kisure tradeoff. 
Van Parijs undertakes to defend basic income against the stanclarcl charge 
tk1t ~:!locating wealth regardless of work violates principles of reciprocity and 
lice1iscs the exploitation of productive persons by idlers. Recalling Dworkin's 
.. de :en island .. hypothetical, Van Parij s a:;sigw; to each person a pm-r~lLt :;hare 
uf [he initial set of undeveloped, external rnaterie1l resources used to generate 
\\Cctlth within a capitalist economy. ln addition. e(lCh person is entitled to a 
sh;Jn: of i n tr~tstructure and know-how generated by the colkctive e ffort:.; of 
g:::: n,:r<ttiuns , which are the necessary conditions or any present creati on uf 
v·;calt h thruugh personal effort or investrnent. Finally. \/ an Parijs \vid:-.?n s thr~ 
basis for redistribution even further by identifying jobs as a scarce resource 
'.vithin capitalist societies. Because there arc not enough desirable jobs to go 
ctrouncl. even persons with identical talents may enjoy different packages of 
"tctsks and benefits." Those lucky enough to snag the best jobs will earn 
undeserved "job rents." These can be legitim::Heiy taxed away and distributed 




Unconditional redistribution thus does not exploit those who engage in 
productive work because no worker can generate wealth without making use of 
resources that are earmarked for others. Working people are not entitled to 
keep the full product of their efforts , but rather owe compensation to those who 
cede their shares of collective resources . Granting everyone credit for 
.. unearned shares"-inclucling a po11ion of undeveloped natural resources , the 
collective products of previous generations· cooperative efforts , and wealth 
reflecting a pro-rata share of "job rents"-justifies the transfer of an amount 
sufficient to support basic subsistence and secure leximin real freedom. 
that are no "nailer than those enjoyed by the person with lea-;r opportunities under :my other feasible 
~trr:mgcmcnt.''). 
!-lil See. e.g .. Robert J. Van Dcr Veen. Reo/ Freedom Versus !lecirrocirY: Compering \liel\s on rhe .!usrice 
oi Uncondirionu/ Bmic /nco111e. 46 PoL. Snm. 140. 152 ( 1998) (explaining Van Parijs·s position that .. ltlhc 
opportunity to earn and to enjoy non-pecuniary benellts. by holding a job. now becomes a scarce and 
unequally distributed cxtcmal asset .. ). ..Thus, in the real world. equal talent is consistent with an unequal 
d istribution of job assets, hence with a distribution of employment at different wages and different durations. 
in which some have highly agreeable and remunerative work to do:· while others have .. part-time_ badly paid. 
and disagreeable jobs ... !d. See also Scheftler. SIIJJra note 48. at 984-86 (expounding on the '·holistic" idea of 
building on antecedent collective resources); Michael Howard. Liberal and Marxist Justifications for Basic 
lncomc 14 (paper presented to the First Congress of the U.S. Basic lncorne Guarantee Network. CUNY 
Gradu:1te Center. New York) (March 8-9, 2002) (on tile with author) ("1l1e key point is that . although some 
wealth and income is due to bbor. some results from the appropriation of external assets which. from the 
st:tndpoint clfjustiee. are common, and thus those who appropriate une::rnecl wealth owe compensation to those 
who cion·t. which compensation can take the form of unconditional basic income ... ). 
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Like Dworkin, Van Parijs embraces the concept of ··tuck in variance ." 
wh ich holds that indivicluai ou tcomes should be insensit ive to aspects of talent 
that individua ls cannot control, but sensiti ve to amb itions that persons may 
choose to harbor, cu ltivate. and pursue. He accepts that persons are 
res ponsible for-because they can shape and control-their tastes and 
pre ferences, and he di savows an y soc ial duty to com pensate fo r inequalities 
resul ti ng fro m differences in as pi rati ons and occupat ional cho ices . ,L\ 1 th ough 
he accepts th at tal ents and other innate endowments arc umkservecL he 





Thi s limited ob ligat ion to make up for b<td lw:k in 
endow ments is key to Van Par ij s's project. since minimi zin g the duty to hold 
peop le harmless for ineq uali ties in fixed attributes such as talents fre es up 
reso urces fo r a per capita basic income that achieves iex imin ·'real fre edom for 
all., . 
Severa l aspects of Van Parijs's defense of guaranteed tncome are 
problematic. First Van Parij s's program for expand ing "real freedom for all" is 
selective and inconsistent in the way it deals wi th different tastes, preferences . 
and aspirations-especially those that influence success on the job market and 
determine choices for consumption , work, and le isure. This inconsistency is 
revealed in Van Parij s' s disc uss ion of ''Lazy" and ''Crazy.'' whom he describes 
as " iden tically talented but rather differently disposed characters." 1.Jc As Van 
Parij s explains. "Crazy is keen to earn a high income and works a lot for that 
I-l l Borrowing fro m an idea tirst elaborated by Bruce Ackerman. Van Par ijs endorses "a cri ter ion of 
j usti ce in matters of internal endowments" tha t relics on people's freedom to choose among conceptions o r the 
good life and thus w assign certain all ri butes more or less va lue. r\ ccord ing ro hi s test of --undominatecl 
diversity, .. on ly if no one wou ld prefer a particular bundle of allributes to any available al tcm ativ•c is 
co mpensation clue. since then those attr ibutes could not be said to fulfi ll any r e ~rso n abk cunccption of the good 
life. In sum. if no one would choose a pa rti cular se t of traits , those Jrai ts arc sa id to be "dominated" in all 
respec ts. And, as Van Parijs exp lains, such dominance is rare: "[ A I bli nd and deaf sp~ i S iic mav still have ni ce r 
hair than some or be better than others at arithmctic. which wou ld be J ee med sufficient to mai;e for a more 
fav ourable enclo\\'ment by at leas t one person. given her concept ion of the good life... V .. \~ P .-\RIJS. RE .\1_ 
FREEDO\t FOR A LL. supra note 6. at 73. In sum. if so meone has an endowment that anyone else \\·ould envy. 
that person is not entitled to be held harm kss for the ir misfortunes in any other respec t. 
The logic behind choosing th is strict criteri on of "dominance .. is that. s ince each person is in some sense 
" responsible" for hi s or her conception of the good life, the poss ibi li ly thai someone (person A) cou ld prefe r 'rn 
attri bute possessed by another (person B) (ancl. by ex tension . that person B could have chosen to va lue it as 
much as ;\. even if he in fact does not), neg ates any claim B might have to compensat ion for that characlcri sli c. 
A de licit is not a misfortunate worthy of co mpensation unl ess everyon e regards it as such: the fact that sc,me 
do not shows that its status as a misfortu ne is a subjective matter of taste. Thus. even if so me Ira its arc pari of 
the endowment that is given to us, ou r judgment of the des irab ility ol· ou r endowments is. in an important 
se nse. "optional " and thu s not compe nsable. 
l-Ie !d. 
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pu rpose . Lazv IS far k ss exc ited by the prospect of a hi gh income anc! has 
decided to take it easy ... 
14
' In suggesti ng th at a guaranteed income ex pands 
'·real freedom·· (or potential opt ions) for both Crazy an c! Lazy-and thus is 
even-hanclec! in th is respect- Van Parij s nonethe less dismi sses Cra7y" s 
complaint th~H thi s ex pan sion comes at hi s expense by noting th at Crazy should 
be "he ld re:;punsihk: fm [h isj tastes''
14
" These tastes include the desire to work 
harder and earn more. However. Van Parij s readil y acknowl edges that the 
same "expcn~i\c t~tste .. argument is available against Lazy' s objection to a 
world without ha ~ i c incomc. 1 10 Or. as Brian Barry exp lai ns: 
If we c:.:n :e ll peop le with expen sive t~t stes that they might have had 
chea p lct\ tcs . ami we regard that as a suffici ent reason for dcny i1lg 
them ~1ddi ti cln ~tl !\:sources, why ca nn ot we tell Lazies tha t they mi ght 
have been Cr·az ics. and th at that is a sufficient reason fo r not c u·i ng 
whether or not they can satis fy their taste for leisure'' Wh y ca nn ot 
l 
, . . . .
1 
IJ I, 
we say t 1at rctS urc rs an cxpens rve tas te'. 
By defining real freedom as preserving the option of doing whatever one 
might want to do (w hether or not one harbors the desire to do it) , and by 
defining the goal of a liberal society as providing the maximal amount of 
sustai nable "real freedom for all ,'' Van Parij s cushions the harshest 
consequences of preferring leis u~·e over hard work and consumption , thereby 
selecti vely suspencli ng res ponsibility fo r one kind of "expensive taste. ,: the 
taste for leisure. Although bas ic income appears to give both Lazies ancl 
Crazies an "identical'' option set, its practical effect is to protect Laz ies from 
the consequences of their preferences and to tax Craz ies for theirs. 
Because the goal of evenhandedness as between Lazies and Crazies is 
elusive or even imposs ible, a principle of neutrality towards different choice 
se ts or conceptions of t'Le good life cannot stand as a stable and independent 
justification for a program of uncondi tional benefits.
147 
But even if we accept 
that ex panding options (ra ther th an achi eving preference-dependant results) is 
desirable in vindicat ing neutrality towards ideas of the good, basic income 
does not necessarily advance that goal. It is far from clear that an 
1-l~ /d. 
l-1-l /d. at 93. 
145 See id. at 9-l 1··1La<:y! cannot usefull y po in t out that it is up to Crazy 10 adopt the same easy-going 
lifesty le ~to; h i ms~ l r ancl hence that he cannot claim to be trea ted unfai rl y at an y level o f the gran t. For under 
the assumption or equal ta len ts. Crazy can use exactly the same argument .. : ·(footnote l'm ittcd)). 
146 Barry. Sllf'ru note 10. at 263. 
14 7 For an cl: :horation of the argumen t that basic incomr; secures neutral ity towards conce pti ons of the 
good li fe. see Lt: V!:\ E. Sllf 'F<l :Hllc 18. at 18-20. 
• 
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unconditional income guarantee will in fact expand the potential choices for 
different ways of life available to all. Unconditional benefits that permi t more 
work-leisure tradeoffs could well curtail possibilities fo r realizing higher kvels 
of income by working harder-a cho ice that some persons might value.'"' ft 
might make available some opt ions (surviving by workin g !c .~s or not ai all). 
but onl y at the price of e limin ating others (getting much richer bv wurking 
h <mlc r). 
f-inally , however, the problem goes deeper than the in,tbili ty to justify b~lsic 
income as a neutral policy that i ~ equally hospitabl e to different wa:ys of liic. 
Rather, the key is the challenge of fending off the objection that basic incumr: 
vio lates reciprocitv or is exploitat ive because it ~ives somethinc: to people whu 
fai l to contribute t;) the social product. 1 ~~ Van P~rij s's cli sc u s sic~n rcvcai s tha t it 
is as difficult for basic income defe nders to refute the ex ploitation objection on 
the basis of commonly held assumptions as it is for bas ic income opponents to 
defend the objection. Critics of basic income cling to the intuition that. even 
denying workers' full entitlement to the value the market ass igns to their labor. 
nonworkers can make no c laim to support from society " in the absence of any 
return to society." 1"' On thi s view, the abstract assignment of passive credit for 
shares of preexisting resources fails to satisfy the bedrock obligation to 
contribute to the "economic benefits of social cooperation." Rather. this 
obligation can be satisfied on ly through some type of act ive part1c1pation. 
exe rtion. or exercise of human agency.
15 1 
Pro-rata shares of material resources 
plus "job rents" thus cannot substitute for affirmati ve contribution throu gh 
wo rk .''' Van Parij s himself worries endlessly over thi s objection ,1'' but neve r 
1·1' See. e.g., Barry. Slll>m note 10. at 264: 
[T[ axation required to pay for the basic income is virtually certain to forec lose other cornbinati olh 
of income and leisure obtainab le under a sys tem in which bene fits arc conditional on vvillingne" 
to work. Anybody who chooses to work a lot will almost certainly find that the net income 
derived from a given effort will be less [when basic income is proviclccl[. Thus some gain and 
some Jose, according to their relative tastes for income and lei sure. The implicati on is thc rcfn re 
that we cannot say that one situati on has more real freedom in it than the ot her. 
t-l'l See. e.g., Eugene V. Tori sky. Jr .. Von Purijs. Rmrls. and Unconditional Basic Income. 53 A0ii\ LY SIS 
289. 296 (1993 ) (desc ri bi ng a ··minimal cost o f me mbership in society"'); Va n Der Vccn. su1>m note 1-+0: 
Whi te. s1111ro note 27. at 3 I 7-20 (s tating the explo itation objection). 
150 Sa Tori sky, supra note 149, at 296. 
1
:\
1 White, su1HD note 27. at 3 IS. See ulso Va n Der Vecn, supra note I -+0. at I 55 1 discussing White). 
152 See. e.g. , White, supm note 27. at 320 (arguing that natural resource shares ancljob rents arc struclllrDI 
elements that "clo not originate fro m the efforts of social cooperation; they arc. so w speak. the pre-existing 
material on which social cooperators (o ;· non-cooperating hermits) go to work""): see olso Gijs Van Donselaar. 
The Benefits of Another"s Pains: Parasiti sm. Scarcity, Basic Income 170-74 1 1997) (unpublished thesi s. 
Universit y of Amsterdam) (on Iilc with author) (c harac terizing compensat ion ex trac ted for nthcrs" use o l· 
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definitively refutes it. Rather, he simply rejects its bas ic assumption-that 
reciprocity by definition demands a personal effort to create wealth and cannot 
be vindicated by passi vely ass1gnmg credit fo r va lued resources that " no one 
alive createcl. '·1'" 
Ulti mately. \fan Par ij s·s endorse n1ent of credit for scarce resource shares. 
like his opponents · r\~j e cr i on of th at idea. reli es on intuitive notions of fairnes s 
that resi st demon '.;tration through reasoned arguments from common starting 
points. The clifficu ities inheren t in bridg ing the gap between these positions is 
ev ident in cli scu s·; ions of the idea of reciprocity gcner<!ll y, in the confusion 
surrounding the concept of exploi ta ti on. and in the absence of any precise 
account of what rec iproc ity entail s for individual obl igation despite the 
repeated embrace Df thar abstract concept as a starting point for liberai social 
organization. On the one hand , the log ic of luck invariance, holi sm, and equal 
initial shares-which recognizes that labor does not "deserve" any particul ar 
quantity of the market returns it enjoys- is unassailable. On the other hand, 
deep-seated moral sentiments and a revulsion against freeloading are at odds 
wi th these insights and uneasily resist their implications. As the foll owing 
section explains, the tension between the conclusions derived from the rational 
analysis of markets and market-based desert on the one hand, and the generally 
hostile reactions of ord inary people to "something for nothing" on the other, is 
shar.::s in inert resources "' an .. ahusc: of ri ghts .. ). Bur see Karl Widerquist. Rcciprociry and rile Guamnrad 
!neon: e . 27 POL. & Suc·y 387 . 389 ( 1999) (questi oning whether critics of guaranteed income can square their 
pos ition with th e defense of c1 .. renti e1· class· and a :;ystcm that permits .. the owner of a significant amount of 
assets ... [to] dc ri,·c a pcnnan.:nt inco me from it without expend ing any persona l effort .. ). 
The argument that rejec ting gu aranteed income is inconsistent with letting persons live off accumulated 
assets is easily refuted in the case of non-inherited wealth: whatever else its value. leisure is also a 
consumption good. and a person might choose to work , invest. and save m one point in his li fe so as to 
purchase le isure for another. Liv ing o ff inherited wea lth may be more problemati c. Ho wever, societies might 
!>till choose to respect the consumption choices of persons who des ire to make a gift of eamed wealth-and 
uninten"Lipted leisure---to their chilclrcn. even though that dec ision will be in tension with recognizing 
everyone 's (including the heir" >) obligati on to contribu te actively to the soc ial product. TI1at tension finds 
.: ;.; press ion in ambivalent fee lings towards the id le rich, who are often condemned as '"parasites ... For a 
di scussion ol· attitudes towards the idle poor and idle rich, see, e.g .. Wax, Rethinking Wef/(Lre Rights , supm 
note J , at 2S I n. 75 . 
153 See Van Parijs. Sll f iW note 36: Philippe Van Parij s, Reciproc iry and rile Jusrijicarion of 011 
Unmndiriona/ Basic fncomc!-Reph ·ro Sruarr \Vliire , 45 POL. STUD. 327 (1997): see also VAN PARIJS, REAL 
FREEDOM FOR All ., Sl!Ji ro note 6. at I 02- 13 (discuss ing pro-rata shares of materia l resources and "'job rents"" ). 
1 5 ~ Karl Widcrquist. Who Exploi ts Who'' 3 (paper presented at CUNY Basic Income Conference) (M arch 
S-9 . 2002) (on fik with author). For rece nt wide-ranging criticJI commentary on Van PJrijs's arguments, see 
ANDR EW REEVE & J\1"\D REW WtLLIA~ I S . REAL Li B ERTc\R I A!"\ I S~·I ASS ESSED: POLITICAL T HEORY AFTER V,\N 
P-\RIJS (2003). 
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not surprising . Po li tical theory and politica l psycho logy eme rge from very 
diffe rent proce:;s::::;, which can be expected to g ive di vr2rgent results. 
'v' . SOCL\L CONTRACT VS . EVOLUTION: T HE Lii:) f'A RlTY OF T HEORY 
AND P RACT!Ct: 
Attempts to clerive from sorne van atiOn on (h e li h•.:i·al co ntract<l ri an 
per:"pccti vc a dchniti\.re ans\ver to the questinn \v h ~:: i_ h e r prov idi _ng public 
:-~U{Ypo rt "vi th no :;irings attached or i 111pos i ng \\- ~_;r k r ~ q u i:·~: nh~nts for aid is 
eithe.r con>~i:-;te~·It • .. vi th or required by basic principles uf justice y i ~ ld equivocal 
re~;u lts. Althc :;gh rhe work of liberal theori sts oft .crs vcdu:1ble insights into this 
question. a defin itive answer re mains e lu sive. T he conc!u:;ion that tran s ferring 
eam ings hom wo rkers to ab le-bodied nomvorkec~ ; i ~; '' unfair," '·unjust, ' ' or 
exploitative i:: difficu lt to derive from the build ing blocks for just liberal 
soc iet ies. Specific1 lly, liberal egalitarians start from a base line of assignment 
of equal ini tial resource shares , skepticism about dr.;sert, a commitment to luck 
in variance that entails the o bligation to hold persons harmless for unearned 
misfonu ne, and an ambi vale nce about the status of personal antecedents and 
attribute:; (including deficient upbringing, lack of tal ent , and e ven un productive 
tempc:rament) th at does not c learly yield a bedrock ob ligatio n to work for a 
li v ing. Rather, the theoretical commitments of egal itarian theo ri sts like 
Dworkin , Rawls, and Anderson would appear to permit, or even require, 
unconditional support for all. On the other hand, those vvriters ul timately 
endorse a pe rfectionist work ethic that reflects the c;ame psycho logy of fa irness 
do minant in the po li tical arena. After criti c izing in hi s well-know n A The01y 
of Jusrice a premarket notion of desert and defi nin g there a class of the 
disadvantaged that takes no overt account o f personal responsibility or 
antecedents of distress, Rawls e lsewhere attempts to ru le out an unconditional 
income for the leust advantaged-or for anyone- - by adding le isure, albeit 
prov isionall y, to the list of primary goods. Ronald Dwork in defends a robust 
d ist inction between unavoidable bad luck (whi ch is at leas t potent ially 
compe nsable) and choices for which we are respons ible (w hich are not), w ith 
the later appearing to cover the dec ision whether or not to work at available 
jobs . But the inhe rent instabi lity of these categories leads him to fall back on a 
hypothetica l in surance mechanism for identifying the consequences against 
which rational actors would coilective ly hole! themselves harmless . Yet that 
device does not by its own terms always rule out insurance against the 
outcomes of adverse choices, including the choice not to work at all. E li zabeth 
A nderson rejec ts the luck egalitarian framework in fa vor of a society 
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committed to providing for basic needs and securing basic dignity for al l. 
Although she embraces an ethi c of care and disparages th e market a~ an 
exc lusive measure of producti vi ty and worth, she staunchly enclors(:s the 
pos ition th at co ll ec ti ve ass istance mu st remain conditional on each pe:·:;on 
making so me (undefined) contribu tion to the soc ial product. For these \vriters. 
as well as for basic income aclvoc ttes such as Phi lippe Van Parij s. argumenh 
in fa vor of placing condition s on th e red istributi on of resources tend to 
smuggle in unclerivcd. fo undmi onal, morali stic assumptions that rest 011 th<..'ir 
own intrin sic appea l. lf these com mitments are indeed sui generis. tio..::y mu :'t 
e ither command our asse nt or fail. 
The tensio n between theory and political psychology finc.ls specific 
ex pression in uncertain ties surrounding the characteri stics possessed by 
idea li zed decisionmakers who determine the rul es of our fut ure ex istence. 
Dworkin 's hypothetica l insurers, for example, are bloodless c rearur,~s who 
harbor no resentment towards free riders, layabouts, or feckl ess Malibu sur fe rs 
seek ing to share resources with hard workers. Dwork in 's pru dent 
dec isionmakers are not endowed with reactive attitudes or moral sentiments , 
and they have no permiss ion to indulge their notions of dese rt by giving free 
reign to high dudgeon or righteous indignation towards slacke rs. Good 
evidence exists that fealty to elemental norms of cooperati on, and the 
spontaneous tendency to punish and reward those who honor or defy them. are 
a commonplace of human psyc hology .
155 
Yet those impulses are banished 
from the scene. These omissions should not surprise us. Contractari an 
theorists do not seek to discover principles of justice that simply re iterate 
ordinary attitudes and impulses, but rather to identify the mora l and pol itical 
views that can be justified by building ideas of justice from the ground up. 
Since the entire exercise proceeds from the ass umption that "a po litical theory 
need not or should not track the familiar structure of our persona l morality and 
ethics," 15" there is no guarantee that what most people believe about justi ce will 
correspond to the rules adopted in hypothetical ci rcumstances . Rather, the 
point of the analysis would appear to be to distance ourselves from pre va iling 
opinions ancl to sit in judgment upon them by testing their validity agai!!st a 
structure that rests on a few (selt·-ev ident) elements . Because an analysis that 
" incorporate[s] common opinion" cannot be expected to "expos[e] the 
155 See e.g .. Fch r & Gachter. Alimistic Punislunenr in Humans. S llfJW note 8. at 139 (contend ing that 
negati ve emotions propel puni shment of free riders); Sigmund et a!., supra note 8. at 87 (expl aini ng the 
success of altrui st ic behav ior over se lfish behavior in group experiments as a function of Darwin ian thcnry). 
156 0\\'0RK I'i . Sllf'W note 5 I , at 297 (d iscussing G.A. Cohen's views). 
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inadequacies of common opinion,"
157 
the temptation is to leave basic intuitions 
and emotions-including emotional responses that inform the very notions of 
rairness we wish to scrutinil.e-out of the equation altogether. 
Yet how strong a claim to validity do resulting principles of justice possess 
if they fly in the f<tc1.' or precepts and norms-such as the norm against the type 
of free riding that <tppropriates the effortful contributions of others-that are 
widclv shared across eras and cultures and so intuitivelv seductive that thev 
0 0 0 
confound the logic of sophisticated thinkers? As Rawls himself has recognized 
in expounding on hi'; notion of "reflective equilibrium." rules for the operation 
of just ,;ocieties cannut stand in complete isolation or OtJposition to "certain 
fu ndamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a 
democratic society .. '
1 
Rawls's paradigm of the original position charges 
future citizens ·with the task of outlining a fundamental framework for society's 
governance behind a veil of ignorance. He suggests that if the principles that 
emerge from behind the veil run contrary to "reactive attitudes" or intuitive 
convictions that "we take provisionally as fixed points." then we should not 
accept those principles uncritically.
15
'J Rather we should engage in the 
follmving deliberative process: 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the 
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and 
conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find 
a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable 
conditions and yields principles which match our considered 




The potential dissonance between Rawls's seemingly inclusive and 
nonjuclgmental definition of the least advantaged entitled to solicitude under 
the difference principle, and a strong, intuitive norm against collective support 
of the "undeserving poor," poses the type of dilemma to which the doctrine of 
reflective equilibrium would appear designed to respond. But how would 
Rawls decide to reconcile this tension? Does the process of reflective 
deliberation that Rawls describes point to a definitive answer to the question 
here clescribecl'7 Or is the answer that there is no one answer-that 
i)/ tv11LLLR. Sl!j)rO note 33. at 52. 
RAWLS. Slif!W note 93. at 13. Sec ul.1o KYrviLIC:KA. supra note 67. at 66-67 (noting Rawls's view that 
the principles of justice derived from the original position should be scrutinized to sec if they "match our 
c·onsidcrccl convictions l'fiuslicc or extend them in an acceptable way"" quoting RAWLS, supm 45. at 19). 
lsY R ,I\ILS . . IIIJJro 45. at 20. 
](,() /d. 
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fundamenta l justice can be squared w ith offering ' 'something fo r nothi ng" or 
with less generous aiTangements ') 
An a lternati ve that sidesteps the thorny difficulties of apply ing the concept 
of re fl ect ive eq uilibriu m looks to Rawls's framework for the ori ginal posit io n. 
and asks what ki nds of attitudes the hypothetica l denizen s of that rea lm are 
pern, it ted to possess . It is genera lly accepted that our j uclgments from behind 
the veil should be ·' impartia\''- tha t is. th ey should be un affec ted by our 
' . ' ' j c ' j 11>1 T ' . t- . parocnu ; ano se 1 1sn persona conc ,~m ~; . , ne requireme nts o Ig norance 
J bout ind i\' iclual circurns tan ccs and of co nsensus among all partic ipants u r~~ 
de ~'ig rc ecl to :;afeguard th is imparti a li ty ~mel pro t<::ct deliberations from the tai nt 
of narrow self- inte rest. But that stil l leaves the question of wh ich elements of 
hu man psychology shoul d be allowed to operate consistent with that constrai nt. 
Speci fi ca ily, whic h common hum an emotions and attitudes are creatures 
behind the ve il of ig norance ailowed to possess'?
162 
On the o ne hand, if we 
want to sit in judgment on popuiar views of justice for the purpose of 
constructing our ideal o f justi ce . we might be well-advised to factor out 
une laborated norms and moralis tic sentiments and indeed to banish emotiona l 
responses e ntirely. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Raw ls' s 
"refiective equilibrium" would recommend purging all intuitions, react ions , 
and fee lings about fa irness , if on ly because it is hard to see how a soc iety 
arrayed against all such responses could stand . But even if we want our f inal 
vision of the just soc iety to refl ec t sympathies and understandings th at are 
deepl y fe lt and w ide ly shared, how clo we dec ide which reactio ns should be 
indul ged? Specificall y, should hypothetical rm ional actors be permitted to 
harbo r and act upon the k inds of " morali stic sentiments" and " reactive 
atti tudes'' that express an abhorrence of free riding? 
O ne way to approach the question might be to observe tha t judgments 
about the fairness of "something for nothing" take the fo rm of ge neral, 
uni versali zed standards fo r conduct--standards that, at least as stated , apply 
across the board and demand adhe rence from all. If such attitudes transcend 
immediate self-in terest and express categorical, exceptionless v iews of 
161 Sa MILLER, supra note 33 . at 57 (observing !ha t R"wb 's adherence Io a form o f con lract" rian 
reasoni ng requires qualit ies such as impart ial it y so th :ll no unreasonable burdens will be created ): BaiTy. supro 
note 10. at 262 (d iscussing imp"11iali ty as an ideal ofjus ti ce). 
162 CJ [\'IiLLE R. S!lf'rrl note 33 , at 55 (sugges ting that the "beli efs about justi ce .. . th:1t deserve tu be 
inciudc' cl as ·cons idered judgments ... are those un affected by ··our emoti ons or by our personal interests" ). The 
suggesti on here in , holl-cvc r. is that not al l emotions vindica te personal interes ts alone, and thus so me might be 
a va lid basis for just rules. 
I 
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acceptable behavior, that \voulc! appear to satisfy the test of impartiali ty rhat is 
essential to the integrity of the dec ision-making process behind the veil or in a 
hypothetical situation.
1
"' f-\ lte rnatively, a key factor might be whether \Ve can 
show that the reactions at issue are innate e lements of hum an psychology or 
common th reads in diverse cu ltures-that we bri ng them with us as human 
beings rather than as contin::~e nt or malleable products of particuh:r soc ial 
• J(,_J 
settmgs. 
T hese queries tie into a iong:s tanding debate about w hether our morcd lives 
are best organi zed aro lln d norms derived from abs tract reaso ning \·i\L iwut 
guidance from natu ra l en~otions , or whether moral sentiments :u be 
primary .1r,, That debate is di rectly pertinent to how we go about judging the 
fai rness of wcwk expectations with in contractarian frameworks . As already 
noted, there is evidence that basic ideas about desert are deeply entrenched and 
widely shared elements of human psychology and cu lture. The question of 
who deserves p ubl ic assistance ou t of pooled collective resources, if framed 
with sufficient general ity, e lic its a remarkable consens us . Not many take issue 
w ith the proposition that individuals should strive towards se lf support if 
possible and should be g iven he lp only if unable to sustain themselves despite 
reasonable efforts.
1
"" A lth ough there is disagree ment about what efforts are 
reasonable, those who see k or receive group help in violation of the agreed-
upon conditions almost a iways r isk coll ect ive d isapproval as free ri ders . 
How these bas ic paradigms fo r determining desert and e ntitleme nt ought to 
f ig ure in any contractarian analys is will in part depend on our v iews of the 
origins of the consensus and on where these attitudes come from . S uppose, for 
example, that we credit an evo lut ionary account, w hich suggests that h um an 
163 See, e.g .. GtLENS. supra no te 33 : MILLER. suJml note 33: Barry . supra note 10 (emph as izing 
imparti ality). 
1r'4 See Wax, !?crhinkin g We/jim· Rig/us, supm note 3, at 266-6tl (rev iewing support for the view that 
sornc momli sti c atti tudes might have C\'o lved ~• s innate i'eatures o f our psychology or as common eicm•: nts in 
convergent cult ural evo lut ion): see also RUUI N. supra note 8 (arguing for evol utionary origi ns of ;m, r~:l i s t ic 
human sent iments); ELLIOT SOBER & D AVID SLOAN W ILSON, U NTO OTHERS 150-5 I ( I Y98) (suggesting that 
abhorrence o f free riding may be a key fea ture o f successful culwres and soc ial groups). 
165 Compare D AV ID 1-i Uo-IE. A TREATISE OF 1-i Uo-IAN NATURE 5 I 7 (L.A. Selby-Bigge eel .. I 978) (theori zing 
that any concept of abstract reason actuGI!y stems from preceding "passions" such that '·[alii morality depends 
upon ou r sentiments"). ll'ith IMMANUEL K i\NT, TilE METAPHYSICS OF M ORALS 376 (iVl ary Grc_c! or trans .. 199 \) 
("[ Nio moral principle is baset.! .. on anyjeding \\hatsoever .. .' ') . 
166 Sec, e.g., Gil.ENS. supra note 33 , at 62-64; fi'IILLER, supm note 33, at I 76; Bowles & Clinti s, Sll f >UI tlllte 
34: Galston, SIIJ!ra note 25: Wax. Rethinking We/ji1re Ri;;hts. supm note 3, at 270-73 ; Stuart White. Sociu! 
l?ights anti the Sociol Conrrocr- l'oliticul TheorY anti rile New We!firre Polirics. 30 BRtT J. PoL. Set. 51.!7 . 50S 
(2000). 
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societies that minimized shirking enjoyed greater stab ility and reproductive 
and material success. Social disapproval of freeloading , and the tendency to 
disdain and punish those who violated cooperati ve norms, helped enforce 
behaviors that may have conferred an adaptive advcmtage.
167 
By showing wh y 
it might ha ve been advantageous fo r g roups tu suppress freeloading behav iors. 
thi s story shows how the tendency to reac t nega li\·e !y to variou s forms of free 
riding may have become firml y rooted in human c ulture and psychology. 
If these habits of thinkin g are indeed widespread and robust features of 
o rgan ized human societies, this may help e \p L\in why ordin<try notions of 
' 'desc rvingncss' ' that fuel demands for "wor~ fur welhtre'' may be hard to 
reason with. Jt is difficult to arg ue persons uut o t· the position that work 
requirements are "only fair" eve n vv hen they accept basic propositions and 
ins ig hts that point in a different direc tion. The arguments that a ll productio n 
builds on unearned antecedents, that everyone benefits from unrec iprocatecl 
gifts, that components of productive valu e cannot be re lated in any coherent 
way to market rewards, and that paid labor is not the onl y form of contribution , 
often fail to make headway against allegiance to the morol duty to be self-
sufficient if possible, and against moml condemnation of unnecessary 
dependency on others. 
The evolutionary account can potentially shed light on why our intmt10ns 
about free riding, exploitation, and deservingness appear fundamental and 
res ist derivation from the assumptio ns that I iberal theori sts take as their starting 
points. If we cannot get there from here , perhaps it is because contractarian 
hypotheticals fail to capture the co ndition s that gave ri se to the basic s tructure 
of our moral sent iments. Evolutionary forces operate through the repetition of 
dynamic processes that pi t individuals or groups w ith disparate behavioral 
strategies against one another in round after round of competition. These 
forces, which play themselves out over time and often yield counterintuitive 
results, are best captured by dynamic, iterative mocle ls.
16
s The logic of 
167 For such an evol utionary accoun t. see Bowles & Gintis . supra note 35: Wax. A Reciprocal We/j(u·e 
Program, supra note 3, at 478-79; Wax Rerhinking \Ve/f(tre Rigllfs . SUfJW note 3, at 266-68: see a/sa SOBER & 
WILSON, supra note 164; DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARWIN'S CATHEDRAL 156 (2002) (suggest ing that religion 
developed universally to curb free-riding). 
16R See Wax, Rerhinking Welfare Righr.1·, .\'1/pm note .3. at 263-7-l (detailing Sugden' s multi-round, mutu al 
insurance game and applying its princip les to grour members who have access to labo r markets); see ulso 
RU BIN, sut>m note 8, at 11-13 (discussing dynamic game theoreti c models of evo lutionary development): 
ROBERT SUGDEN. THE ECONOM ICS OF RIGHTS. CO-OPER,\TION, r\ ND WELFA RE 8-9 ( 1986) (describing 
repetitive games to illustrate the evolutionary crea tion of "spontaneous order"). For a comprehensive review 
I 
:zoo:1 1 SO,v!I:TH! NG FO R NOTHING 
evo lutionary development is fundamentally at oclcl s with the static , one-shot 
thought experiments th at liberal theorists favor. The method of choice fo r 
mimicking evolutionary forces is game theory, not a single, iclealized, analytic 
exerci se conducted by rati onal ac tors placed behind a ve il of ignorance or in an 
origiml or hypotheti ca l pos ition or on a pri stine desert island. There is no 
reason to be li eve th at the logic ofju stice that emerges from the human rnind ·s 
evo lution ove r time and under intense competiti ve pressure would coincide 
with th e basic principles that issue from contrac tari an constructs. 
11
"' Thi s is 
espec iall y so becctuse the psyc hology that informs our noti ons of justi ce was 
forge d under conditi ons tha t are ve ry different from those that prevail today . 
Our sentiments evol ved tu hold together voluntary cooperative structures of 
mu tual support under condi tions of great ri sk and scarcity. Small-scale 
cooperative form s of soc ial orga ni zation domin ated human societies for eons. 
long before strong centra li zed governments and large political units came upon 
the scene . 
17
n Yet th e ex istence of such centrali zed governments is prec ise ly 
what theorists take for gr:mted in constructing the ideal scenarios from which 
they deri ve modern liberal theori es of justice . 
An account from evolved psychology suggests that any analytic framework 
that leaves certain rnoral sentiments completely aside may do violence to the 
bas ic intuitions that mos t people bring to moral judgments. On the other hand, 
the consensus on these issues is far from complete. Theori sts such as Robert 
Goodin and Philippe Van Parij s, who are pass ionate believers in basic income, 
deplore the applicati on of conve ntional notions of deservingness in the realm 
of public welfare. That these thinkers and other bas ic income advocates
171 
have 
managed to overcome any impulse to deplore free riding and unnecessary 
dependency su g: ges ts that these norms, however w idespreacl, are not 
ineluctable. They may be amenable to modification through the emergence of 
counter-norms and new cultural conventions or by the simple use of reason . 
of work on co tnputc·r si mu la tion' of hum an soc ial interac ti ons. see Jonathan Rauch, Seeing Aro und Comers. 
ATLANTIC l'vlONTIIL Y, Apr. 2002. iU http://www. thcatlantic.co tn/ issucs/2002/04/rauch.hun. 
169 For discussions o f the rc lali onship between moral and pol iti ca l theory and evolut ionary psychology. 
see RICHARD A LEX,\NDER. T i lE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTE,'v!S ( 1987); RUil iN, supra note 8 and sources cited 
therein . at 72-75; M ichae l Ruse, Mora/in· and Commitmellf, in EVOLUTION AND THE CAP.-\CITY FOR 
CO,'vli"vi!HIENT (Randolph M. Nesse cd., 2000); PETER SI NGER, A D ARWIN IAN L EFr: POLI"fiCS. EVOLUTION AND 
COOPERATIOF\ (2002 ). 
I /O See CHRISTOPHER BOEHl\!, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST: T HE EVOLlJTIOi\ OF EGALITARIAN BEHAV IOR 
(I 999) (describing organi zation of ancient hunter-gatherer groups); RUBIN. sup ra note 8, at 94-117 (descri bing 
small hunter-gatherer societi es and emergence of larger politi cal units over the course of human history) . 
17 1 For aclclitional work advocat ing bas ic income, see references in Wax, Rethinking Welj(u·e Rights . . wpm 
note 3, at 262 n. l 7. 
70 i Vol. 52 
Indeed. t'vVO insights offer hope in persuading political actors to tame or 
restrain the1r customary reactions. First, as noted above, there may be 
compelling practical or prudential justifications for abandoning work-
conditioned welfare programs in favor of a simple basic income guarantee. 
\Vithin affluent capitalist economies, basic income might advance important 
social objectives more effectively and at less cost than alternati ves that are 
more politically popular. fi' those factors are properly emphas ized . opposition 
might erode to some cxknt. Second, a deeper understanding on the pcu·t ot' 
voters of the origins of upposilion to basic income and of why Ihcrt opposition 
rnay b~ obsolete Inight ~-d _l rn~Lkc :;_;cine headviay against entrenchc \:1 ~Jtlitude s. 
Because the condition :~ that g~1.ve rise to reat·ti'-/r:_ attitudes again ~:;t fr::~eloade rs 1n 
the past have abated to some ex te nt, those attitucks may serve a less irnportant 
social function today. Unlike primitive nations , modern western societies do 
not face extreme scarcity and can tolerate some degree of shirking. Also, the 
rise of centralized governments with efficient and effective taxing power bas 
obviated the need to reiy on reciprocal norms to maintain group cooperation 
and effect redistribution for emergencies. The power to tax ancl spend 
effectively holds workers hostage to their desire to get ahead, superseding the 
need for coordination conventions in the informal context.
172 
In sum, the 
realization that strong norms against free riding are no longer necessary and 
may indeed be counterproductive, coupled with insights into the genesis of 
these attitudes, may help vvean many enlightened citizens away from hostility 
to "something for nothing. " That at least some individuals can be ~;wayecl by 
these understandings suggests that we should not give in too readily to the 
popular tendency to divide the poor into the deserving and undeserving. to 
classify some dependencies as free riding, and to react negatively to persons 
who violate norms of self-heip. 
It is possible, however, that reason never will succeed completely in 
overcoming the elemental aversions and objections that inform our political 
I ife. Despite its practical advantages, an arrangement that just "feels" unfair to 
many ordinary people may always meet resistance in the voting booth and fall 
short of commanding popular support. Even if abandoning work requirements 
as the centerpiece of social redistribution would work well in practice and 
make life better for some or all of the least advantaged, it does not follow that 
such a policy would be adopted or would gain voter support. Basic income 
may always have an uphill road in the political arena. 
172 For more on this point, sec Wax, Rerlrinl.:ing We!firrc Riglr/.1·. supra note~. at 288-97. 
